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This paper provides an overview, using extensive documentary material, of developments 
in U.K. macroeconomic policy in the last half-century.  Rather than focusing on well-
known recent changes in policy arrangements (such as the introduction of inflation 
targeting in 1992 or central bank independence in 1997), we instead take a longer 
perspective, which characterizes the favorable economic performance in the 1990s and 
2000s as the culmination of an overhaul of macroeconomic policy since the late 1970s.  
We stress that policymaking in recent decades has discarded various misconceptions 
about the macroeconomy and the monetary transmission mechanism that officials held in 
earlier periods.  The misconceptions included: an underestimation of the importance of 
monetary policy in demand management until 1970; a failure to distinguish real and 
nominal interest rates until the late 1960s; the deployment until the mid-1980s of 
ineffective monetary control devices that did not alter the monetary base; and the 
adherence by policymakers in the 1960s and 1970s to nonmonetary views of the inflation 
process.  We also consider developments in fiscal policy in light of changes in the 
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1.  Introduction 
 
With the end of 2004, the United Kingdom has had positive economic growth for 50 
consecutive quarters, a record unmatched in its half-century of quarterly GDP data.  
Figure 1, showing a 50-quarter moving average of U.K. growth since the mid-1960s, 
and Figure 2, showing corresponding moving standard deviations, illustrate this 
achievement. 
 
Over the same period, unemployment has declined, while inflation has been low and 
stable.  Indices of inflation performance depend on the precise price index used; in 
addition, they depend on how the price index is extended back in time and how 
seasonality is removed, since official seasonally adjusted inflation series are not 
available over a long sample.  But because the improvement in performance has been 
so marked, such choices have a relatively minor effect on the comparison.  Estimates 
using a series for U.K. consumer price inflation
1 that we constructed give annualized 
mean and standard deviation of 2.7% and 2.2% respectively for October 
1992−August 2001, compared to 8.8% and 8.6% for January 1965−September 1992.
2 
Similar (indeed, better) results hold if the 1992−2001 sample is extended to 2004, 
while the inflation record still registers a pronounced improvement after 1992 if a 
different sample period is chosen to represent pre-1992 behavior.
3 
 
The reason that springs to mind for this improved record is the overhaul of the 
macroeconomic policy framework in the U.K. over the last 25 years.  True, the 
decline in output volatility, the achievement of longer economic expansions, and the 
fall in the mean and variance of inflation are by no means phenomena unique to the 
U.K.  Increased macroeconomic stability has been a development in the U.S. and 
several other countries, as discussed by McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000) and 
Blanchard and Simon (2001), among others.  But greater stability at a global level 
does not preclude the possibility that the dominant sources of U.K. improvement are 
the changes rung in domestic macroeconomic policy.  For one thing, as emphasized 
in Bernanke’s (2004) discussion of the “Great Moderation,” just as there are parallels 
between different economies’ improvements, there are parallels between the shifts in 
policy regime that took place in each country over the same period—particularly in 
the exclusive responsibility assigned to monetary policy for inflation control.  For 
another, the improvement in the U.K. economy has been especially drastic: from  
 
————————————————————————————————— 
1 Defined in Section 2 below. 
2 Batini and Nelson (2001, Table 1). 
3 As we stress below, it is desirable to break the pre-inflation targeting period into several regimes rather 
than treat it monolithically.   3
























double-digit inflation rates in the 1970s far exceeding those in the U.S. and many 
other countries, and poor inflation outcomes as late as 1990, to a high level of 
stability in inflation from 1992; and from several episodes of negative economic 
growth to the complete absence of negative growth in the last decade (unlike, for 
example, Australia and the U.S., which had at least one quarter of negative growth 
during 2000−2001). 
 
It is from that perspective that we provide in this paper an analysis of U.K. 
macroeconomic policy developments.  At first blush, a study of changes in U.K. 
macroeconomic arrangements would appear to be a redundant exercise, given the vast 
amount of research that has already been undertaken on inflation targeting.  The existing 
literature does provide many useful comparisons of the U.K.’s recent record with other 
countries (see especially Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin, and Posen, 1999, Mishkin and   4
Schmidt-Hebbel, 2001, and Levin, Piger, and Natalucci, 2004), which we do not provide 
here.  But equally, it does not go to the heart of the issues that we are interested in. 
 
A shortcoming of what has been written in recent years is that the focus on the effects of 
U.K. inflation targeting naturally leads to the pre-inflation targeting period being treated 
monolithically.  In this category one can include quantitative studies such as that of Ball 
and Sheridan (2005), which compresses the entire pre-inflation targeting period into a 
single regime (albeit one with a shifting steady-state inflation rate).  Discussions by U.K. 
commentators which group the 1970s and 1980s together as a “high inflation” period, 
failing to note the differences in both policy and performance across the two decades, are 
guilty of a similar oversimplification.  Other recent analyses, such as Balls and 
O’Donnell (2001), emphasize the post-1997 macroeconomic arrangements—i.e., the 
independence conferred on the Bank of England as well as other reforms by the Blair 
Government—and contrast the macroeconomic results with those of earlier in the 1990s.  
Though important in consolidating the period of stability since 1992, these reforms are 
evidently minor in effect relative to the changes in arrangements introduced in 1992, 
since low inflation and continuous economic growth were achieved over 1992−97.  
Existing accounts, on the whole, give insufficient detail on the initial conditions leading 
to inflation targeting in the United Kingdom or on the developments that made the U.K. 
pre-1990s record exceptionally poor. 
 
The aim of this paper is to fill this gap by carrying out an analysis that helps explain 
recent U.K. macroeconomic developments, yet focuses on past policies rather than 
current arrangements.  As one study observed, “The British experience is one that is full 
of experiments in monetary regimes and switches in regimes.”
4 And that statement was 
written in 1982, prior to the variety of experiments undertaken in the last two decades: a 
switch of emphasis of monetary targeting from broad money to the monetary base; a 
subsequent period of informal and then formal pegging of the pound to the Deutschmark; 
and inflation targeting from 1992.  We will provide an up-to-date account of U.K. 
experiences under different policy regimes, with the emphasis on sources of policy 
mistakes (both in specific policy decisions and, more fundamentally, in the underlying 
economic analysis).  Thus, our objective is not to undertake yet another review of 
inflation targeting in the United Kingdom, but rather, a critical analysis of U.K. monetary 
policy developments over 1955−2004, focusing on the confusions, misconceptions, and 
theoretical mistakes in the economic analysis that guided U.K. macroeconomic policy 
over that period, and how current arrangements have shaken off the earlier sources of 
error. 
————————————————————————————————— 
4 Howard and Johnson (1982, p. 161).   5
In carrying out this analysis, we have found it useful to draw heavily of archival material.  
Our analysis will make use of information about changes in policymakers’ views of the 
role of monetary policy, as recorded in contemporaneous records such as newspaper 
reports, publications of policy agencies and financial institutions, policymakers’ 
speeches, and transcripts of television interviews.  We also will draw critically on 
memoirs of several of the relevant policymakers.  Again, it is tempting to conclude that 
this exercise is unnecessary, on the grounds that the relevant information is already 
provided in the existing retrospective accounts of U.K. monetary policy.  We have found, 
however, that this is in fact not the case, and that our own consultation of the archival 
record has been essential both in obtaining factual information and in guiding our 
interpretation of policy developments.  An example of where our analysis differs from the 
existing literature on U.K. policy produces not simply in interpretation but, instead, on 
the factual record, is brought out by the statement in a recent study of U.K. monetary 
policy over 1975−2000 by Cobham (2002, p. 29): “A remarkable feature of U.K. 
monetary targeting is the almost complete lack of official explanation for (and non-
official comment on) the numbers selected for the target ranges,” a situation that Cobham 
claims changed only in 1985.  But in fact an official memorandum was published in 1980 
by the U.K. Treasury (which had authority over monetary policy until 1997), providing 
its estimates of the velocity trend in the targeted monetary aggregate (Sterling M3).  So 
further examination of documentary material establishes that an alleged “remarkable 
feature” of U.K. monetary targeting was not in fact a feature of monetary targeting at all.
5 
Our discussion will bring out further differences from the existing literature that arise 
from our own consultation of archival material. 
 
In studying the monetary policy record of the U.K., there are two pitfalls to be kept in 
mind.  The first is the danger of assuming that a policy analysis appropriate for other 
countries—particularly the U.S.—can be transplanted without modification to the U.K., 
without regard to institutional differences.  This danger has meant that U.K. policy 
officials have understandably been wary of analyses of their economy by non-U.K. 
economists; in the words of an internal Treasury memorandum in 1981, a flawed analysis 
should “not [be] surprising from someone unfamiliar with our institutions.”
6 And whether 
the analysis is by U.K. or non-U.K. economists,
7 the degree of attention given to U.K. 
institutional detail can make a crucial difference.  One example that illustrates this is the 
————————————————————————————————— 
5 See HM Treasury (1980).  We discussed this memorandum in Batini and Nelson (2000).  The velocity 
assumptions in the 1980 Treasury memorandum were also mentioned by Budd and Holly (1986, p. 17). 
6 Quoted in Howe (1994, p. 186).  The memorandum was from Peter Middleton (the Permanent Head of the 
Treasury) to Geoffrey Howe, the Chancellor of the Exchequer (the Cabinet minister responsible for 
economic policy).  
7 The reader is forewarned that the present authors are in the second category, although we have worked in 
the U.K.   6
study of Haldane and Quah (1999), whose explanation for the U.K.’s inflation experience 
rests on the assumption that the Phillips curve was the model guiding U.K monetary 
policy between the late 1950s and the mid-1970s.  But U.K. policymakers in fact 
subscribed to a nonmonetary view of inflation throughout this period, immediately ruling 
out the hypothesis advanced, even as a partial explanation.  To avoid this pitfall, the 
explanations for policy behavior that we provide will be documented by statements of 
policy officials. 
 
The opposite pitfall is to accept too readily a position of “U.K. exceptionalism.”  Under 
such an approach, U.K. policy arrangements that appear suboptimal, and economic 
analysis by policy officials that appears flawed, might be too readily excused by the 
claim that the U.K. is “different,” hence the nonstandard approach.  Acceptance of U.K. 
exceptionalism can imply that even what is intended as a critical analysis of U.K. 
monetary policy might unwittingly repeat the omissions, analytical errors, and talking 
points of the U.K. policymakers themselves.  One class of studies that falls into this 
category consists of the outside analyses of 1970s economic policy that criticized U.K. 
governments for adopting the “wrong” type of incomes policy—e.g. a compulsory wage 
freeze instead of a tax-based incomes policy.  Such critiques accepted the governments’ 
nonmonetary diagnosis of inflation, and therefore shared with policymakers a major 
misconception.  A second and more recent class of studies that suffer from this pitfall are 
those that accepted the validity of the authorities’ “credit counterparts” approach to 
analyzing money growth determination, and criticized policy from within that 
framework.
8 As we discuss below, this framework should itself be regarded as flawed.  
Conscious of this second pitfall, we will take a critical view of the analysis both of the 
policymakers and of many of their outside critics. 
 
Our discussion will draw on our own prior research on U.K. macroeconomic policy.  We 
will not, however, reproduce that research here; instead, our prior work will allow us to 
give relatively brief treatment of topics that are usually prominent in discussions of the 
U.K. experience.  For example, the extensive analysis of the U.K.’s 1970s inflation in 
Nelson and Nikolov (2004) and Nelson (2004) allows a short treatment of that episode 
here.  Another example is the low emphasis we put on openness and exchange-rate 
issues.  Our prior work suggests that imports should be treated as an intermediate good 
rather than a final consumer good.  This implies that the Phillips curve describing CPI 
————————————————————————————————— 
8 For example, the book by Congdon (1992), though described on the back cover as “critic[al] of successive 
governments’ failures in economic policy,” accepts many of the authorities’ premises that we criticize, 
including the counterparts approach to money supply determination, the advantages of targeting broad 
money over narrow money, and the effectiveness of “overfunding” as a means of altering broad money 
growth.    7
inflation involves only the output gap and expected-inflation terms, just as in the closed-
economy case (see e.g. Kara and Nelson, 2003; and Batini, Jackson, and Nickell, 2005). 
 
The plan of the paper is as follows.  Section 2 lays out some terminological rules we 
follow in discussing U.K. economic variables.  Section 3 discusses the nonmonetary 
approach to macroeconomic policy that prevailed in the U.K. in the 1950s and the 1960s.  
Section 4 discusses the era of broad money targeting, while Section 5 discusses several 
problems with U.K. monetary policy conduct from the 1950s to the 1980s.  Section 6 
discusses monetary policy developments in the final 15 years of the period under study—
1990 to 2004.  Fiscal policy is taken up in Section 8, followed by a discussion of 
economic growth in Section 9.  Some conclusions (Section 10) complete the discussion.   
 
2.  Terminological preliminaries 
 
Due to the frequency of changing terminology and U.K.-specific terminology in policy 
discussions over the period we are studying, it is useful to lay out some conventions that we 
will be following regarding terminology.  We start with the country name (Sect. 2A), then 
consider financial variables (Sect. 2B), and consumer prices (Sect. 2C). 
 
2A. United Kingdom 
 
We will use “United Kingdom” or “U.K.” throughout as the abbreviation for the full name 
of the country (i.e., The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland). This 
convention is in line with most official U.K. publications on monetary policy, as well as the 
IMF’s International Financial Statistics and the OECD’s Economic Outlook.   Many U.S. 
writers in monetary economics, including Friedman and Schwartz (1963), have used “Great 
Britain,” as have some U.K. authors such as Carter (1960) and Griffiths (1974).  During the 
period studied in this paper, many U.K. citizens and policymakers did give the impression 
that “Great Britain” was the term to use in formal discussions,
9 although this view seems to 
have tapered off during the 1960s and 1970s, and “U.K.” is now standard.   
 
U.K. government publications have occasionally given the term “Britain” some official 
status, as in a 1987 publication by the U.K. Central Office of Information entitled Britain 
————————————————————————————————— 
9 For example, James Callaghan, who later served as Chancellor of the Exchequer and Prime Minister, 
opened a House of Commons debate in 1962 with the criticism that the government “proposes no adequate 
policies for lifting Great Britain out of the prolonged industrial stagnation from which the country is still 
suffering… especially in Scotland, the North of England, Wales, and Northern Ireland.”  House of 
Commons Debates, November 5, 1962, page 604.  (For speeches and unsigned articles in official U.K. 
government publications, as well as for newspaper articles and financial circulars, we provide full 
bibliographical details in footnotes.  The details for other articles we cite are provided in the references.)    8
which stated that Britain was “the same as” the U.K.,
10 and a 2001 book by the U.K. 
Treasury entitled Reforming Britain’s Economic and Financial Policy.
11 However, as Crick 
(1988, p. 2) notes, “Britain” is “the name of a former Roman province, [with] no modern 
legal or precise geographical meaning.”  In light of this, it seems preferable to use “U.K.,” 
which is already an abbreviation, in macroeconomic discussions, rather than adopt the 
further shorthand of “Britain.” 
 
For economic data, an important qualification should be made.  Some aggregate data, most 
notably those for the labor market, are available historically only for the Great Britain 
portion of the U.K.  Aggregate estimates of U.K. productivity require aggregate real GDP 
data (which are available for the U.K.) as well as data on employment and/or hours 
(generally available for Great Britain alone).  In our discussion, we refer to the implied 
output-per-worker series as “U.K. productivity,” although, in fact, series such as this are 
derived from a combination of U.K. and Great Britain aggregates. 
 
2B. Interest rates, money, and credit 
 
Because of the close historical and geographical connections between U.K. policy officials 
and the “City of London” (i.e., the U.K. financial markets), macroeconomic discussion in 
the U.K., especially that in the 1950s and 1960s, has been dominated by “City” 
terminology.  This terminology sometimes dates from the nineteenth century and typically 
differs from that used in macroeconomic discussion.  For example, what the City calls 
“gilt-edged Government stock” are simply long-term government securities.  In this paper, 
we will eschew “City” jargon and will instead use standard macroeconomic terminology.  
 
This will include the terminology we use for monetary and credit aggregates.  Particularly 
in the era of official quantitative controls on banks, the term “advances” was commonly 
used in the U.K. to refer to (the increase in) commercial banks’ loans to the private sector.  
We will avoid this terminology and make clear in the context whether we are referring to 
commercial bank loans to the private sector, bank lending to the private plus public sectors 
(i.e., total bank credit), or total credit (i.e., the aggregate of bank and nonbank credit).  
————————————————————————————————— 
10 Quoted in Crick (1988, p. 2). 
11 Balls and O’Donnell (2001).  The usage of “U.K.” vs. “Britain” evidently differs across institutions 
within the U.K. government.  This was illustrated by the annual “Mansion House” speeches for 2004 by the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer (Gordon Brown) and the Governor of the Bank of England (Mervyn King).  
Chancellor Brown’s speech referred to the U.K. as “Britain” 34 times, as “Great Britain” twice, and “U.K.” 
three times; Governor King’s speech used “U.K.” six times, and did not use the alternative terms.  Gordon 
Brown, “Speech Given by the Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown at the Mansion House, 
London,” June 16, 2004, U.K. Treasury website; Mervyn King, “The Governor’s Speech at the Mansion 
House,” June 16, 2004, Bank of England website.   9
“Lending” and “credit” will thus refer to stocks of loans, and not to the absolute or 
percentage changes in those stocks. 
 
For money, a glossary of terms in a book by a U.K. financial journalist contains the 
puzzling statement: “The money supply is the increase in the stock [of money]” (Smith, 
1987, p. 174).  This definition is clearly not that used in macroeconomics, where “money 
supply” and “money stock” are used interchangeably.  As far as we can tell, Smith’s 
terminology was not widely used in the U.K. at any point, even in the City.   His definition 
seems to arise out of tentative moves to change official terminology in the early 1970s.  For 
example, the Midland Bank Review in 1970 observed that a recent Bank of England 
publication had started to show a preference for the term “stock of money,” which the 
Review applauded “since [‘money supply’] contains implicit suggestions of a flow rather 
than a stock.”
12 In the event, this switch in terminology never came to pass, and the 
continued use of “money supply” to refer to the money stock was acknowledged by the 
Governor of the Bank of England’s reference in May 1971 to the “money supply” as an 
“inelegant but apparently unavoidable term.”
13 In our own discussion we will use “money 
supply” synonymously with “money stock.” 
 
In referring to specific monetary aggregates (M0, M1, Sterling M3, M4, etc.), we use the 
definitions used by the U.K. authorities.  However, in referring to different categories of 
money within each aggregate, we use standard macroeconomic terminology.  For 
example, the standard terminology for the non-reserves component of outside or base 
money is “currency,” and we will use that in preference to the U.K. terminology of “notes 
and coin.”  We will refer to the non-currency component of (the former) M1 as “demand 
deposits,” rather than the U.K. labels of “current accounts” or “sight deposits.” 
 
2C. Consumer prices 
 
Traditionally, the cost-of-living index of consumer prices used in U.K. discussions has 
been the Retail Price Index (RPI).  This was frequently referred to as an index of 
“consumer prices,” for example in speeches by U.K. Chancellors of the Exchequer
14 and 
in statistical publications by agencies such as the IMF and the OECD, as well as in 
research, such as Artis and Kontolemis’ (1996, p. 68) reference to the RPI as the 
“consumer price level.”  With inflation targeting in the 1990s, the RPIX (the RPI 
————————————————————————————————— 
12 “Another Look at Money Supply,” Midland Bank Review (November, 1970), reprinted in Wadsworth 
(1973, pp. 93−98); quotation from page 97. 
13 Leslie O’Brien, “Key Issues in Monetary and Credit Policy,” May 28, 1971, speech, Bank of England 
Quarterly Bulletin (June, 1971), Vol. 11(2), pp. 195−198; quotation from page 195. 
14 E.g. Chancellor Selwyn Lloyd, House of Commons Debates, November 7, 1961, page 833; and 
Chancellor Iain Macleod, House of Commons Debates, July 7, 1970, page 504.   10
excluding mortgage interest payments) acquired prominence,
15 with official inflation 
targets from 1992 to 2003 given in terms of the RPIX.  Recently, however, an official 
“Consumer Prices Index” or CPI series, distinct from the RPIX, has been advanced by the 
U.K. government, and since December 2003 its inflation rate has served as the rate 
targeted by monetary policy. 
 
In this paper, “consumer price inflation” will refer to inflation in an RPI/RPIX series.  
The specific price series we use is the RPIX as far back as that series is available, spliced 
into the RPI to obtain observations earlier than 1975.  As the official RPI/RPIX series are 
not seasonally adjusted, we have applied our own seasonal adjustment in generating 
inflation rates from our consumer price series.
16 
 
3.  The nonmonetary approach to macroeconomic policy (1955−79)  
 
In this section we cover U.K. macroeconomic policy developments over the first half of 
the 1955−2004 period—that is, the years to 1979.  As well as splitting the period evenly, 
this division is convenient because 1979 represented the clear break away from a 
nonmonetary approach to inflation control.  By 1979, U.K. policymakers had also turned 
away from using devices other than monetary policy as their main tools for manipulating 
aggregate demand.  The nonmonetary approach to aggregate demand control had 
dissipated earlier than the nonmonetary approach to inflation control, which is why in 
Section 3A we consider the block of years from 1955 to 1970—the heyday of  U.K. 
policymakers’ nonmonetary outlook toward demand management.  We follow this with a 
discussion in Section 3B of the nonmonetary approach to inflation control that was 
dominant from 1955 to 1979. 
 
3A. The nonmonetary approach to demand management (1955−70) 
 
We consider first developments in demand management and monetary policy in the 
1950s (Section 3A.1) then subsequent developments to 1970 (Section 3A.2). 
 
3A.1. U.K. monetary policy in the 1950s 
 
Milton Friedman and the Romers have argued that U.S. monetary policy in the 1950s was 
guided by an emphasis on aggregate demand and inflation control that was more 
————————————————————————————————— 
15 As early as November 1989, the U.K. Treasury had stated: “A better indicator of underlying inflation is 
provided by the RPI excluding mortgage interest payments” (quoted in Craven and Gausden, 1991, p. 30). 
16 The adjustment procedure, described in Nelson and Nikolov (2004), uses seasonal effects estimated on 
those sample periods where price controls were not in effect.   11
enlightened than the policies that followed in the 1960s and 1970s—indeed, by “a 
relatively modern view” in the Romers’ evaluation.
17 On the surface, the same judgment 
would appear appropriate for the U.K.: U.K. consumer price inflation averaged only 
3.4% for 1955−59, while the real ex-post Treasury bill rate averaged 1.1% over the same 
period,
18 certainly low but far from the negative values observed in the 1970s.  In 
addition, Congdon (1980, p. 28) describes the 1950s as “the only prolonged period since 
the war… [where] conscious and deliberate use was made of monetary policy” to control 
inflation in the U.K.
19 
 
Despite these similarities, the parallels between U.K. policy in the 1950s and either U.S. 
policy in the 1950s, or modern U.K. inflation targeting, are not very close.  The key 
differences are that nonmonetary views of inflation, on the one hand, and skepticism 
about the effectiveness of monetary policy in controlling aggregate demand, on the other, 
remained prevalent in official circles throughout the 1950s.  The relatively tight monetary 
policy that took place occurred in part because official advice was resisted by 
policymakers, and in part because the U.K.’s fixed exchange rate obligations under 
Bretton Woods limited the extent to which the authorities could disregard monetary 
policy.  Most importantly, despite what in retrospect was a successful decade for the use 
of monetary policy in demand management, the skepticism in policy circles about such 
use intensified in the 1950s, and led to a strongly nonmonetary perspective coming into 
force in 1958−59.   
 
The doubtful attitude toward monetary policy among 1950s U.K. officials reflected their 
acceptance of what was regarded as a major message of the Keynesian revolution.  
Blinder (1984) and Gordon (1984) dispute the claim of monetarists that skepticism 
regarding monetary policy was prevalent in the 1950s.  Instead, they suggest that what 
Blinder calls “the bad old days in which Neanderthal Keynesians roamed the land, 
spreading the false word that money does not matter” (1984, p. 118) were essentially over 
by the early 1950s.  But the “land” Blinder refers to was of course the U.S.  What 
————————————————————————————————— 
17 Romer and Romer (2002b, p. 19); see also Romer and Romer (2002a) and Milton Friedman, “To Jimmy 
from James,” Newsweek, December 6, 1976, page 45.  Friedman argues that the 1950s monetary policy 
proceeded as it did “only because… [President] Eisenhower was willing to flout the reigning temper of the 
time” and tolerate two recessions to subdue inflation.  Romer and Romer, on the other hand, argue that the 
successful policy reflected a generally coherent theoretical framework on the part of the Federal Reserve. 
18 As we discuss in Section 4, we use the U.K. Treasury bill rate since it has always been closely related to 
the official policy rate. 
19 As Congdon was writing in 1980, it was not yet clear that the shift to an inflation-oriented monetary 
policy in 1979 would be “prolonged.”  See our discussion of this shift in Section 6 below.    12
monetarists thought they saw in the U.S. was a reality in the U.K.: the majority of both 
policy advisers and academics adhered closely to the “Neanderthal Keynesian” view.
20 
 
The climate of 1950s academic opinion on monetary policy in the U.K. is reflected, 
though not endorsed, in Meade’s (1951) Theory of International Economic Policy, the 
only U.K. contribution to monetary economics to be the basis for a Nobel Prize.  Since 
Meade’s focus was on stabilization policy for an open economy, he could hardly ignore 
monetary policy.  On the contrary, in addition to emphasizing the link between exchange-
rate movements and interest rates, he actually proposed using monetary policy to stabilize 
the price index for domestically produced goods (Meade, 1951, p. 106).  But just before 
making this prescription, Meade gave credence to the possibility that “domestic 
expenditure is not in fact very sensitive to changes in the rate of interest,” while 
expressing no corresponding doubt about the effectiveness of fiscal policy (1951, p. 104).  
Essentially, Meade was making a concession to the “Neanderthal Keynesian” body of 
opinion in the U.K. that monetary policy was ineffective.  
 
The “Neanderthal Keynesian” position implied extremely interest-inelastic aggregate 
demand.  One example of this view was the judgment of Thomas Balogh—a 1950s 
academic in the U.K. who became a senior Treasury adviser during the 1960s—on the 
U.K. evidence: “Monetary policy seems to have no systematic impact on either fixed or 
liquid capital investment.”
21 Nevertheless, there had to be some adaptation of this 
position to recognize the open-economy contribution to U.K. aggregate demand.  Even 
extreme Keynesians did not deny that policy choices for the interest rate mattered for 
maintenance of a fixed exchange rate, and that the exchange rate mattered for net exports.  
The position that emerged from this acknowledgement was the view that consumption 
and investment were quite insensitive to monetary policy actions, so that monetary policy 
mattered only via its influence on the exchange rate.  This position continued into the 
1960s, enshrined in the Chancellor of the Exchequer’s accompaniment of a 1964 increase 
in the policy rate (Bank Rate) with the statement that the action was intended to support 




The skepticism about monetary policy was not always apparent from public statements.  
When, for example, the authorities increased short-term interest rates twice in early 1955, 
————————————————————————————————— 
20 As Cobham (1984, p. 160), observes, “British Keynesianism has traditionally been more ‘extreme,’ more 
‘hard-line’ than that prevalent for example in North America.” 
21 Balogh (1958, p. 226). 
22 James Callaghan, November 23, 1964 statement, quoted in Iain Macleod, “Iain Macleod” column, Daily 
Mail (London), March 29, 1966, page 8.   13
a wire report recorded: “A Bank of England spokesman said Thursday morning that the 
second increase, like the first, was imposed as an anti-inflation measure.”
23 The same 
Thursday of the increase, however, the Governor of the Bank of England wrote to the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer expressing doubts about the measure: stating that “the 
contribution of credit policy to a balanced economy should not be overestimated,” he 
added that “the inflationary pressures which have threatened to develop in recent months 
have their origins much less in the monetary than in the cost and wages structure” 
(quoted in Dell, 1996, p. 198).  Reflecting the U.K. consensus, the Governor’s concerns 
combined an elasticity pessimism that implied a nonmonetary view of aggregate demand 
determination, with a nonmonetary (cost-push) view of inflation that discounted the role 
for demand restriction. 
 
It was, however, a monetary policy tightening in 1957 that saw the greatest departure of 
policymakers from the prevailing skepticism about monetary policy.  In announcing an 
increase in the short-term policy rate (Bank Rate) to 7%, Chancellor Thorneycroft said: 
“There can be no remedy for inflation and the steadily rising prices which go with it 
which does not include, and indeed is not founded upon, a control of the money 
supply.”
24 The Economist noted accurately that this “resort to a classical monetary 
policy” by the government was a major break from its practice in the 1950s of attempting 
demand management by “nonmonetary means.”
25 The shift in priorities did not, however, 
reflect a major change in thinking among policy advisers: indeed, according to Dell 
(1996, p. 233), Thorneycroft’s statement “horrified Treasury economists.”
26 Roy Harrod, 
an economist who became a major influence on members of the Government, criticized 
the fact that “remedies for a demand-pull inflation have been applied” when, he claimed, 




Lacking deep support in official circles, the 1957 shift toward greater reliance on 
monetary policy was therefore vulnerable.  In the event, a successful backlash of opinion 
against monetary policy did occur, in the form of widespread misinterpretations of the 
effects of the 1957 tightening.  The lag in reaction of aggregate spending to the monetary 
tightening appeared to reaffirm the view that demand was interest-elastic.  By the late 
————————————————————————————————— 
23 “Bank of England Again Increases Its Interest Rates,” The Daily Oklahoman, February 25, 1955, page 2. 
24 Peter Thorneycroft, September 19, 1957 statement, quoted in the November 1957 Midland Bank Review 
article “Bank Deposits and Currency,” reprinted in Wadsworth (1973, pp. 77−81).  The quotation also 
appears in Dacey (1960, p. 130) and “Mr. Thorneycroft Rejects ‘Mere £50m’ Argument,” The Times 
(London), January 15, 1958, page 13. 
25 Editorial, “Putting On the Brakes,” The Economist, September 28, 1957, pp. 997−999; quotations from 
page 998. 
26 Similarly, Goodhart (1973, p. 502) says that Thorneycroft’s views were not shared by his officials. 
27 Harrod (1958, p. 67).   14
1960s, with greater acknowledgment of the effects of monetary actions on aggregate 
demand, the verdict on the 1957 tightening remained negative, but stressed instead the 
lack of reaction of inflation rather than of aggregate demand to the tightening measures.  
For example, Peter Jay, Economics Editor of the London Times, wrote in 1968 of “the 
failure of Mr. Thorneycroft’s policies, which caused high unemployment without 
stopping inflation,”
28 while The Guardian’s Financial Editor said in 1969 that the 
1955−58 experience had established that “dear money will drive up prices… [producing] 
stagnation accompanied by price inflation”—an interpretation apparently relying on an 
interest-cost-push and unit-cost-push view of inflation.
29 
 
In fact, the judgment that monetary tightening did not reduce inflation is based on an 
analysis that fails to take into account the importance of lags.  Artis (1961), for example, 
found that money had a low contemporaneous correlation with prices over 1956 
Q1−1960 Q3, and that the correlations between prices and money 1−2 quarters earlier 
were even smaller.  In Batini and Nelson (2001), however, we found that there were 
significant correlations of money growth with U.K. inflation over 1953−69 when money 
growth behavior of about a year earlier was considered.
30 This pattern appears to describe 
well the response of inflation following the 1957 monetary tightening,
31 since, as Hanson 
(1962, p. 345) observed, “Great Britain [i.e., the U.K.], helped to some extent by the fall 
in world prices of primary products, enjoyed its longest period of stable prices for a 
quarter of a century, the Index of Retail Prices rising little more than one point in the 
three years 1958−60.”  The fact that Hanson’s account of this success made use of a cost-
push explanation (i.e., his reference to primary goods prices) again shows that monetary 
policy got little credit for the late 1950s price stability. 
 
Over this same period, as it happened, monetary policy was being critically examined by 
an official inquiry, the Radcliffe Committee, whose Report arrived in 1959.  Laidler 
(1989) characterizes the Report as painting interest rates as the center of the transmission 
mechanism, at the expense of focus on the money stock; Goodhart (1999, p. 64), on the 
other hand, argues that the “focus, and heart” of the Radcliffe Report was its emphasis on 
————————————————————————————————— 
28 Peter Jay, “Inflation: Is the Money Supply Crucial?,” The Times (London), May 31, 1968, page 31. 
29 Anthony Harris, “Help Stamp Out Friedmanism,” The Guardian (London), November 18, 1969. 
30 We found (2001, Table 3) for 1953−69 a peak correlation between 12-month inflation and 12-month 
money growth of 0.42, with money growth leading inflation by 11 months.  If we use that dataset to 
consider the 1950s subsample alone (January 1953−December 1959), the peak correlation is again with 
money growth 11 months earlier, now with a correlation of 0.41; while a reduced-form regression of 12-
month inflation on lags 1−12 of 12-month money growth delivers a coefficient sum on money growth of 
0.98. 
31 Griffiths and Wood (1984, p. 4) also attribute price stability in 1959 to the 1957 monetary tightening.   15
liquidity, a quantity covering both monetary and nonmonetary assets,
32 as the variable 
that mattered for aggregate demand.  The two characterizations can be reconciled: from 
the Radcliffian perspective, it is asset prices that matter for aggregate demand, while the 
quantity of liquidity matters for asset-price determination.  And regardless of whether the 
Radcliffian view is seen as emphasizing liquidity or interest rates, the common element is 
a negative conclusion for monetary policy.  The Radcliffe Committee specifically 
concluded that aggregate demand was insensitive to securities-market interest rates, 
especially the short-term rates on which the authorities had most influence.
33 The key 
asset prices that mattered for aggregate demand could not, the Committee believed, be 
appreciably influenced by monetary policy actions; likewise, central bank actions could 
not hope to have an appreciable impact on the key liquidity variable because open market 
operations affected only the composition of liquidity and not its aggregate quantity. 
 
Many of the analyses of the Radcliffe Report have emphasized its negative conclusions 
about the role of monetary aggregates in monetary policy.
34 It should be stressed, 
however, that the Report’s view of the transmission mechanism was inconsistent with 
assigning any important macroeconomic role for monetary policy, not just a framework 
that emphasizes monetary aggregates.  Thus the implication of its analysis was not a 
preference for a Wicksellian analysis of price-level determination over a quantity-
oriented approach, but a rejection of both these perspectives due to its conclusion that 




In 1970 testimony, Lord (or, more precisely, Viscount) Radcliffe explained that “I have 
rather turned away, and not tried to keep au fait with what has gone on.”
36 Au fait or not 
au fait, Radcliffe had played a pivotal role in “what [had] gone on” in 1960s policy: his 
Report was “extremely influential,” as Allsopp and Mayes (1985, p. 401) observe.
37 It did 
————————————————————————————————— 
32 As Dacey (1960, p. 133) observed, the Radcliffe Report was ambiguous on the issue of whether its 
“liquidity” concept referred to an aggregate of assets or of credit.  There is support in the Report for Artis’ 
(1974, p. 524) interpretation that its “emphasis [was] on total credit flows,” just as other passages suggest 
that a broad assets aggregate was the crucial quantity.  
33 See Radcliffe Committee (1959, e.g. para. 489). 
34 As well as the Laidler (1989) paper mentioned above, see also e.g. Walters (1970) and Goodhart (1973). 
35 The inconsistency of the Radcliffe Report with Wicksellian analysis was emphasized by Dacey (1960, p. 
120). 
36 February 4, 1970, testimony, to Select Committee on Nationalized Industries (1970, p. 219). 
37 Dennis (1981a, p. 141) offers a contrary conclusion, arguing that while U.K. authorities did share the 
Committee’s dismissal of the significance of the money stock, “the operation of policy is indicative of a 
rejection of the specific details of the Report, particularly with respect to the transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy… Therefore it is incorrect to overplay the significance of the Report in the design of U.K. 
monetary policy in the 1960s.”  To this end, he claims that U.K. authorities did not share the Committee’s 
doubts about the interest elasticity of aggregate demand (1981, p. 139).  This claim, however, is incorrect: 
our quotations from a key Treasury adviser (Balogh) and a principal monetary policy maker (Callaghan) 
echo the elasticity pessimism expressed by the Committee and by Bank of England officials.  Consistent   16
not, as noted, contradict the status quo majority view of policy advisers and academics 
regarding monetary policy—on the contrary, Goodhart (1999, p. 66) reported that Bank 
and Treasury officials’ evidence “formed much of [the] basis” for the Report’s outlook.
38 
Instead, the Report ratified the disapproval officials had voiced of the use of monetary 
policy to fight inflation in 1955 and 1957, as well as their judgment that those attempts 
had turned out to be ineffective.  It thus served as a “coup de grace”
39 on lingering 
minority views in officialdom regarding the importance of monetary policy.  Harold 
Wilson, Prime Minister for most of the 1960s,
40 accepted “the devastating analysis of the 
Radcliffe Report about over-reliance on monetary policy,”
41 and the Treasury under 
Wilson’s administration featured as senior personnel several academics who had shaped 
the Report’s findings, including Alec Cairncross, Nicholas Kaldor, and Robert Neild.  
The judgments of the Radcliffe Committee underpinned policymakers’ renewed 
emphasis in the 1960s on fiscal policy for aggregate demand management and incomes 
policy for inflation control. 
 
Lionel Robbins was a prominent advocate of the conventional monetary view of inflation 
over this period, first as an occasional adviser to the Government in the late 1950s and, 
from 1959, as a member of the House of Lords and critic of the nonmonetary approach to 
inflation control taken by successive governments.
42 As early as 1954, Robbins observed 
that while “the years since the war have witnessed a gigantic experiment, so to speak, in 
fiscal control… without recourse to the more old-fashioned instruments of monetary 
policy,” he was confident that “any doubts of the capacity of monetary policy to control 
inflation [would] vanish” if monetary policy was used consistently for that purpose.
43 
Robbins, in fact, believed that the event that had entrenched the nonmonetary view as 
official policy was not the release of the Radcliffe Report, but the resignation in January 
1958 of Chancellor Thorneycroft and two other Treasury ministers.  Robbins quoted a 
Keynesian colleague at the London School of Economics as saying of this event: “This is 




                                                                                                                                                 
with our evidence, Bell (1970, p. 287), a former Treasury advisor, noted that “the traditional view in both 
Whitehall and Threadneedle Street is that borrowers are interest-insensitive.”  (Whitehall and Threadneedle 
Street are the locations in London of the Treasury and Bank of England, respectively.) 
38 And Goodhart (1973, p. 506) judges that the authorities were “in broad agreement” with the Report’s 
conclusions. 
39 As Schwartz (1969, p. 38) puts it. 
40 Wilson served as Prime Minister for the periods October 1964−June 1970 and March 1974−April 1976. 
41 Harold Wilson, House of Commons Debates, July 26, 1961, page 445. 
42 See Robbins (1979) for a collection of his speeches. 
43 Robbins (1954, pp. 82−83 and 85). 
44 Lionel Robbins, House of Lords Debates, April 10, 1968, page 399.   17
In retrospect, it is surprising that this episode was seen as a blow to the quantity-theory 
perspective, because the issue that prompted Thorneycroft and his colleagues’ resignation 
was the failure of Thorneycroft’s proposals for cuts in government spending, not 
monetary policy actions.  Indeed, Thorneycroft’s post-resignation speech to Parliament 




What the 1958 episode does highlight, however, was the misconception at the time 
among U.K. policymakers that an automatic, mechanical link existed between 
government spending or deficits and money creation.  By contrast, the standard modern 
position is that such a link arises only if the monetary policy reaction function creates 
one.  Overstatement of the deficit/money growth link remained prevalent in U.K. policy 
circles until the 1980s,
46 but was especially severe in these early debates, engendering the 
confusion that fiscal conservatism and tight monetary policy were synonymous.  One of 
the figures who propagated this confusion was Enoch Powell, who had been among the 
Treasury ministers resigning in 1958.  In later years Powell would encourage the view 
that he had been an early U.K. monetarist.  But his policy prescriptions constantly 
conflated fiscal tightening and monetary restraint: as late as 1980, Powell was calling on 
the government to “tax heavily, ruthlessly and comprehensively” as a means of reducing 
monetary growth.
47 For that matter, some of Powell’s emphasis on fiscal policy was 
based on a cost-push view of inflation: in 1968, he blamed inflation on the channel 
running from taxes to costs, which was a standard 1960s Conservative Party position but 
quite inconsistent with viewing inflation as a monetary phenomenon.
48 Nevertheless, 
Powell came to be identified with the minority in the 1950s and 1960s that emphasized 
the importance of monetary policy; and, as Robbins suggested, the fact that Powell was 
widely known not for economics but as an extremely controversial social critic certainly 
did not help in making the advocacy of monetary policy a respectable pursuit.
49 The 
situation was the upside down of later U.S. developments: whereas the advocacy of 
supply-side economics by leading U.S. political figures in the 1980s gave the false 
————————————————————————————————— 
45 “I do not believe [the control of inflation] lies in an answer to the question whether we should use Bank 
Rate or physical controls.  To tell the truth, neither of them works very well.”  Peter Thorneycroft, House of 
Commons Debates, January 23, 1958, page 1296.  
46 See Section 4. 
47 Andrew Taylor, “Powell Calls for Big Tax Rises,” Daily Express (London), September 6, 1980, page 4.  
Similarly, in 1970 Powell had said that deficit spending “can only [produce] one result: the Government 
will create sufficient extra money to meet its expenditure.”  Powell, “Balance of Payment and Prices,” June 
6, 1970 speech, reprinted in Wood (1970, pp. 92−97); quotation from page 96. 
48 See Peter Jay, “Powell’s Theory of Inflation: A False Premise,” The Times (London), May 16, 1968, 
page 32.  The tax-cost-push view of inflation was also endorsed by the Conservative Party’s economic 
spokesman, Iain Macleod (e.g. in his “Iain Macleod” column, Daily Mail (London), September 20, 1966, 
page 6), and shaped both the Conservative Party’s platform for the 1970 general election and the early 
policies of the Heath Government (see Nelson, 2004). 
49 Lionel Robbins, House of Lords Debates, November 23, 1972, page 1073.   18
impression that supply-side economics was a major school of thought in the economics 
profession, the emphasis on monetary policy by figures on the U.K. political fringe made 
it seem that belief in monetary policy had had little basis in economic theory. 
 
3A.2. Developments in the 1960s 
 
The U.K.’s adherence to a fixed exchange rate continued in the 1960s, and some policy 
tightenings were dictated by exchange-rate considerations, including 1964, as noted, and 
1966.  Nevertheless, the exchange rate constraint did not prevent a substantial loosening 
of monetary policy during the 1960s relative to the 1950s, reflecting the consolidation of 
the nonmonetary outlook to macroeconomic management.  This loosening was feasible in 
part because foreign exchange controls permitted substantial short-run departures of U.K. 
monetary policy from purely external considerations.  Indeed, one empirical study has 
gone so far as to conclude that in the U.K., “interest rates apparently were fully insulated 
from U.S. interest rates during both the fixed-rate and floating-rate regimes” (Throop, 
1980, p. 14).  This finding surely overstates the actual circumstances, but makes it likely 
that while exchange-rate considerations dictated infrequent adjustments of the intercept 
term in the U.K. policymakers’ interest-rate reaction function, they were not an 
overriding constraint on that reaction function.  In the event, the U.K. reaction function 
produced an upward trend in money growth and inflation during the 1960s that made 
continued adherence to a fixed exchange rate infeasible.  
 
Some accounts of developments in policy following the exchange-rate devaluation of 
1967 suggest that the U.K. shifted sharply at that time toward greater reliance on 
monetary policy in controlling aggregate demand.  In particular, the U.K.’s commitments 
to the IMF in 1968 and 1969 included targets for Domestic Credit Expansion (DCE),
50 
and this has sometimes been treated as a watershed for the increased importance of 
monetary policy.  Prime Minister Harold Wilson, for example, later wrote that “[a]t the 
end of 1967… monetary aggregates began to play a more important role in the conduct of 
monetary policy,” and the “role of monetary policy was then further enhanced in 1969.”
51 
One financial commentator in 1969 even described the government as “bowing to that 
————————————————————————————————— 
50 Letters of Intent were written to the IMF by Chancellor of the Exchequer Callaghan in November 1967 
and Chancellor Jenkins in May 1969 (reprinted in Wadsworth, 1973, pp. 484−490).  The Wilson 
Government’s decision to set DCE targets, according to Wilson, was made at the end of 1967 at IMF 
instigation (Wilson Committee, 1980, p. 79), which is consistent with the Bank of England’s account that 
“[i]n 1968 and 1969, in agreement with the International Monetary Fund, quantitative limits were set for 
domestic credit expansion” (in “The Gilt-Edged Market,” Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin (June, 1979), 
Vol. 19(2), pp. 137−148; quotation from page 138).  However, of the 1967 and 1969 Letters of Intent, only 
the latter referred to DCE targets; the 1967 letter referred to Callaghan’s “expectation” of slower growth in 
bank credit expansion and the money supply. 
51 Wilson Committee (1980, pp. 79 and 16).   19
new god, the money supply.”
52 
 
In retrospect, it is hard to see why this period was regarded as such a watershed.  Within a 
few years, it was clear that “[c]ontrary to early expectations[,] the 1969 commitment to a 
specific DCE target did not signify a major change in policy,”
53 and Gowland’s (1978, p. 
5) conclusion that “it was very much the mixture as before, even after the adoption of a 
DCE target” seems much more on target than the proclamations by commentators at the 
time.  The lack of a genuine policy shift was no doubt in part because the conversion was 
in rhetoric rather than practice: Keegan (1985, p. 41), for example, claims that the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Roy Jenkins, was privately dismissive of the monetarist 
critique of old-fashioned Keynesianism. 
 
But even judged on their public declarations, the authorities provided few grounds to 
expect a major change in emphasis.  The DCE targets were part of a package that 
included strong emphasis on nonmonetary techniques: Jenkins’ 1969 Letter of Intent 
stated that monetary policy’s role was as “support to fiscal policy,” and the promised 
policy package also gave prominence to incomes policy for inflation control.
54 And 
judged by their impact on monetary policy, the commitments to the IMF were not a 
substantive change, because DCE targeting was compatible with a Radcliffian approach 
to monetary policy.  The Radcliffe Report had emphasized concepts of aggregate credit 
with a corresponding downgrading of the importance of monetary aggregates.  The 
emphasis on DCE was in keeping with this attitude: the Bank of England said in 1969 
that the U.K. authorities had agreed on the DCE target because of their “belief that the 
rate of growth of the money supply… is an inadequate indicator of monetary 
conditions.”
55 Consistent with this, the Bank of England Governor testified in 1969: 
“What we are trying to do primarily is to contain the whole corpus of credit…”
56 The 
interpretation by many commentators, on the other hand, that the government now 
emphasized money supply, largely reflected the fact that these commentators treated 
credit control as synonymous with money supply control.
57 But close DCE control need 
not translate into tight money supply control, and, in the event, did not: the U.K. had 
————————————————————————————————— 
52 Patrick Sergeant, “Bets on Bank Rate,” Daily Mail (London), May 14, 1969, page 13. 
53 Kern (1972, p. 37). 
54 From Jenkins’ May 22, 1969, Letter of Intent (in Wadsworth, 1973, p. 489). 
55 Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin Supplement: Domestic Credit Expansion (September, 1969), page 
363. 
56 Governor Leslie O’Brien, May 21, 1969, testimony, in Select Committee on Nationalized Industries 
(1970, p. 75). 
57 The slippage was evident in a commentary by a U.K. merchant banker who discussed the Chancellor’s 
targets “for the growth of the money supply (or more correctly, domestic credit expansion)…”  Geoffrey 
Bell, “Britain Must Reassess Her Economic Armoury,” The Times (London), September 29, 1969, 
“International Scene” section, page III.   20
external surpluses in 1969−70 that permitted achievement of the DCE target alongside 
rising base money growth and cuts in official short-term interest rates.  The rising money 
growth was welcomed by Chancellor Jenkins, who thought one virtue of the DCE target 




Chancellor Jenkins’ conduct of macroeconomic policy over this period won him a 
reputation as an orthodox or “austere” economic manager; this apparently led to 
unsuccessful efforts to recruit him in 1979 as the first Chancellor of the Exchequer in the 
Thatcher Government,
59 as well as the praise from Goodhart (1997, p. 852−853) that 
“Roy Jenkins injected some sanity in 1968−69.”  But this reputation for austerity is 
justified only by the substantial fiscal tightening Jenkins enacted, and not by his approach 
to monetary policy.  Not only did money growth rise under Jenkins, but his short-term 
interest rate decisions in 1969 opened up a deviation of interest rates from the 
prescriptions that a Taylor rule now suggests were appropriate—a deviation that Jenkins’ 
successors in the 1970s would continue and magnify.  Furthermore, both as Chancellor 
(1967−70) and as Labour Party economics spokesman (1970−72), Jenkins would take a 
cost-push view of inflation, leading to his recommendation in 1971 of demand stimulus 
combined with compulsory price controls (see Nelson, 2004).  In 1983, Jenkins would 
lead the Social Democratic Party on an election platform that again included compulsory 
price controls.  Therefore, while Jenkins has been described as “the grandfather of New 
Labour” and therefore as an influence upon the policies of the current U.K. government,
60 
that description is inappropriate as far as macroeconomic policy is concerned, since 
Jenkins belonged to the old nonmonetary tradition in economic management. 
 
The Bank of England 
 
In discussing monetary policy over this period, we have focused upon developments in 
the executive branch of the U.K. government.  The reason for this is that the Bank of 
England was not independent; official statements by the Bank are useful as articulations 
of government policy, but the Bank itself was not the maker of monetary policy.  Well 
into the 1970s, the Bank of England instead placed primacy on its role as a “sponsor” of 
the City of London: as a conduit that could communicate the views of the financial 
community to the government, in much the same way as the Department of Industry 
informs the government about the concerns of industry (Goodhart, 1972, p. 463).  As the 
————————————————————————————————— 
58 Jenkins (1969, p. 1214). 
59 See Campbell (2003, p. 10) and Therese Raphael, “Blair’s Mentor, Thatcher’s Maker,” Wall Street 
Journal Europe, January 8, 2003, page A11. 
60 Former Labour Cabinet Minister Tony Benn, quoted in Raphael, “Blair’s Mentor, Thatcher’s Maker.”   21
Governor of the Bank put it in 1969, the Bank had “a view influenced by the market 
conditions in which it lives.”
61 The importance assigned to this function reflected both the 
Bank’s lack of a policymaking role and the relatively low priority the Bank placed on 
macroeconomic analysis.  For it was in this period that the Bank conformed to what 
Brunner (1981, p. 23) calls “City Syndrome,” whereby expertise in central banking 
corresponds to a good understanding of the day-to-day psychology of the U.K. financial 
markets, with macroeconomic knowledge merely an optional extra.  As of 1959, the 
notion that the Bank of England would devote substantial resources to economic analysis 
was considered sufficiently unlikely that in the James Bond novel Goldfinger, after Bond 
is told he is going to meet “the head of the Bank’s research department,” he is informed 
that this department is “nothing more or less than a spy system” (Fleming, 1959, p. 47). 
 
The Bank did not have a Research Department in reality, though it did have an Economic 
Intelligence Section.  Many economists on the Bank staff in the 1950s and 1960s, 
however, learned economics during the period of “Neanderthal Keynesian” U.K. 
academic thought, with their views on monetary policy shaped further in that direction by 
the Radcliffe Report.  Consequently, senior Bank economists during this period tended 
not to be monetary specialists.  It is perhaps significant that when in 1968 the Bank hired 
an economist with a monetary economics background, the event was considered unusual 
enough to merit a news item in the London Times.
62 
 
3B. The nonmonetary approach to inflation control (1955−79) 
 
We divide our discussion of the nonmonetary approach to inflation control into the 1950s 
and 1960s (Section 3B.1) and the 1970s (Section 3B.2). 
 
3B.1. 1955 to 1969 
 
As we mentioned in Section 3A, cost-push theories of inflation held a prominent place 
among policy officials in the 1950s.  These theories tended to produce advocacy of wage 
and price controls or other incomes policies as the means of controlling inflation.  On the 
other hand, the import-price-push view of inflation was one of the reasons behind support 
for fixed exchange rates among economists.  For example Hanson (1962, pp. 343, 256) 
said that a “devaluation of sterling… would be disastrous for Great Britain [i.e., the 
————————————————————————————————— 
61 Governor Leslie O’Brien, April 30, 1969, testimony, in Select Committee on Nationalised Industries 
(1970, p. 17). 
62 “A Goodhart at the Bank,” The Times (London), May 20, 1968, page 8.  The new Bank employee was 
Charles Goodhart, who subsequently recalled that he was told upon joining that “the Bank is a bank, and 
not a study group” (Goodhart, 2004).   22
U.K.]” because “the effect of higher import prices is to raise wages and set the 
inflationary spiral in motion again.”  This import price-wage-price spiral view has no 
more merit than other variants of the cost-push theory of inflation; but unlike the other 
variants, this particular view served in the 1950s and early 1960s as a restraining force on 
U.K. monetary policy.  
 
Domestic wage-push views of inflation were also prevalent.  In the early 1960s, in line 
with its diagnosis that “inflation… is a cost-push problem,”
63 the Conservative 
Government began a series of attempts at a voluntary incomes policy, as did the Wilson 
Government in 1964−66.  The Wilson Government then imposed compulsory wage-price 
controls in 1966−67, and again attempted thereafter to organize a voluntary policy 
regarding nominal wage growth.  When wage growth and inflation rose in 1969−70, the 




3B.2. 1970 to 1979 
 
The period 1970−79 is covered in detail in Nelson (2004) and Nelson and Nikolov 
(2004), so we provide only a summary here.  Under the leadership of Edward Heath, the 
Conservative Party had criticized the incomes policies of the Wilson Government.  For 
example, Heath had said of the 1966 wage-price freeze: “Never before has there been 
such interference with business and commerce, nor with the normal process of law.”
65  
However, it was also clear that these objections were focused on the compulsory 
character of the controls rather than on the underlying cost-push view of inflation.  The 
Heath Government elected in 1970 accordingly took a variety of nonmonetary measures 
intended to fight inflation: manipulation of prices of government-owned industries 
(especially in 1970−72), attempts to keep wage growth for government employees down 
(1970−71), income tax cuts to fight a wage-price spiral (1970), and a sales tax cut (1971).  
These measures culminated in mandatory wage and price controls throughout the Heath 
Government’s last fifteen months in office. 
 
The succeeding Wilson Government had a “Social Contract” agreement with unions 
designed to restrain wage growth, and also attempted to manipulate prices directly by 
————————————————————————————————— 
63 Chancellor of the Exchequer Reginald Maudling, House of Commons Debates, November 5, 1962, page 
621. 
64 For example, in June 1970 Home Secretary Callaghan said that while “the doctrine of economics is left 
to wiser heads than mine,” the Government’s “principal concern is the level of wages’ increases.”  Quoted 
in “New Wages Freeze on the Way?,” Daily Mail (London), June 4, 1970, page 1. 
65 “Heath Warns: We’ll Fight All the Way,” Daily Mail (London), October 6, 1966, page 1.   23
another sales tax cut (1974) and subsidies to key commodity prices (1974−75).
66 The 
Social Contract agreement also meant that wage restraint was intended to be traded off 
against fiscal measures to boost disposable income, such as income tax cuts.  This partly 
accounts for the large number of Budgets enacted by the 1974−79 Wilson and Callagan 
Governments—which various accounts give as anywhere from 12 to 14.
67 
 
In February 1979, following the collapse of the Social Contract, Prime Minister 
Callaghan signed a new agreement with the union leadership, entitled the “Concordat,” 
which announced a package to bring inflation down to 5 per cent by 1982.  As with many 
of the nonmonetary measures against inflation during the 1970s, plans to stimulate 
aggregate demand formed part of this package, highlighted by Callaghan’s statement in a 
television interview that the U.K. would have a “steaming” economy in 1982.
68 In the 
normal course of events, the design of the Government’s April 1979 Budget could be 
expected to be driven by tax-cut measures to support the Concordat.  But on March 28, 
1979, the Callaghan Government was defeated in the House of Commons by one vote on 
a confidence motion, forcing a general election.  This meant that Callaghan could remain 
in office until the election, but could not introduce policy changes before the election; 
consequently, the government’s April 1979 Budget was a “caretaker” package not guided 
by the Concordat proposals.  The victory of the Conservative Party at the May 1979 
general election then brought the era of the nonmonetary approach to inflation control to 
an end. 
 
Post-mortems on the 1970s 
 
A detailed post-mortem on the U.K.’s Great Inflation is given in the 2004 papers cited 
above.  Some flavor of the explanation offered there is given by considering two 
explanations that do not work—one based on a nonmonetary view of inflation, the other 
that rests on the monetary view. 
 
Advocates of the cost-push or nonmonetary explanation for inflation not only have the 
————————————————————————————————— 
66 Accounts differ on whether the Wilson Government also continued the Heath Government’s compulsory 
price controls.  Friedman and Schwartz (1982, p. 119) characterize the compulsory controls as ending with 
Heath’s departure, whereas Brittan and Lilley (1977, p. 18) portray the Wilson Government as 
“maintaining and intensifying the price controls it had inherited.”  Nelson and Nikolov’s (2004) 
econometric modeling of inflation over this period suggests that the price controls are best characterized as 
not continuing beyond Heath’s government. 
67 According to Whitaker’s Almanack 1979 (1978, p. 358), the April 1978 Budget was the Labour 
Government’s thirteenth, which would make the 1979 Budget its fourteenth.  A separate count at the time 
of the April 1979 Budget listed that Budget as the twelfth.  
68 James Callaghan, interview on Panorama television program, February 26, 1979, quoted in Cockerell 
(1989, p. 245).   24
problem of overcoming the logical inconsistencies inherent in that explanation, but also 
of explaining why the nonmonetary measures taken against inflation did not work.  A 
recent attempt to defend the nonmonetary explanation is Bernstein (2004), who blames 
the take-off in inflation in the early 1970s mainly on the abandonment of incomes policy 
and the 1973 oil shock; similarly, he attributes the declines in 1976−78 and after 1980 
largely to incomes policy and falling commodity prices, respectively.
69 The failure of the 
nonmonetary approach to inflation is then principally attributed to individuals’ 
weaknesses, such as: “Heath was so lacking in political savvy that it remains a source of 
amazement that he could have risen to the top of a major political party” (Bernstein, 
2004, p. 232).  But the approach to inflation control that Heath undertook was not out of 
line with those undertaken by his predecessors and successors.  Indeed, Harold Wilson 
later categorized 1973−75 as a single “phase” of macroeconomic policy, thereby 
conceding the continuity of his own policies with those of Heath.
70 The nonmonetary 
measures Heath embraced were in line with official advice, to such an extent that The 
Economist later judged that Heath “relied too heavily on civil servants.”
71 Nor were these 
measures taken without Cabinet debate and consent.  A senior Cabinet minister in 
Heath’s government has written, “For my part I never found any difficulty in expressing 
my views, and nor to my knowledge did anyone else.  If they were silent it was by 
choice.”
72 Consistent with this account, Margaret Thatcher has admitted that she did not 




In short, the fundamental problem with 1970s macroeconomic policy was not a reflection 
of the idiosyncrasies of individual policymakers, but was instead the nonmonetary 
framework that guided successive governments. 
 
Another explanation of the U.K.’s Great Inflation, which was founded on acceptance of 
the monetary explanation but is nevertheless faulty, is that Chancellor of the Exchequer 
Nigel Lawson gave in 1984.
74 Lawson claimed that prior to the election of the Thatcher 
Government, U.K. policymakers used macroeconomic policy to achieve output and 
employment goals, and microeconomic policy to achieve inflation goals, while the 
Thatcher Government reversed the assignment of instruments in pursuing those goals. 
 
————————————————————————————————— 
69 Bernstein (2004, pp. 214, 244, 534).  Another aspect of Bernstein’s nonmonetary explanation of 
inflation—the 1972 tax cuts—we consider in Section 8. 
70 Wilson Committee (1980, p. 10). 
71 “A Celebrated Failure,” The Economist (London), July 10, 1993, page 83. 
72 Geoffrey Rippon, “Loyalty and Dissent in the Party,” The Times (London), October 12, 1981, page 7. 
73 Thatcher (1995, pp. 220, 224). 
74 See (e.g.) Keegan (1985, p. 216).   25
Lawson’s characterization of both employment and inflation-control policy is an 
oversimplification and factually inaccurate in several important respects.  Consider first 
employment policy.  Contrary to Lawson’s characterization, policymakers in the 1960s 
and 1970s did use a concept of productive potential as the reference value for output, 
with demand management viewed as the means of matching demand levels to that supply 
goal.
75 The central problem with this approach was not that policymakers believed that 
potential was subject to manipulation by demand management, but instead that their 
estimates of potential were mistaken (biased upward).  This error was of the same 
character as that in the U.S. during the same period—whose importance is highlighted by 
Orphanides (2003, 2004).  In addition, as we have already noted, the importance of 
monetary policy relative to other demand-management tools was underestimated prior to 
the 1970s.  
 
It is also problematic to characterize the pre-1979 inflation-control regime as 
“microeconomic.”  For one thing, policymakers did realize that output above potential 
contributed to inflation.  Even under the pre-1979 approach, therefore, they were willing 
to tighten demand if they felt the output gap was positive.  This willingness did not do 
much to keep inflation under control because, as noted above, they too infrequently 
appreciated that the output gap was positive (and, when they were willing to tighten, 
underestimated the importance of the need for monetary tightening relative to fiscal 
tightening). 
 
Another important aspect of pre-1979 macroeconomic policy was that, even when they 
did not realize the output gap was positive, policymakers did use macroeconomic policy 
to control inflation, but did so in a counterproductive way.  For example, tax cuts and 
interest-rate cuts were advanced as anti-inflation measures, either as cost-reducing 
devices in their own right or as support for incomes policy packages.  In addition, the 
authorities’ nonmonetary framework meant that they saw output below potential as 
something that worsened inflation, via a unit-cost-push channel, rather than a 
disinflationary tool.  Thus, so long as policymakers thought output was below potential, 
they were inclined to use macroeconomic policy to push it back to potential.
76 Again, this 
factor reaffirms the importance of policymakers’ errors in overestimating potential output 
as a significant contribution to policy mistakes. 
 
————————————————————————————————— 
75 See Nelson and Nikolov (2003) for a detailed discussion. 
76 For example, the Heath Government’s policy was described in 1970 as one in which “more growth will 
give higher productivity to provide further relief on unit wage costs” (“The Economy: A Very Awkward 
Course,” The Bankers’ Magazine (August, 1970), Vol. 205(1517), pp. 96−98; quotation from page 97).  
Roy Harrod was one of many U.K. economists supporting this view, contending that “an increase in 
demand should be a helpful factor in the fight against wage-price spiraling” (Harrod, 1972, p. 62).   26
A more accurate characterization of the pre-1979 policy framework, and thus the U.K.’s 
Great Inflation, is instead that given by Allan Meltzer in 1976 Congressional testimony:
77 
 
  For decades influential British economists argued that it was unnecessary to control 
the rate of monetary expansion.  Some argued that the way to end inflation was to 
stimulate the economy by government policies that create jobs and output.  By 
increasing output they hoped to lower prices or the rate of inflation.  Contrary to 
experience everywhere they sought to end inflation by stimulating the economy.  The 
result was predictable, and both the predictions and the results are part of British 
history. 
 
4.  Broad money targeting 
 
In this section we consider the period of broad money targeting in the U.K. (1976−85), 
starting with an analysis of the sequence of events that led to that policy (Section 4A), 
then providing a critical discussion of the official monetary analysis that underlay the 
pursuit and choice of the targets (Sections 4B and 4C). 
 
4A. The Kremlinology of monetary targets 
 
Targets for broad money growth in the U.K. were formally announced in July 1976.  
While their public disclosure reflected pressure from financial markets,  monetary targets 
had been used within the Treasury and the Bank of England since 1973 (Healey, 1990, p. 
491), which in turn followed what the Bank of England later called the adoption of an 
“aim of regulating the growth of the money supply” in 1971.
78 
 
These developments occurred despite continuing strong attachment among U.K. policy 
officials to the nonmonetary approach to economic management.  For example, Rowan 
(1973, pp. 36−37) observed that “it is clear that the authorities do not accept that either a 
restrictive monetary policy or a restrictive fiscal policy would make a useful contribution 
to reducing cost inflation… [T]he Bank [of England] probably sees fiscal policy as the 
main means of controlling demand[,] and ‘incomes policy’… as offering the best hope of 
containing inflation.”  And several appointments during 1973−74 consolidated the 
position of the hard-liners: Christopher Dow (a major influence on the Radcliffe Report) 
became Economics Director at the Bank of England in early 1973, and when Harold 
Wilson returned to office in March 1974, Nicholas Kaldor again became a senior advisor 
to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, while Thomas Balogh actually became a member of 
————————————————————————————————— 
77 Meltzer (1976, p. 179). 
78 “The Gilt-Edged Market,” Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin (June, 1979), Vol. 19(2), pp. 137−148; 
quotation from page 138.  Similarly, the OECD (1982, p. 78) judged that “[t]he focus of [U.K.] monetary 
policy shifted during the early 1970s toward control of various monetary aggregates.”   27
Wilson’s ministry.  These personnel changes reinforce the puzzle of why U.K. 
policymakers actually moved away from the traditional nonmonetary approach to 
demand management and toward monetary targeting during the 1970s.
79 
 
As observers such as Keegan (1985, p. 100) have noted, there is an element of 
“Kremlinology”  in analyzing U.K. monetary policy over this period, because while 
policy decisions were undoubtedly the outcome of much internal debate, the details of 
internal deliberations were not disclosed officially, with a monolithic view being 
presented publicly.  In the present instance, the debate within the government was 
between the advocates of greater use of monetary policy and the traditional U.K. hard-
liners. 
  
One can rationalize the increased role for monetary aggregates in monetary policy from 
1971, despite the hard-liners’ strength, by continuing the “Kremlinology” analogy.  The 
policy of détente was adopted in the Soviet Union in the 1970s in part because it had 
elements that appealed to both “reformers” and “hard-liners” within the Kremlin: to the 
reformers, détente was a means of achieving a genuine thawing of international relations 
and promoting internal reform; while to the hard-liners, détente offered an opportunity to 
“lock in,” via international agreements, recognition of postwar borders imposed by Soviet 
military power. 
 
By analogy, the growing interest in monetary aggregates in the 1970s had some appeal to 
both reformers and hard-liners in U.K. policy circles.  To reformers, it was a shift away 
from the traditional nonmonetary framework.  To hard-liners, there was a positive side to 
each of the steps in 1971, 1973, and 1976, that seemingly attached monetary policy ever 
more firmly to monetary aggregates. 
 
Regarding the initial 1971 shift, Gowland (1978, p. 40) contends that hard-liners at this 
time might have increased their interest in money supply series, despite regarding credit 
and liquidity as the important aggregates for monetary policy.  The reason, he speculates, 
is that the 1971 reforms reduced the regulation of banks, which might have had the effect 
of making broad money a less distorted proxy for a wider liquidity aggregate than 
previously.  Gowland’s speculation was borne out by disclosures by a Bank of England 
official in 1982 (Fforde, 1983).
80 Fforde noted that policy officials had been able to reach 
————————————————————————————————— 
79 Though retaining, as we will see, nonstandard views on how to control monetary aggregates. 
80 Fforde’s paper was an official account of policy developments, and therefore can be presumed to have 
had top-level clearance from both the Bank of England and the Treasury.  Nevertheless, there is evidence in 
the paper that the clearance may have been rushed, resulting in the final product being unusually candid.  
For example, Fforde gives the wrong date both for the release of the Radcliffe Report (corrected in the 
Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin version of his article) and the first 1974 election (an error that likely   28
agreement because “the use of a broad money target could be justified by reference to 
rather different theories about the importance of ‘liquidity’ and ‘credit’” (p. 53)—or, as 
Fforde’s discussant put it, U.K. officials could “justify monetary targeting in 
nonmonetarist terms” (Davis, 1983, p. 68).  Indeed, during 1971 the Bank of England 
Governor described monetary policy as “control over liquidity,”
81 thereby leaving 
nebulous whether monetary aggregates were being given importance in their own right.  
In the event, the issue became moot, as over 1971−73 the overriding interest of the 
authorities was in stimulating the economy, and so rapid growth in a variety of monetary 
and credit aggregates was permitted. 
 
The acceptance by the hard-liners of the 1973 shift to an internal monetary target is only 
slightly more difficult to rationalize.
82 The main departure from the Radcliffian position 
by the authorities in 1973 was their renewed deployment of direct controls over bank 
balance sheet growth—which the Radcliffe Report had criticized as ineffective, and 
which again created the scope for money growth to diverge from the “liquidity” concept.  
The hard-liners nevertheless probably accepted this departure on pragmatic grounds.  For 
one thing, not all the hard-liners who were prominent in 1973−74 shared the Radcliffe 
Report’s negative view of direct controls; Kaldor, for example, had decided that the 1971 
deregulation was a “disastrous reform” and preferred “the well-tried methods” of direct 
controls.
83 But more fundamentally, the reason the Heath and Wilson Governments 
favored direct controls to rein in broad money growth was to avoid the need for interest-
rate increases.  Whatever reservations Dow and others had about the effectiveness of 
direct controls on banking activity, they would have sympathized with the sentiment that 
interest-rate increases should be avoided.  According to the hard-liners’ and the 
Government’s cost-push view of inflation, interest-rate increases were doubly 
undesirable: to the extent that they reduced aggregate demand, they added to 
unemployment without fighting inflation, and to the extent that they raised costs, they 
actually contributed to inflation. 
                                                                                                                                                 
would have been corrected if a Treasury minister had read the article in detail).  In addition, a footnote in 
Fforde’s paper also downplays monetary expansion as a source of the U.K.’s 1970s inflation, contradicting 
the Thatcher Government’s official position. 
81 Leslie O’Brien, “Key Issues in Monetary and Credit Policy,” May 28, 1971, speech, Bank of England 
Quarterly Bulletin (June, 1971), Vol. 11(2), pp. 195−198; quotation from page 197.  The labeling of the 
1971 reforms as “Credit Control” had raised suspicions from the start that there had been little change by 
the authorities from the Radcliffian position (Johnson, 1971). 
82 Paralleling the increased internal interest in monetary targets at this time was growing discussion of the 
money supply in U.K. policy debate.  For discussion of this, see Keegan (1984), Smith (1987), and Parsons 
(1989, Ch. 6).  
83 Nicholas Kaldor, House of Lords Debates, June 11, 1980. pp. 466−467.   29
The introduction of announced monetary targets (initially for M3, then Sterling M3)
84 in 
1976 likewise had its bright side for the traditional critics of monetary policy.  The shift 
to broad money targeting did not end the nonmonetary approach to inflation control; 
rather, as Allsopp (1991, p. 23) observes, “the emphasis of counter-inflation policy 
remained on incomes policy throughout this period.”  Nor did monetary targets even 
come to dominate short-term interest-rate decisions.  On the contrary, the credit 
counterparts approach to money supply analysis (see Section 4B below) led the 
authorities to believe that the monetary targets could be achieved largely by fiscal 
actions.  Indeed, very soon after the introduction of monetary targets, the authorities used 
short-term rates to impose what Goodhart (1984a, p. 18) describes as “almost pegging” of 
the dollar/sterling exchange rate, a policy that produced sharp cuts in nominal and real 
interest rates; and when in 1977 The Economist referred to “the government’s new 
economic policy,” it was to this exchange-rate policy, not to the monetary targets.
85 The 
hard-liners had considerable reason to be pleased with the state of macroeconomic policy, 
as it was adhering to a “sixties-style” combination of incomes policy and pegged 
exchange rates, rather than to an inflation-oriented monetary policy.  Thus, despite 
official monetary targeting from 1976, a real break from the nonmonetary approach to 
inflation control did not occur until the Thatcher Government’s election in 1979.  
 
4B. The credit counterparts approach 
 
During the broad money targeting period, the U.K. authorities made use of an identity 
describing commercial bank asset and liability growth, known as the “credit 
counterparts” identity, as a guide to the determination of monetary growth.  Along with 
several outside U.K. economists, they argued that the counterparts identity shed light on 
the link between budget deficits and deposit creation, and also provided a reason for 
targeting broad money growth instead of a narrower monetary aggregate.  But these 
arguments were flawed: the credit counterparts identity does not, in fact, shed light on the 
link between budget deficits and deposit creation, nor does it provide a reason for 
targeting broad money growth instead of a narrower monetary aggregate. 
 
The credit counterparts identity is simple to exposit in generic form.  Neglecting the non-
earning assets of commercial banks, their total assets may be written as: 
————————————————————————————————— 
84 The original broad money targets, and much early 1970s U.K. discussion, referred to M3, but Sterling 
M3 (which excludes foreign currency deposits at U.K. banks) soon became the targeted aggregate.  The 
change was technically justifiable, but also probably influenced by the fact that Edward Heath had taken to 
using the argument that since M3 contained foreign deposits, he had been justified in disregarding the 
growth in that aggregate.  See Edward Heath, House of Commons Debates, March 10, 1976, page 466.  
85 “Gilts: Interest Grows as Interest Falls,” The Economist (London), August 13, 1977, pp. 87−88; quotation 
from page 87.   30
 
Total commercial bank assets = Bank lending to government  
                                               + Bank lending to private sector 
 
while on the liabilities side: 
 
Total commercial bank liabilities = Total deposits + Total nondeposit liabilities. 
 
With the “budget deficit” defined as the change in total borrowing by the government, 
and assuming the central bank does not directly acquire newly issued securities, 
 
Budget deficit = Change in bank lending to government  
                      + Change in nonbank private sector lending to government, 
 
the credit counterparts identity follows as: 
 
Change in total bank deposits =   
            Change in bank lending to private sector  + Budget deficit  
             − Change in nonbank private sector lending to government  
             – Change in total nondeposit liabilities. 
 
From this identity, the authorities concluded that there was a one-for-one relationship 
between absolute changes in the budget deficit and in Sterling M3 (which was, after all, 
currency plus total bank deposits), unless the budget deficit was financed by selling 
securities to the nonbank private sector.
86 This conclusion was inappropriate: it amounted 
to using the identity to make general equilibrium conclusions from a partial equilibrium 
analysis.  The identity does not provide a good guide to the economic behavior that 
determines broad money growth.  Various misleading aspects of the policy conclusions 
that came out of the credit counterparts identity are highlighted in Parkin (1982), Darby 
and Lothian (1983), Allsopp and Mayes (1985), and Schwartz (1985), and we synthesize 
and build on these critiques in this section. 
 
There is a longstanding confusion in monetary economics about the implications of 
commercial bank lending to the government.  Friedman and Schwartz (1963, p. 566) 
document that the Federal Reserve in the 1940s treated commercial bank purchases of 
government securities as similar to central bank purchases of government debt, in that 
both imply higher money growth.  As they note, this conclusion was incorrect.  Central 
————————————————————————————————— 
86 It further led to the misguided policy of “overfunding,” discussed in Section 5B.1 below.   31
bank purchases of government debt (including purchases of securities initially acquired 
by the private sector), not offset by other transactions, expand the monetary base and, 
together with the interest-rate reactions associated with the change in the base, create the 
conditions for an expansion for the total deposits of the commercial banking system.  On 
the other hand, commercial bank purchases of government securities, for given monetary 
base, must be at the expense of greater lending to the private sector, since the unchanged 
monetary base means that no conditions for an expansion of overall commercial bank 
deposits have been created.  These behavioral factors mean that, the credit counterparts 
identity notwithstanding, the division of the budget deficit between commercial bank and 
nonbank financing is unimportant for monetary control. 
 
Nonetheless, the belief that commercial bank purchases of government debt stimulated 
money growth remained prevalent in the U.K., including among U.K. monetarists, such 
as Walters (1969),
87 and in such inaccurate descriptions such as that of The Economist 
that it corresponded to “printing money through borrowing from the banks.”
88 The credit 
counterparts identity appeared to provide an underpinning for this belief, which probably 
contributed to the popularity of the counterparts approach in the U.K.  Cobham (2002, p. 
21) dates the counterparts approach to articles by U.K. government officials in 1966, but 
the approach was exposited earlier by Holtrop (1957), the Governor of the Netherlands 
central bank, who had also testified to the Radcliffe Committee (Holtrop, 1958).  
Holtrop’s original exposition had included the key fallacious policy conclusion that 
emerges from the counterparts approach: “borrowing by the Treasury from the 
commercial banking system has, by itself, exactly the same inflationary character as 
borrowing from the central bank” (Holtrop, 1957, p. 316). 
 
Numerous exponents of the credit counterparts approach have stated that the identity can 
only be applied to a broad aggregate like Sterling M3 and not a transactions money 
aggregate like M1 (see e.g. Bank of England, 1984, p. 45); and it was this property, 
according to a Bank of England official, that “turned the decision” in determining the 
authorities’ preference for Sterling M3 over M1 targeting.
89 But the claimed property is 
incorrect both in principle and as a matter of history.  It is incorrect in principle because 
the counterparts identity does hold when M1 deposits constitute the “bank deposits” 
aggregate; one simply needs to define the non-M1 deposit component of Sterling M3 as 
“nondeposit liabilities.”  It is incorrect as a matter of history because the originator of the 
————————————————————————————————— 
87 “One method of financing the deficit is for the Government to borrow from the banking system… 
[which] clearly increases the quantity of money.”  (Walters, 1969, pp. 1181−1182). 
88 Editorial, “Agenda for the Tories,” The Economist (London), July 2, 1977, pp. 9−10; quotation from page 
9. 
89 Allen (1982, p. 104).   32




The claim that the counterparts identity applies only to Sterling M3 deposits does, 
however, throw light on the views of its exponents.  It would appear that the U.K. 
advocates of the counterparts approach were attached to it precisely because they 
believed the appropriate measure of money was one that moved closely with aggregate 
credit.  This is perhaps most clear from the discussion of Congdon (1982, p. 129), who 
argued that the counterparts approach was a good way of analyzing money creation in the 
U.K. but not in the Federal Republic of Germany, because in the latter country variations 
in banks’ equity issues drove a large wedge between broad money and aggregate credit 
growth.  But the insistence that money and credit move together does not provide a good 
criterion for defining money, for the credit/money distinction is crucial to much of the 
quantity-theory and monetarist literature, and is central also in modern optimizing models 
where it is services of money, not credit, that enter the utility function.  The appropriate 
conclusion from Congdon’s observation is instead that the counterparts identity should 
not have been at the center of monetary analysis in the U.K. or any other country, and 
that it should not have played a part in deciding the issue of which monetary aggregate 
the authorities should target. 
 
4C. The choice of broad money 
 
As the Bank of England Governor acknowledged in 1978, “The view that monetary 
aggregates matter does not in itself imply a choice of any particular aggregate.”
91 But 
until the early 1980s, the issue was settled as far as the authorities were concerned: as 
Cobham (1991, p. 43) notes, since “they first began to talk in terms of monetary 
aggregates, the U.K. monetary authorities had shown a preference for broad money as the 
best measure.”  Indeed, two striking features of U.K. discussions of monetary targeting 
are, first, the number of arguments made in favor of broad money measures, such as 
Sterling M3, over narrow aggregates such as the monetary base (M0) or M1; and second, 
the poor quality of these arguments.  In fact, it seems clear that the authorities would have 
been better served in both the 1970s and 1980s in focusing on narrower aggregates, 
————————————————————————————————— 
90 “[A] shift from time deposits to current deposits, i.e. a creation of money…” (Holtrop, 1958, p. 266).  
See also the discussion of Holtrop’s views in “The Banking Sector and Monetary Policy,” Midland Bank 
Review (Winter, 1978), pp. 19−25.  Geoffrey Bell, who was one of the figures who introduced credit 
counterparts analysis to the U.K. in 1966 (Cobham, 2002, p. 21), himself favored a definition of money 
considerably narrower than the official M3 series (Bell, 1970).  
91 Governor Gordon Richardson, “The Building Societies in a Changing Financial Environment,” May 18, 
1978, speech, published in Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin (June, 1978), Vol. 18(2), pp. 245−249; 
quotation from page 247.   33
particularly the monetary base, as the measure of money in making interest-rate 
decisions.  
 
Predating even the monetary targeting period, several commentators who believed that an 
M1-type measure was appropriate for monetary analysis in the U.S. sought to rationalize 
the interest in broad money in the U.K.  The U.S. monetary economist Lauchlin Currie, 
for example, wrote in 1934 that “[i]n Great Britain [i.e., the U.K.] and Canada[,] 
competition between banks has led to a relaxation of the prohibition against the drawing 
of checks against time deposits” (Currie, 1934, p. 19).  On the basis of this argument, one 
might infer that it was appropriate to treat Sterling M3 or other broad aggregates as a 
measure of transactions money.  Even U.K. officials could not accept this argument—it 
was clear that time deposits and similar instruments were not equivalent to demand 
deposits as media of exchange.  Thus the U.K. authorities acknowledged in 1970 that the 
M1 series was “based more firmly on the distinguishing function of money as a medium 
of exchange.”
92 Though the M1 aggregate was abolished in 1989, the authorities continue 
to acknowledge the distinction between broad money and transactions money, for 
example by reporting Divisia versions of the M4 series.
93 
 
It was also claimed by proponents of broad money that narrow measures such as M0 and 
M1 failed to predict the take-off in U.K. inflation in the 1970s, particularly the peak in 
1975, whereas Sterling M3 did so (e.g. Bank of England, 1984, p. 45).  Sterling M3 did 
rise at a greater rate in 1971−73 than either M0 or M1, and more closely matched in its 
percentage-point increase the subsequent rise in inflation.  But this did not reflect 
aberrational behavior on the part of the narrow aggregates.  For M0, one important factor 
was that the cut in reserve requirements by the authorities in 1971 produced the 
equivalent of about six percentage points of money base growth, so one would expect 
deposit money to rise by more than base money over this period (Pepper, 1994, p. 244).  
In addition, M0 and M1 had larger interest elasticities than Sterling M3, on account of the 
substantial interest-bearing component of broad money.  Under those circumstances, it is 
to be expected that the rise in inflation to exceed the rise in money growth—given that, in 
the U.K. from 1972, nominal interest rates too were increasing.  Such a money 
growth/inflation pattern is a fundamental part of the adjustment of prices to a monetary 
expansion, and qualitatively the same pattern was observed in the M1 growth/inflation 
relationship during the rise in inflation in the U.S. (Barro, 1982). 
————————————————————————————————— 
92 HM Treasury, “A Note on Definitions of the Money Supply,” Economic Trends (August, 1970), Vol. 
202(8), pp. xi−xii; quotation from page xi. 
93 Other early arguments, such as in Newlyn (1962, pp. 7−9), that attempted to justify broad money for the 
U.K. rather than M1 on grounds of institutional differences between the U.S. and the U.K, proved equally 
shaky (see Friedman and Schwartz, 1970, pp. 118−121).   34
Another argument, as we have discussed, was that Sterling M3 was regarded as 
preferable to M1 because of the direct link between budget deficits and Sterling M3 
claimed by advocates of the credit counterparts approach.  For example, in 1979, Alan 
Budd, later an adviser to the U.K. government (and much later, one of the original 
members of the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee) claimed: “M3 is the 
preferable measure amongst those available because of its direct link with the 
government’s fiscal and financial policy” (Budd, 1979, p. 12).  The link between deficits 
and broad money growth suggested by this approach, had already meant that the 
monetary targets were one factor guiding fiscal policy in the early monetary targeting 
period (1976−79).  The belief in a link was enshrined in the “Medium-Term Financial 
Strategy” (MTFS) announced alongside the 1980 Budget, setting out multi-year plans for 
reductions in Sterling M3 growth and the deficit.  Fortunately, however, 1980 turned out 
to be the last budget where the broad money targets were a major consideration in setting 
fiscal policy.
94 But in any case, the credit counterparts identity was not a valid grounds 
for preferring Sterling M3 as the measure of money. 
 
It was also claimed, both by Treasury Ministers Howe and Lawson in 1981
95 and by 
outside commentators such as Congdon (1995, p. 18), that movements in M1 and the 
monetary base could not meaningfully register excessive or inadequate money creation, 
because private sector behavior determined the split between non-M1 deposits and M1 
deposits, and between currency and total deposits.  To be an argument in favor of Sterling 
M3 or M4, the argument requires it to be the case that the private sector’s portfolio 
adjustments cannot change the aggregate stock of broad money.  This claim is not 
correct: every monetary aggregate, under modern institutional arrangements, corresponds 
to the quantity of nominal money demanded by the private sector.  The monetarist claim 
that central banks can create an “excess supply” of money does not amount to a denial of 
this reality, but instead rests on the fact that open market operations alter the quantity of 
nominal money demanded.  The “excess money supply” concept does not require a lack 
of intersection between demand and supply curves for money, just as the “output gap” 
concept does not deny that aggregate demand and supply curves continuously intersect.  
Both concepts instead highlight that macroeconomic policy can create quantities (of 
————————————————————————————————— 
94 An individual who served as a junior Treasury minister over this period later claimed that Sterling M3’s 
high growth led to the tightening of fiscal policy by Chancellor Howe in his 1981 Budget (Ridley, 1991, p. 
182).  But Howe (1994, p. 205) says that broad money behavior played a “very modest role” in the 
formation of the 1981 Budget, which seems more plausible, especially as Margaret Thatcher’s newly 
appointed economic advisor (Alan Walters) preferred the narrow measures of money.  This is also 
consistent with Howe’s statement in his Budget speech that “underlying financial conditions have, as the 
Government intended, been tight” (House of Commons Debates, March 10, 1981, page 762). 
95 For a statement to this effect by Howe, see House of Commons Debates, March 10, 1981, page 762; 
while one by Lawson is quoted in Keegan (1989, p. 78).  The same argument figured in the Callaghan 
Government’s preference for Sterling M3 (Allsopp, 1991, p. 30).   35
money and output, respectively) that are “excessive” relative to a price-stability baseline, 
and which therefore trigger price-level responses.  
 
Finally, the fact that Friedman and Schwartz (1963, 1970) used a broad money concept 
(old M2) in their analysis of the U.S., and justified it by appealing to the “temporary 
abode of purchasing power” or “asset” function of money, does not provide much support 
for the emphasis on broad money in the U.K.  Friedman and Schwartz (1970) specifically 
excluded certificates of deposit from their definition of money; whereas in the U.K., not 
only were CDs included by the authorities in the Sterling M3 definition, but their growth 
was a large contributor to the divergence between broad and narrow money growth in 
1971−73.  In fact, within the U.K., the authorities’ inclusion of CDs in the M3 definition 
had been questioned as early as 1970 (Bell, 1970). 
 
The arguments in favor of broad money appear weak, but can more positive arguments be 
made in favor of the narrow definitions?  It was Friedman and Schwartz (1970, p. 145) 
who also provided a practical argument for regarding the narrowest measures of money 
as more reliable indicators than broad money.  They argued: “In many a country… the 
meaning of different categories of bank deposits has altered as banks have reacted to 
government regulations and interventions”—in the U.K. case, principally quantitative 
controls on banks’ balance sheets—so that it could be “preferable to return to earlier 
definitions of ‘money’ as currency (or high-powered money) solely and to omit all 
deposits.”  Their general argument applies best to currency, but applies also to the U.K.’s 
monetary base (M0) series, which is largely currency and for which the required-reserve 
component is not typically a large contributor to the annual growth rate.
96 A dissertation 
by one of Friedman’s students pursued Friedman and Schwartz’s argument.  In the 
published version of the dissertation, the author remarked that the “United Kingdom 
currently provides an instructive example” of their point (Lothian, 1976, p. 67). 
 
Lothian was referring to the U.K.’s marginal reserve requirement, labeled the 
“Supplementary Special Deposit” or “corset” scheme, introduced in late 1973 with the 
explicit aim of lowering M3 (or Sterling M3) growth without altering interest rates.  The 
corset scheme was specifically designed to curb broad money growth by inducing slower 
growth in certificates of deposit.  Since these instruments were, as noted above, among 
the most questionable elements of the broad money definition, it is doubtful whether the 
corset scheme would have had a restrictive effect on aggregate demand even if it had 
————————————————————————————————— 
96 Since 1981, required reserves have not been a component of the official M0 series.  Over 1955−2004, 
changes in reserve requirements have had direct implications for the reserves component of the M0 series 
only in 1971 and 1981; the required reserves (Special Deposits) that resulted from operation of a variable 
reserve requirement over 1961−1980 are not part of the M0 series (Capie and Webber, 1985, p. 12).    36
reduced CD growth and not promoted any kind of bank evasion.  But, of course, the 
corset did lead to efforts by the banks to evade the new control; and with interest rates 
low and reserve growth high during much of the corset period, the evasion took the form 
of the creation of deposit substitutes.  The outcome was that in the period during which 
the corset was imposed (or in danger of being reimposed), 1973 to 1980, Sterling M3 
growth was a far less reliable measure of money growth than was monetary base growth. 
 
With the corset’s abolition in mid-1980, annual Sterling M3 growth rose to rates of 
around 20 per cent.  Various factors have been cited to explain the rapid broad money 
growth over this period; for example, Meltzer (1981, p. 25) suggests that income tax cuts 
led to a shift to time deposits, Allen (1982, p. 99) and Keegan (1985, p. 146) mention 
“distress borrowing” by corporations, and Walters (1986) stresses the effect of sterling 
appreciation on household wealth.  But these explanations by themselves only explain 
why certain classes of deposits or loans should grow in relative terms, not why aggregate 
broad money growth rose.  Ultimately, there is no getting away from the explanation that 
“[e]vidently banks’ (and their customers’) ingenuity and determination to avoid corset 
penalties had been underestimated” (Bootle, 1985, p. 327), and that consequently broad 
money growth in 1980 gave a misleading picture of monetary conditions—a fact the 
authorities quickly acknowledged. 
 
Money base growth, on the other hand, reached low single-digit levels in the early 1980s, 
accurately reflecting the restrictive monetary policy in force.
97 It was this situation that 
led Karl Brunner, when talking to Margaret Thatcher in 1980, to emphasize the monetary 
base, using much the same argument as Friedman and Schwartz (1970).  “From the start 
we told her it was in part a data problem,” Brunner recalled shortly afterwards.  “M1 is 
too narrow and M3 is much too broad… So long as there is this data problem, the central 
bank should focus on the monetary base.”
98 Thatcher heeded this advice, indicating in a 
1981 television interview that while she was “not relying on M1” and that rapid M3 
growth had been due to the fact that “we took off that thing known as the Bank of 
England corset,” she felt that the “monetary base happens to be an extremely important 
[aggregate]… We do look at monetary base.”
99 Thus the weight given to the monetary 
————————————————————————————————— 
97 Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin, and Posen (1999, p. 149) report U.K. base money growth as falling from 
12% to minus 2% over 1980−82.  Part of this decline, however, reflects regulatory changes in 1981 which 
reduced required reserves and shifted the remaining required reserves out of the monetary base definition.  
Our own series that adjusts for this change still shows a major decline over 1980−82, from 12% to below 
1%. 
98 Karl Brunner, quoted in Lindley H. Clark Jr., “Battle of the Bank of England,” Wall Street Journal, April 
7, 1981, page 35. 
99 Margaret Thatcher, interview with Brian Walden, Weekend World, London Weekend Television, 
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base increased, although the Government rejected the option of monetary base control 
and continued to use the short-term interest rate as a policy instrument. 
 
Ongoing institutional changes in the 1980s continued to make Sterling M3 and M4 less 
reliable than base money as an indicator for monetary policy.  Cobham (2002, p. 42) 
argues that since the standard deviation of the broad money velocity growth rate was not 
higher in the 1980s than previously, the broad money/nominal income relationship was 
not “more variable and more uncertain” in the 1980s.  But a second-moment statistic like 
the standard deviation of the growth rate understates the uncertainty about velocity when, 
as in the U.K., policymakers’ beliefs referred to the level of the series.  The U.K. 
authorities had in 1980 given their estimate of the trend in Sterling M3 velocity of about 
+1.25% per year (HM Treasury, 1980).  By 1986, the deviation of actual Sterling M3 
velocity from this trend stood at 15% or more, while M4 velocity stood at a level at least 
10 percent below what might have been suggested by its pre-1979 trend.
100 
 
While inflation targeting has reduced the attention given to monetary aggregates in U.K. 
policymaking, both the monetary base and broad money are discussed as indicators, and 
so the issue of which series is more reliable remains important.  The same considerations 
that led to policymakers’ disillusionment with broad money in the 1980s should also lead 
today’s policymakers to prefer the monetary base as the measure of money. 
 
5.  Flaws in monetary policy execution (1955−85) 
 
The execution of monetary policy had a number of flaws both during the period of the 
nonmonetary approach to demand management and during the monetary targeting period.  
Some of these flaws were shared with other countries; some were specific to the U.K.; 
and some (such as lack of transparency about its interest-rate decisions, and over-reliance 
on reserve requirements as a policy instrument) the U.K. shook off earlier than other 
countries.  We divide our discussion of the conduct of monetary policy into short-term 
interest-rate policy (Section 5A) and other policy instruments (Section 5B). 
 
5A. Short-term interest-rate policy 
 
After giving some background to the conduct of interest-rate policy in the U.K. (Section 
5A.1), we look at two problems with interest-rate policy formulation: neglect of the real 
rate/nominal rate distinction (especially before 1970) and inadequate nominal-rate 
————————————————————————————————— 
100 And unlike the later break in trend of M0 velocity, which followed the adoption of inflation targeting, 
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responses to inflation (especially important during the 1970s). 
 
5A.1 Interest rates and U.K. policy 
 
In the U.S., the formal acknowledgment by the Federal Reserve Board in 1994 that it 
used the Federal funds rate as its instrument, and the prompt disclosure of its chosen 
values for that instrument, were regarded as a watershed.  In the U.K., however, there 
was no corresponding watershed, because the authorities’ use of a short-term interest-rate 
instrument, and its chosen instrument value, were public knowledge throughout the 
1950s, 1960s and into the 1970s.  When Jonson (1976, p. 996) wrote in the Journal of 
Political Economy that “U.K. monetary policy is conducted by setting some important 
nominal interest rates,” it amounted to a simple statement of fact, whereas, at the time, a 
corresponding statement applied to the U.S. would have been controversial (though 
accurate).   There was also no episode in the U.K. corresponding to the U.S. experience 
of 1979−82, during which use of an interest-rate instrument was dropped in favor of a 
nonborrowed reserves operating target.  In these respects, there has been a degree of 
continuity in the conduct of monetary policy in the U.K. not present in the U.S. 
 
The continuity is reflected in the similarity of coverage of monetary policy decisions in 
the 1950s and 2000s: 
 
“[The] Bank of England boosted to 3½% from 3% the cost of money it will lend through 
the discount markets… [T]o businessmen and the man in the street it’s the key to all 
interest rates.  Changes in its level govern bank charges and personal loans, interest on 
bank deposits, mortgage rates and others.”  (Wall Street Journal, January 28, 1955)
101  
 
“The Bank of England yesterday moved to head off a recession by dramatically slashing 
interest rates to their lowest level since Winston Churchill was Prime Minister… 
Following the announcement, a flurry of lenders were quick to pass on the latest cut to 




Despite this continuity, much discussion prior to the 1990s of the U.K. authorities’ 
conduct of monetary policy was clouded by misconceptions.  The abolition of interest-
rate pegging by central banks in the early 1950s coincided with the abolition of price 
————————————————————————————————— 
101 “Bank of England Raises Discount Rate in Mild Move on Inflation,” Wall Street Journal, January 28, 
1955, page 11. 
102 Ian King, “4% Mortgage Delight as Rates Hit 46-Year Low,” The Sun (London), November 9, 2001, 
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controls in many countries, including the U.K.  This probably encouraged a belief that 
central banks’ influence over interest rates rested on a suppression of market forces 
analogous to that associated with price controls.  The false analogy between price control 
and interest-rate control in turn encouraged the view that, as financial markets became 
progressively more sophisticated and deregulated, the U.K. authorities’ ability to 
manipulate interest rates would wear off.  Complementing this view was the influence of 
the Gurley-Shaw (1960) and Radcliffe Committee positions that financial innovation was 
creating conditions where private intermediaries would be able to expand their balance 
sheets independently of the actions of the monetary authorities, with the result that the 
determination of interest rates would become outside the influence of central banks. 
 
Along these lines, both academic and financial-market commentators on the U.K. scene 
in the 1960s and 1970s made claims that the era of an official interest-rate instrument was 
ending.  For example, a 1964 discussion of monetary policy in Western Europe stated: 
“Bank [R]ate, as a policy instrument, has lost some of its former importance… and is apt 
to be a follower rather than an initiator of policy” (Beckhart, 1964, p. 96).  And in 
October 1969, the financial column of the London Daily Mail stated: “Time was when all 
London interest rates were geared to Bank Rate.  But that is long since past… Bank Rate, 
in fact, is meaningless.”
103 In January 1972, the same column stated: “Nowadays the 
Bank influences rates through open market operations, and Bank Rate follows interest 
rates rather than leads them.”
104 Nearly five years later, in November 1976, a column 
entitled “What Happened to Bank Rate” began: “The Bank of England has pulled its 
Minimum Lending Rate, successor to Bank Rate, out of the firing line and into reserve.  
MLR’s meaning has changed, its importance has diminished.  The Bank has other forces 
at its command, and now will use them more freely.”
105 Thus in 1964, 1969, 1972, and 
1976, the obituary was written for interest rates as a meaningful policy instrument in the 
U.K.—yet in 2004 the monetary authorities employed an interest rate as an instrument 
just as they did in 1955.
106 
 
In fact, the conditions under which central bank actions cease to be a strong influence on 
short-term interest rates never arrived in the U.K.  In a Gurley-Shaw (1960) type world, 
financial innovations do result in the elimination of a demand for base money, and so the 
————————————————————————————————— 
103 Patrick Sergeant, “Bank Rate: The Fiction,” Daily Mail (London), October 30, 1969, page 15.   
104 Patrick Sergeant, “Will It Matter If Bank Rate Goes Down?,” Daily Mail (London), January 20, 1972, 
page 21.  Also in 1972 a book on the U.K. economy by a financial journalist claimed, “Bank Rate is much 
less important nowadays than it was, say twenty years ago… [I]nterest rates generally do not follow Bank 
Rate” (Davis, 1972, p. 24). 
105 Christopher Fildes, “What Happened to Bank Rate,” Daily Mail (London), November 8, 1976. 
106 The policy rule guiding instrument choices, of course, changed substantially from 1955 to 2004, as we 
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fading away of central-bank influence over interest rates, broader monetary aggregates, 
and aggregate demand.  But in actual practice, banks and other intermediaries have 
continued to find it convenient to use balances at the central bank as a means of settling 
interbank debt; combined with the demand for currency by private households, this 
ensures a positive demand for the monetary base.  At a minimum, this ensured a long-run 
central-bank influence on nominal interest rates by being able to influence the expected-
inflation component of nominal rates.  But when there is some degree of price stickiness, 
open market operations that alter the nominal monetary base will alter the real monetary 
base in the same direction, and thus imply that central bank operations have a powerful 
short-run influence over both nominal and real short-term interest rates.   There are 
grounds for expecting these qualitative conditions to continue to prevail, both in the U.K. 
and elsewhere (Woodford, 2001).  And since these conditions have prevailed throughout 
1955−2004, it follows that the repeated statements in U.K. debate that loss of central 
bank influence on interest rates was at hand were misguided. 
 
What, then, was behind the periodic commentary about monetary policy was losing 
control of rates?  The quotation given above from 1964 probably reflects the incorrect 
“price control” analogy, while that from 1969 was probably driven by a misinterpretation 
of the implications of financial liberalization and global financial integration.  The 1972 
declaration that Bank Rate now follows market rates, on the other hand, likely reflects 
initial confusion about the implications of the financial deregulation measures 
(Competition and Credit Control) introduced in 1971.  These reforms were designed to 
encourage greater competition among commercial banks, particularly with regard to the 
interest rates offered by those banks.  Such reforms may have been interpreted as 
implying a permanent loss of official influence on market rates, whereas, in fact, they are 
better regarded as causing a one-time permanent shift in the spread between rates offered 
to customers by commercial banks and official interest rates. 
 
Another factor, discussed by Goodhart (1992, p. 324), is that the monetary authorities in 
the 1970s and 1980s themselves encouraged the view that interest rates were market-
determined, as this served as a “smokescreen.”  For the U.S., John Taylor observed in 
1982 that if the perception that the central bank was no longer setting interest rates had 
made it “easier politically” to carry out a disinflation, since the change in perception was 
“reducing political pressures on the Fed to lower interest rates.”
107 A successful 
smokescreen, in other words, could reduce the assignment of blame to central banks for 
————————————————————————————————— 
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“high” nominal interest rates.
108 As one U.K. financial columnist put it in 1984, there 
were “frequent official claims when interest rates are rising that they are ‘being pushed 




Gowland (1978, p. 51) and Goodhart (2004) mention specifically the replacement of 
Bank Rate with Minimum Lending Rate in October 1972 as one reform motivated by 
“smokescreen” considerations—as Gowland put it, creating a “cloak [over] policy 
changes.”  Some contemporary observers did take the 1972 reforms at face value, and so 
erroneously regarded the authorities as having abandoned an interest-rate instrument.
110 
For the most part, however, most financial market and academic observers quickly 
realized after each reform that the authorities had not abandoned interest rates as their 
control variable.  Tew (1979, p. 253), for example, noted that in the 1970s “the Bank 
[had] as effective a control over rates… as it had enjoyed in the 1960s.”  The 1976 
newspaper column quoted above also establishes that the 1972 reform had not succeeded 
in “fooling” the market about the importance of policymakers’ influence.  The attempt 
described in that column to downplay the role of Minimum Lending Rate (MLR) was, in 
turn, quickly abandoned: during 1977, the government, as noted above, attempted to 
restore fixed exchange rates, and so no longer had any interest in hiding its control of 
interest rates.  In this environment, The Economist noted that “the Bank effectively tells 
the discount market what rate it wants,”
111 while a London financial broker was quoted as 
accurately observing: “The authorities are trying to hold the pound steady and… interest 
rates are the variable.”
112 
 
Even after the authorities resumed a free float late in 1977, financial commentators 
————————————————————————————————— 
108 See Mishkin (2001) for a recent application of the “smokescreen” argument to Federal Reserve policy 
over 1979−82; in particular, Mishkin (2001, p. 2) argues that “the 1979 policy shift... was a smokescreen to 
obscure the need of the Fed to raise interest rates to very high levels to reduce inflation.”  A very early 
exponent of this position was Anna Schwartz in a 1984 Wall Street Journal interview, which gave her 
judgment as that in 1979−82 “the Fed embraced monetarist principles as a smokescreen for raising interest 
rates and reducing inflation.”  See Lindley H. Clark Jr. and Laurie McGinley, “Money’s Role: Monetarists 
Succeed in Pushing Basic Ideas But Not Their Policies,” Wall Street Journal, December 10, 1984, pages 1 
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by Bindseil (2004). 
109 Samuel Brittan, “A New Look at ‘Monetary Base,’” Financial Times (London), June 4, 1984, page 15. 
110 For example, Derek Porter, “Bank Rate Is Up 1pc,” Evening News (London), June 8, 1978, stated that 
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change in operating procedures.”  Milton Friedman, “Has the Fed Changed Course?,” Newsweek, October 
22, 1979, page 35. 
111 “Goodbye to the Duke of York,” The Economist, January 15, 1977, pp. 72−73; quotation from page 72. 
112 Nigel Althaus, senior partner of the Pember and Boyle brokerage company, quoted in Patrick Sergeant, 
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recognized that private commercial interest rates were, as before, governed by the 
authorities’ actions on the official interest rate.
113 An academic study in 1979 stated 
simply that rates on “short-term securities in the United Kingdom… have been 
administered by Bank Rate policy and, more recently, through alterations in the 
Minimum Lending Rate” (Foster, 1979, p. 152).  Consistent with this, the Bank of 
England Governor acknowledged in 1978 that “[t]he execution of monetary policy relies 
importantly on the control and movement of short-term rates of interest,”
114 while the 
following year Margaret Thatcher publicly explained her government’s increases in the 
MLR in reaction-function terms.
115 This directness continued in 1980, with Chancellor of 
the Exchequer Geoffrey Howe stating: “The level of interest rates is determined by the 
requirements of domestic monetary policy.”
116 
 
Both Smith (1987, p. 96) and Goodhart (2004) nominate the Bank of England’s abolition 
of the Minimum Lending Rate in 1981 as another reform motivated by “smokescreen” 
considerations—which a Bank of England official effectively admitted at the time when 
he said that MLR had been abolished because “[d]eclared changes in MLR tended to be 
political events of considerable significance for the government” (Allen, 1982, p. 109).  
This reform, however, was even less successful than the 1970s attempts to cloak the 
authorities’ manipulation of short rates.  Soon after the early 1980s reforms, Allan 
Meltzer accurately judged that they were a change “in name but not in fact; [the U.K.] 
continues to aim at interest-rate [operating] targets,”
117 while Congdon (1982, p. 80) 
stated: “The Bank [of England] can keep rates within its ‘unpublished’ target band.  The 
contention that short-term interest rates are market-determined in Britain is a serious 
misunderstanding.”
118 And official statements by policymakers in the 1980s 
acknowledged the authorities’ continued use of short rates as an instrument: for example, 
Chancellor Lawson’s 1983 Mansion House speech described the factor’s underlying his 
“short-term interest-rate decisions” (quoted in Smith, 1987, p. 117). 
 
Thus, despite their short-lived efforts to suggest otherwise, the U.K. monetary authorities 
have consistently used a short-term interest rate as their policy instrument.  In fact, even 
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the changes in the particular rate used as the instrument—e.g. from Bank Rate to 
Minimum Lending Rate, and in recent years, repo rate—have been of little 
macroeconomic significance, because all series have been closely related to the Treasury 
bill rate.  Thus, it is the bill rate we focus upon when we come to characterize the 
monetary policy reaction functions of the authorities during 1955−2004 (Section 5A.3). 
 
5A.2 Real vs. nominal interest rates 
 
That policymakers controlled short-term interest rates was well enough understood in the 
U.K. from the 1950s onward.  That “high” nominal interest rates did not necessarily 
imply tight monetary policy was far less well understood.  In particular, discussions prior 
to the late 1960s show a striking lack of interest in the real/nominal interest rate 
distinction.  This problem went to the very top level of policymaking, with former Prime 
Minister Anthony Eden displaying his own confusion on the subject in a 1957 letter to his 
successor, Harold Macmillan, where Eden asked, “How can one talk of a property-
owning democracy and a seven per cent Bank Rate?”
119 
 
But postwar U.K. monetary economists also rarely focused on the subject until the 
monetarist critique brought it to the fore in the late 1960s.  For example, the 600-page, 
approximately 264,000-word Readings in British Monetary Economics (1972) contained 
only four sentences that mentioned the real/nominal interest-rate distinction—and all four 




The Radcliffe Report, it is true, as well as some of the financial press, discussed the issue 
of whether index-linked bonds were desirable.
121 But such discussions put the focus on 
the supply-side consequences of low real interest rates—i.e., the implications for the 
purchasing power of saving and for capital accumulation—and even this channel was 




The demand implications of the Fisher relation were neglected: little attention was given 
to the fact that reductions in real rates were a stimulus to aggregate real spending, and 
that, therefore, in the face of rising inflation, a given level of policy tightness required 
higher nominal rates.  That aspect of the Fisher relationship was clouded by the constant 
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references during the 1960s to the prevailing 7 or 8 percent Bank Rate as a “crisis” rate.  
As noted above, a revival of interest in the Fisher relation did finally occur in the late 
1960s.  An early discussion in the press that perceived the importance of the Fisher 
relation for aggregate demand was that in The Observer in 1969: “Eight per cent sounds 
horribly high; it is nothing of the kind… If prices are rising at the rate of 5 per cent, as 
they did last year, then Bank Rate at 8 per cent is a mere bagatelle—a true rate of no 
more than 3 per cent.”
123 
 
In policy, financial, and academic circles, discussion of the real rate/nominal rate 
distinction exploded in the early 1970s.  Thus it appears appropriate to conclude that lack 
of understanding of the Fisher relationship was an impediment to good policy 
formulation in the U.K. up to the late 1960s, but not thereafter.  The problem in the 1970s 
was predominantly policymakers’ continuing belief that expected inflation could be 
manipulated by nonmonetary devices, not their failure to appreciate the importance of the 
expected-inflation component of nominal interest rates. 
 
5.A.3 Interest-rate reaction functions 
 
Studies of U.K. monetary policy since the 1960s have estimated interest-rate reaction 
functions, although most early studies (e.g. Goodhart, 1973) do not present estimates 
comparable to those in recent papers, mainly because they have the price level on the 
right-hand side instead of the inflation rate.  To give some simple characterizations of 
U.K. monetary policy over the last half-century, we present in this section simple 
interest-rate reaction functions estimated on annual data. 
 
Following Taylor (1999), our estimated specification has the nominal short rate (in our 
case, the Treasury bill rate) as the dependent variable, with the right-hand-side variables 
the contemporaneous values of annual inflation and the deviation of log real GDP from a 
broken linear trend (the breaks in the trend, in our case, taking place in 1974 and 1981).  
We use annual-average data.  The data refer to recent revised vintages, despite the 
quantitative importance of real-time output gap mismeasurement for the U.K.  Estimates 
in Nelson and Nikolov (2004) suggest that gap revisions do not have the powerful effect 
on policy-rule estimates for the U.K. that Orphanides (2004) found for the U.S. 
 
We consider several sample periods: 1955−1978; the subsample 1970−1978 taking in the 
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123 Anthony Barbridge, “Last Laugh for the Bankers,” The Observer (London), March 2, 1969, page 10.  
See also Margot Naylor, “Your Real Mortgage Rate Hasn’t Changed,” Daily Mail (London), October 27, 
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last years of the nonmonetary approach to inflation control;
124 the period of inflation-
oriented monetary policy 1981−2003; and the inflation-targeting period 1993−2003.  We 
start the sample period for the inflation-oriented monetary policy in 1981 rather than 
1979 because 1979-average data include some behavior from the Callaghan 
Government’s incumbency, while the inflation data for both 1979 and 1980 are affected 




Table 1. Interest-rate reaction functions for the U.K.: Annual data 
 





(t = 7.45) 
0.318 
(t = 1.83) 
0.731 
1970−1978 0.279 
(t = 3.97) 
0.875 
(t = 2.96) 
0.778 
1981−2003 1.050 
(t = 8.04) 
0.445 
(t = 3.05) 
0.786 
1993−2003 1.397 
(t = 0.91) 
0.187 
(t = 0.48) 
0.103 
 
Note: Dependent variable is the nominal Treasury bill rate (annual average). 
 
 
The table shows that the policy-rule response to inflation was very weak before 1979.  
The 1955−78 estimated inflation response is not much higher than that for 1970−78; 
evidently, the 1955 and 1957 tightenings in response to rising inflation do not make a 
great impression on the estimates.
126 The period of an inflation-oriented monetary policy 
(1981−2003) is associated with a response to inflation above unity, paralleling Taylor’s 
(1999) estimates of this specification for the U.S. over 1987−97.  Within the 1981−2003 
era, the inflation targeting period (1993−2003 in annual data) appears to exhibit a larger 
response to inflation and a smaller one to output deviations, though the low variability in 
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124 The floating of the exchange rate in June 1972 did not represent a major break from the monetary policy 
regime in force since 1970, because in 1970 and 1971 “the external situation ceased to be the dominant 
consideration in the application of domestic policies” (“Annual Monetary Survey—1971: A Sound 
External Situation,” Midland Bank Review (May, 1971), reprinted in Wadsworth, 1973, pp. 412−432; 
quotation from p. 412). 
125 In quarterly policy-rule estimates, Kara and Nelson (2004) control for this tax increase and show that 
once this is done, rule estimates for the whole post-1979 period are similar to those for the inflation 
targeting regime. 
126 A much larger inflation response (2.397) is reported for the period 1958−76 by Budd and Burns (1981, 
p. 139).  Their specification, however, includes the current account balance and exchange-rate change as 
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the data (itself, of course, a symptom of successful stabilization policy) and the small 
number of observations produce low t-statistics for our estimates.  The point estimate of 
1.4 on inflation is close to Chancellor Gordon Brown’s characterization of current U.K. 
arrangements: “For a 1 per cent rise in British inflation, the British interest rate would, 
other things being equal, tend to rise by 1.5 per cent.”
127 
 
5B. Inappropriate monetary control devices (1955−85) 
 
A focus on the shortcomings of interest-rate policy, while identifying important problems 
with past U.K. monetary policy, does not adequately address some key flaws in the 
policy record.  In particular, we look now at various other monetary control devices used 
in the U.K. from 1955 to 1985—long-term debt operations, lending controls, cash reserve 
requirements, and secondary reserve requirements—and argue that all were 
inappropriate.  A unifying principle in our criticism should be mentioned at the outset.  It 
could well be, and we believe is indeed the case, that there are important channels in the 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy not captured by the effect of policy on the 
path of the nominal short-term interest rate.  But it does not follow that one should expect 
monetary policy to have effects on aggregate demand by employing devices that leave 
the nominal short rate unchanged.  We will argue that, on the contrary, such an 
expectation is fallacious, and that embrace of this fallacy accounts for the repeated use of 
the devices that we now describe. 
 
5B.1 Long-term debt operations 
 
If the U.K. authorities’ attempts to portray the short-term interest rate as market-
determined were an attempt to deceive the public, their attitude to the determination of 
the long-term interest rate was instead a case of self-deception.  Denying the expectations 
theory of the term structure—as well as plausible generalizations of that theory—the 
authorities in the 1960s and 1970s both talked and acted as though the long-term 
government bond rate was a policy instrument, which could be manipulated 
independently of the short-term rate.  For example, the Bank of England Quarterly 
Bulletin’s description of developments in the long-term securities market in early 1969 
was that  “[d]uring the period the authorities generally allowed yields to rise,”
128 and 
similarly, later in the year “[t]he authorities allowed yields to rise very sharply…”
129 The 
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129 Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin (September, 1969), Vol. 9(3), page 287 of “Commentary” (pp. 
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authorities left no doubt of their view that they could manipulate long rates independently 
of the short rate with their March 1969 account: “a rise in U.K. interest rates other than 
the very shortest was seen as an appropriate accompaniment to the measures which had 
been taken to restrain domestic demand; and the authorities reverted to a policy of 
allowing any weakness to be fully reflected in [long-term bond] prices.”
130 
 
Before discussing how the authorities thought monetary policy could manipulate long-
term interest rates, let us first consider why the authorities regarded management of the 
long-term rate as a desirable policy.  Here their justification changed over time.  An early 
rationale, inherited from the “cheap money” period of 1939−51 during which both short 
and long rates were pegged, was the central bank’s traditional debt-management role.  
The Radcliffe Committee had concluded, “In our view debt management has become the 
fundamental domestic task of the central bank.”
131 In line with this, the Bank of England 
described its long-term operations as guided by the aim of “maximization of demand for 
British government debt,”
132 while Walters (1970, p. 44) contended that this constituted 
the principal aim of U.K. monetary policy for the entire postwar period.  Schwartz (1985) 
argues that from this aim the authorities took it as an “article of faith” that “debt 
management requires administered changes in interest rates,” leading to official attempts 
to administer the long rate. 
 
A second rationalization for the authorities’ interest in administering long rates, of 
increasing prominence from the late 1950s, was manipulation of the long rate for 
aggregate demand control.  The long-term rate had been one of the few observed interest 
rates that the Radcliffe Report had expressed some constructive remarks regarding its 
relevance for aggregate demand, though it had discounted the importance of even this 
rate.
133 Similarly, the Bank of England Governor in 1978 recounted that “one strand” of 
official thinking in the 1950s and 1960s was that the long-term rate had a role in 
stabilization policy beside its function in “merely financing the Government,”
134 while 
the Bank of England publicly emphasized this role in 1966, stating that its purpose in 
long-term bond transactions was “to assist economic policy by promoting or sustaining 
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monetary policy; and in Artis’ (1961, p. 360) assessment, the Report’s pessimism encompassed doubt about 
the elasticity of aggregate demand with respect to both short and long rates. 
134 Gordon Richardson, “Reflections on the Conduct of Monetary Policy,” February 9, 1978 speech, Bank 
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the most appropriate pattern of interest rates” and specifically “seeking to influence the 
behavior of prices and yields”
135 of long-term securities.  The demand-management 
rationale is also evident in the March 1969 Bank of England statement quoted above, 
while Goodhart (1972, p. 460) went so far as to say that “an understanding of the Bank’s 
view of [the long-term bond] market is an absolute precondition to comprehension of 
recent monetary policy in the U.K.” 
 
How do these rationalizations for the manipulation of the long rate stand up today?  
There seems little merit in the debt-management justification for controlling the long rate.  
Rather, it has become standard practice for central banks, to the extent they have a 
“banker to the government” function, not to interpret their role as an obligation to attempt 
to determine the prices at which the debt will be sold in the long-term market.  As for the 
demand-management rationale, macroeconomic analysis today does lend support to the 
notion that long-term rates matter more than short rates for aggregate demand—subject to 
important qualifications that we will discuss at the close of this section.  But the 1960s 
position of the authorities is still hard to defend, because even if (real) long rates are 
important for total demand, the U.K. official thinking on how monetary policy could 
affect (real and nominal) long rates seems, in retrospect, unsatisfactory. 
 
How did the authorities see their influence over the long rate working?  A U.S. observer, 
Kareken (1968, p. 101), interpreted the authorities’ references to their influence on the 
long rate as amounting to the claim that their short-rate policy affects “expectations about 
tomorrow’s interest rates and thereby today’s long-term rates”—that is, via a standard 
expectations channel.  This interpretation, however, is too generous to the authorities, 
while also underestimating their ambitions.  It is too generous because it presumes that 
the authorities’ view of how they could affect long rates fell within a defensible economic 
theory.  It underestimates their ambitions because the authorities in the 1960s felt that 
their ability to manipulate long rates went well beyond their influence on expectations of 
future short rates. 
 
In fact, the authorities’ estimation of their ability to affect long rates expanded during the 
1960s and became quite unorthodox.  These changes were clearly influenced by the 
Radcliffe Report.  In some respects, the Radcliffe Committee’s sketch of how monetary 
policy could affect long rates was quite standard and modern: for example, at one point it 
stated that a change in Bank Rate—i.e., in the official short-term interest rate—could be 
expected to induce a larger movement in the long rate (in the same direction) if the Bank 
————————————————————————————————— 
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Rate movement was expected to be long-lasting.
136 But the Report also suggested that the 
authorities could go further in moving the long rate if they followed a less “passive” 
attitude in the long-term bond market, and that they “must have and must consciously 
exercise a positive policy about interest rates, long as well as short, and about the 
relationship between them.”
137 Influential “City” economists also claimed that such a 
policy was feasible; for example, Dacey (1960, p. 123) dismissed the importance of Bank 
Rate but argued that long-term debt sales can “always” produce a desired increase in the 
long rate; while The Banker editorialized that “more positive tactics in the gilt-edged [i.e., 
long-term securities] market” would give the authorities an instrument distinct from Bank 
Rate “for the purpose of bringing about… changes in longer rates” (1960, p. 226).  In 
light of this kind of analysis, the authorities’ belief in their ability to affect the long rate 
via long-term debt operations was hardened.  Indeed, by 1969, their confidence in 
affecting the long rate via direct intervention contrasted with their pessimism about the 
expectations channel, which they felt was frustrated by “often volatile” attitudes on the 
part of private market participants.
138 
 
The Bank of England did state in 1961 that “it was not the practice of the authorities to 
support [bond prices] in the sense of pegging,”
139 and similarly Goodhart (1984b, p. 92) 
notes of the 1960s as a whole that “[n]o attempt was made to peg long rates,” but the very 
fact that management of the long rate short of a peg was seen as a feasible policy is 
jarring from a modern perspective.  And to a remarkable degree, private-sector observers 
accepted the premise that the authorities were manipulating the long rate independently 
of the short rate.  For example, the Midland Bank (a commercial bank), in its 
commentary on the “emergence of a gap between short and long rates from early 1970,” 
offered the explanation that the authorities had reduced short-term interest rates and 
intervened in the long-term market to prevent the decrease from being transmitted to long 
rates.
140 By contrast, a more standard interpretation would see the long-rate response as 
purely a market-driven Fisher effect in the wake of a monetary policy easing.  Similarly, 
The Bankers’ Magazine said in 1969 that the Bank of England had “allowed prices to fall 
————————————————————————————————— 
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The authorities clearly encouraged the idea that bond market intervention can permit 
management of the long rate.  What are the merits of this idea?  Obviously such 
intervention—for a given path of the short rate—does not provide a feasible means for 
affecting long-term rates if the strict expectations theory of the term structure is valid.  
Interestingly, the type of actions favored in the U.K. would also be ineffective in 
influencing the long rate in an extended version of term-structure theory such as that in 
the Brunner-Meltzer (1973) type of monetarist model.
142 In this more general model of 
monetary transmission, it continues to be the case that the central bank cannot set the 
long rate independently of the short rate; rather, operations on base money affect both 
rates.  The difference from the standard model is instead that the response of the long rate 
(and other asset prices) to actions on base money goes beyond that the response of the 
path of the short rate.  The U.K. authorities’ view, on the other hand, clearly suggested 
that the authorities could set the two rates independently, manipulating the long rate for a 
given path of short rates, and for a given path of the monetary base.  Their position was 
therefore inconsistent with both standard and extended theories of the term structure—
and was, in fact, an untenable position. 
 
The fact that the Bank of England’s debt operations did not actually give it scope to 
manage the long rate, gradually forced itself on the authorities and outside observers 
during the 1970s, as the Fisher effect became the overwhelming factor driving long-rate 
movements.  The Bank’s description of the bond market in 1979 acknowledged 
inflationary expectations as the dominant factor, phrasing the problem as that “investors 
may lack confidence in the outlook, for example in respect of wage demands and 
industrial disturbance and their implications for future inflation, and in the economic and 
financial policies being pursued.”
143 Incidentally, the fact that monetary policy was listed 
as the third item driving inflationary expectations (or fourth, if monetary policy is 
classified under “financial policies” rather than “economic policies”) behind labor and 
industrial factors, reaffirms the grip that nonmonetary explanation of inflation had on 
official thought in the late 1970s. 
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Over 1975−79, the authorities continued to take actions to influence the long rate but did 
so via sharp increases in the short rate.
144 They thus reverted to reliance on the 
expectations channel as the means for influencing the long rate. 
 
Despite the adoption of a more standard attitude to long-rate determination, central bank 
operations in long-term markets continued to be assigned an importance by U.K. 
policymakers from the mid-1970s that they did not merit.  The Bank of England 
Governor said in 1978 that “the importance attached to operations in the gilt-edged 
market” now lay in their significance “in terms of the monetary aggregates.”
145 
 
The belief that long-term debt sales were important for the government’s Sterling M3 
target had its origin in the credit counterparts approach to monetary control, already 
discussed.  A Bank official expressed the philosophy simply (Coleby, 1983, p. 61): “The 
sale of any form of public sector debt to the nonbank public will, in principle, help to 
restrain M3 [growth], because the public sector will have a correspondingly reduced need 
to borrow from the banking system.”  This philosophy led the authorities to regard it as 
important to finance the budget deficit by sales of long-term debt to the nonbank private 
sector (in preference to the main alternative of selling short-term securities to the 
commercial banks).  In addition, it led to the policy of “overfunding”—the sale of more 
long-term debt to the nonbank sector than necessary to finance the budget deficit. 
 
Strong claims have been made about the effects of the overfunding policy and of its 
abandonment in 1985.
146 Congdon (1992, p. 227) asserts that overfunding was 
“immensely useful as a means of curbing the growth of the monetary aggregates,” while 
Pepper and Oliver (2001, p. 47) claim that the abandonment of overfunding did “harm to 
the U.K. economy” by pushing up broad money growth and thereby producing an 
“inflationary boom.”  And even discussions that question the significance of 
overfunding—for example, Dow and Saville (1988) and Cobham (2002)—take for 
granted that overfunding had a negative effect on Sterling M3 growth.
147  
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By contrast, an alternative approach, more consistent with standard economic theory, is 
that overfunding had no overall effect on broad money growth (and by extension, neither 
did the attempts in 1976−81 to restrain money growth by shifting the financing of the 
budget deficit from purchases of debt by banks to purchases by the nonbank sector).
148 It 
follows that the abandonment of overfunding did not contribute to the late 1980s 
expansion of aggregate demand.  To see why overfunding should not be expected to be 
effective in restraining deposit growth, let us consider two cases: one where the long-term 
interest rate does not enter the money demand function, the other where it does. 
 
If short-term interest rates are the only opportunity cost variable in the broad money 
demand function, then central bank operations in the long-term market—which were 
regarded as a separate policy instrument precisely because they left short rates 
unchanged—should not be expected to affect the quantity of money demanded.  Then 
attempts to control deposit growth by changing the quantity of debt sold to commercial 
banks are subject to the same critique as the whole credit counterparts approach to 
controlling money growth.  That is, with the reserve position of the commercial banking 
system unchanged by the operation, and with the quantity of money demanded by the 
public the same as before, commercial banks will offset the effect on their total asset 
growth of fewer purchases of government debt by expanding their loans to the private 
sector.  Broad money growth will be unaffected by overfunding.  
 
In the case where long rates do enter the money demand function, there is scope for 
overfunding operations to affect money growth, provided the operations affect the long 
rate.  During the early years of Sterling M3 targeting, almost all discussion treated long-
term debt sales to households as having an automatic negative effect on deposit growth, 
implied by the credit counterparts identity, and did not portray the effect as contingent on 
the operations being able to affect long-term rates.  In other words, the justified doubts 
that the authorities had acquired regarding their ability to influence the long rate via these 
sales did not cause them to doubt the effectiveness of these sales in restraining broad 
money growth.  But, as we have discussed, the claimed restraining effect on broad money 
growth did, in fact, require that the sales affected the long rate.  This fact was noted late 
in the monetary targeting period by a U.S. observer (Davis, 1982a, p. 56): 
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  [T]here are some in the United Kingdom who believe that… [short-term] interest rates 
are not an effective tool for controlling [Sterling M3].  Rather the best tool that is 
available to the Bank of England is to try to directly influence the movement of this 
aggregate by debt management operations that, in effect, shift the yield curve. 
 
Within the U.K., discussions of the overfunding policy from the mid-1980s did 
increasingly discuss its effects in terms of any influence on long rates.
149 These 
discussions did at least grasp what overfunding had to do to have an effect on aggregate 
broad money growth. 
 
There are, however, no grounds for expecting overfunding to have had an effect on long-
term interest rates, because the overfunding operations had the same feature as the Bank 
of England’s 1960s operations in long-term markets—that is, their effect on the monetary 
base was sterilized.  With the path of short-term interest rates and the path of monetary 
base unchanged by overfunding operations, there is no justification either from the 
expectations theory of the term structure or from a monetarist perspective to expect 
overfunding to affect long-term interest rates.  Therefore, the conclusion remains that the 
U.K. authorities’ long-term operations had no effect on money growth.  Consistent with 
this conclusion, reduced-form empirical evidence for the U.K. does not support a link 
between overfunding and either long-term rates or broad money growth (Miles and 
Wilcox, 1991; Chrystal, 1999). 
 
We conclude that the U.K. authorities’ actions in the long-term markets did not provide it 
with a separate instrument for influencing either money or interest rates distinct from its 
open market operations.  Indeed, to the extent that such operations as overfunding 
convinced the authorities they needed to do less with their short-term interest rate to 
achieve monetary restraint, these operations made policy easier than intended in the 
1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, not tighter.  The reassignment in 1998 of debt-management 
functions from the Bank of England to the Debt Management Office therefore did not 
sacrifice room to move for monetary policy, but instead signified a realistic recognition 
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Curiously enough, alongside the fallacious ideas that guided the U.K. authorities’ 
operations in long-term markets were some observations that were worth pursuing and 
which identified what proved to be resilient stylized facts.  The Bank of England in 1966 
had observed that among the regular purchasers of long-term debt were “institutions 
[which] fall into fairly homogeneous groups with broadly similar investment 
preferences.”
151 Along the same lines The Economist noted in 1965 that pension and life 
insurance funds were not “interested in stock with less than five years to maturity;”
152 the 
shorter-term securities being demanded by commercial banks.
153 This stylized fact 
continues today, with Chrystal (1999, p. 194) observing: “most of the long-term [U.K.] 
government debt outstanding is held by pension funds and insurance companies.  Banks 
prefer short-term debt holdings because they have short-term liabilities, and they need to 
hold some safe liquid assets.” 
 
These stylized facts have important implications for the transmission of monetary policy.  
Andrés, López-Salido, and Nelson (ALSN) (2004) show that the existence of agents who 
subscribe exclusively to long-term debt is a crucial condition for making the long rate 
appear in the aggregate IS function in an optimizing macroeconomic model.  
Otherwise—for all the stress in the literature on long rates—one obtains the standard IS 
equation, where what matters for aggregate demand is the integral of the path of short 
rates.  In the standard model, therefore, deviations of the long rate from the expected path 
of short rates are irrelevant for aggregate demand; on the other hand, in ALSN’s 
framework, these deviations are relevant because the long rate appears directly in the IS 
equation.  ALSN further modify the standard model to accommodate the monetarist or 
Tobinesque assumption that long-term securities are not perfect substitutes for other 
assets.  In particular, reflecting the stylized fact noted above, ALSN’s modification 
makes those agents who hold both short-term and long-term assets prefer, other things 
equal, to hold the former.  This creates an extra transmission channel in the model, 
whereby monetary policy affects the long rate both via the expectations channel and the 
risk premium.  But this channel requires that the monetary policy actions affect the 
monetary base, and so does not provide a justification for the U.K. authorities’ operations 
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5B.2 Credit controls 
 
Credit controls were official requirements (labeled “directives” or “requests”) that the 
commercial banks to keep their increase in loans to the private sector to a specified limit 
(or “ceiling”).  These controls applied to the “clearing banks” up to 1961, and were 
extended thereafter to other commercial banks.  They were used so vigorously during the 
1960s that they have been described as the “main instrument” of monetary policy prior to 
their abolition in 1971, and by former Prime Minister Wilson himself as his “principal 
technique of monetary control” in the 1960s.
154 
 
Direct controls on lending appealed to policymakers because they believed credit was an 
economically significant variable, and controls appeared to avoid the need to use interest 
rates to restrict credit or aggregate demand.  Prime Minister Harold Macmillan saw this 
as one attractive feature of controls,
155 and Wilson admitted that this had been his “main 
reason for applying direct controls.”
156 
 
Interest-cost-push views of inflation were also a factor leading to support for controls.  
For example, in 1965 a London financial columnist wrote: “The aim must be to cut the 
internal cost of money by reducing interest rates but at the same time to exercise control 
over the amount of credit.  In other words—cheaper money, but less of it.”
157 He was 
evidently voicing an opinion that was shared by key policy advisors such as Nicholas 
Kaldor.  Kaldor praised controls as “the way in which credit expansion has been 
controlled ever since the war,”
158 while criticizing interest-rate increases because 
“interest costs are passed on in higher prices in much the same way as wage costs.”
159 
Kaldor’s fellow advisor Thomas Balogh was attracted to credit controls on the additional 
grounds that the demand for loans was insensitive to interest-rate changes (Balogh, 
1958). 
 
As might be expected, direct controls became ineffective as a means of restricting 
aggregate credit in the economy, due to more credit being intermediated through the 
unregulated portion of the financial system.  The considerable scope for evasion is shown 
by the fact that at the time of their abolition in 1971, controls applied to 200 commercial 
banks, but only 20 of 1500 finance houses, none of 300 investment trusts, none of 150 
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unit trusts, and none of 500 building societies.
160 
 
It would be a mistake, however, to rest the judgment that credit controls were an 
ineffective monetary policy instrument solely on the existence of a large uncontrolled 
component of lending.  In a standard macroeconomic model, as we noted earlier, it is 
money balances rather than the stock of credit that pins down the price level.  Suppose 
the lending by the unregulated sector created corresponding liabilities that do not 
substitute closely for bank deposits.  Then the disintermediation induced by credit 
controls might still have a meaningful contractionary effect on aggregate demand by 
slowing growth of money relative to growth in credit (Lewis, 1980). 
 
Unfortunately, this argument does not apply to the practical experience of the U.K., and 
therefore cannot salvage the case for credit controls.  First consider the case where a 
narrow aggregate such as M1 or the monetary base is the appropriate definition of 
money.  It is likely, as we discuss in the next subsection, that nonbank financial 
institutions did not produce deposits in the 1960s and 1970s that substituted closely for 
M1 transactions balances.  But credit controls were nevertheless ineffective, because in 
the 1960s they were directed at all banks, including those that created primarily non-M1 
deposits.  Thus, insofar as credit controls indirectly restricted deposit growth, they did so 
in restricting M3 growth, with no necessary implications for growth in M1. 
 
Consider now the case where a broad money concept is the appropriate definition of 
money.  Further make the generous assumption that the credit controls, which really 
applied only to lending to the private sector, had a restrictive effect on total balance sheet 
growth of commercial banks—i.e., that their slower lending to the private sector was not 
offset completely by greater acquisition of government securities.  Even making this 
assumption, the conclusion is that credit controls failed to produce a meaningful 
monetary restriction.  Disintermediation encouraged not only growth in nonbank lending 
but, on the liabilities side, growth in instruments, notably building society deposits, that 
were close substitutes for banks’ time deposits.  Broad money growth, correctly defined, 
was not restricted by the credit controls. 
 
The authorities could, if they wished, have inhibited the extent to which credit controls 
promoted the creation of deposit substitutes.  A tight interest-rate policy and 
accompanying slower growth in base money would have stifled the private sector’s 
ability to create deposit-like instruments.  But credit controls were intended precisely as a 
device which reduced the recourse to a tight interest-rate policy.  The bottom line is that 
————————————————————————————————— 
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the critique of credit controls today is precisely the same as that made fifty years ago: 
“control of the cash base will secure the Chancellor’s objective without directives[,] 
whereas the most perfect implementation of the directives, without any contraction of the 
cash base, will make no contribution whatever.”
161 
 
A postscript on the U.K.’s experience with credit controls came in 1980, when two 
figures who had both featured prominently in U.K. policy debates offered their 
assessment of controls.  While Harold Wilson had used controls frequently during his 
1964−70 incumbency, his conclusion in 1980 was that they “inhibited competition among 
banks and between them and other financial institutions, thus protecting market shares 
and discouraging innovation.  [They] also became less effective with the passage of 
time.”
162 Milton Friedman, submitting evidence to the House of Commons Treasury and 
Civil Service Committee, delivered a briefer verdict: “There is, in my opinion, no case 
whatsoever for direct controls on credit.”
163 
 
5B.3 Cash reserve requirements 
 
Until 1981 the U.K. authorities imposed two types of cash reserve requirement: a cash 
reserve ratio of 8% on “clearing banks,” cut to 1.5% in 1971; and a variable reserve 
requirement known as calls for “Special Deposits,” initially (1961) imposed on the 
“clearing banks” but imposed on all commercial banks from 1971.  The variable reserve 
requirement was set at zero in 1980 and was discontinued thereafter, while mandatory 
reserve requirements were substantially altered in 1981 and, as we will see, ceased to be 
part of the conduct of monetary policy.  As a result, over the last 25 years the U.K. has 
had an environment where reserve requirements are at low levels and are not seen as 
essential to monetary policy.  This outcome represented a victory for the arguments 
against reserve-requirement changes as a monetary policy instrument. 
 
The traditional critique of variations in cash ratio requirements as a monetary control 
device is that they do nothing that cannot alternatively be achieved by open market 
operations (Friedman, 1960, pp. 47−48; Johnson, 1972b, p. 143), since both actions can 
be thought of as working on a requirement-adjusted monetary base series.  In the U.K. in 
the 1960s, a second prominent criticism—analogous to the criticism of credit controls—
was that binding reserve requirements encouraged the growth of depository institutions 
that were not subject to the requirement, with the eventual prospect of reserve-
requirement changes losing their equivalence to open market operations and becoming 
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ineffective (e.g. Johnson, 1972b, p. 144).  U.K. policy actions in the 1960s and early 
1970s were perhaps less subject to the second criticism than was thought at the time.  For 
while official regulation did promote disintermediation and the creation of deposit 
substitutes, these activities was strongest in creating alternatives to time deposits.  
Building societies and similar nonbank institutions were less adept, especially before the 
1980s, at creating close substitutes for demand deposits.
164 As reserve requirements until 
1971 fell predominantly on the “clearing banks” and so the main creators of transaction 
deposits, they probably did have a restraining effect on the M1 aggregate and therefore 
transactions money.  Certainly the sharp rise in the M1 multiplier following the cut in the 




But cash reserve requirements were subject to the first criticism in the preceding 
paragraph, as well as to a third criticism, less commonly made at the time, which 
reinforces the first criticism.  This is that a reserve-requirement increase, in conditions of 
an unchanged choice for the short-term interest rate, simply leads to the extra reserves 
being provided to the commercial banks.  The monetary base rises to compensate for the 
increase in reserve requirements, and wider monetary aggregates and market interest rates 
are unaffected.
166 Not only are variations in reserve requirements ineffective, but their 
presence as a policy instrument may encourage the authorities to regard other, effective 
policy actions—especially increases in the policy rate—as unnecessary. 
 
This danger became a reality in 1970 when the Heath Government increased Special 
Deposits as a monetary tightening measure, in preference to increasing Bank Rate.
167 
This ineffective attempt at tightening, together with the conscious easing of monetary 
policy from April 1971, contributed to the very expansionary monetary policy of the 
early 1970s and subsequent rise in inflation. 
 
Variations in reserve requirements continued to be used as a policy instrument during the 
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1970s.  Since 1980, however, the authorities have taken a much more enlightened view of 
the role of reserve requirements.  The authorities’ Monetary Control document in 1980 
emphasized that some balances at the Bank of England were required for the authorities’ 
“point of control over short-term interest rates,”
168 but in 1981 the 1.5% cash ratio was 
abolished, allowing the demand for reserve balances to emerge voluntarily.
169 Special 
Deposits were also effectively abolished, ending variations in reserve requirements as a 
policy instrument.  For the purposes of financing the Bank of England, a new mandatory 
cash ratio (initially at 0.5%) was introduced, imposed on banks and a variety of other 
financial institutions.  These funds were impounded by the authorities and thus could not 
serve to carry out transactions between the Bank of England and the commercial 
banks.
170 The fact that the new reserve requirement was not a monetary policy instrument 
was emphasized by the fact that the resulting funds were excluded from the official 
definition of the monetary base,
171 although for some analytical purposes it would be 
legitimate to include them.
172 
 
The very low levels of reserves that emerged from this system did attract some criticism: 
for example, Karl Brunner said in December 1981 said that the fact that banks were “able 
to run on virtually no reserves... is really a subsidy to the City.”
173 But such criticisms 
have not stood the test of time, and it has been much more common to regard the low 
level of reserves as a sign of efficiency: as a low tax on banking, rather than a subsidy to 
banking.  At the same time, the framework where open market operations work off 
voluntarily-held balances, with (almost) no reserve requirement on financial institutions, 
has come to be seen as sufficient for central bank control of aggregate demand while 
simultaneously lowering welfare costs (e.g. Dotsey, 1991; Woodford, 2001). 
 
Very soon after the onset of present arrangements, a U.S. observer accurately saw the 
U.K. system as a benchmark for other systems, such as the U.S., that then relied more 
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heavily on required reserves: “it is clear that the central bank could exert relatively large 
immediate interest-rate effects with only rather small-sized variations in its own 
portfolio—much like the situation apparently facing the Bank of England, whose money 
market operations focus on the quite small clearing balances at the Bank” (Davis, 1982b, 
p. 30).  Thus, while the U.K. authorities made mistakes in its use of reserve requirements 
for monetary policy that mirrored those in other countries, they were among the world 
leaders in dismantling the reserve-requirement system. 
 
5B.4 Secondary reserve requirements 
 
A secondary reserve requirement is a regulation imposed on commercial banks that 
requires banks’ holding of Treasury bills, or of cash reserves plus bills, be equal to some 
minimum ratio to total deposits.  In the U.K., the authorities until 1981 imposed a virtual 
secondary reserve requirement on banks—initially in the form of the Liquidity Ratio 
(which was 28% at the time of its abolition in 1971) on clearing banks, then from 1971 
the 12.5% reserve assets ratio
174 on all banks.  In principle these ratios could be satisfied 
by holding base money (and, to a limited extent, other assets) rather than Treasury bills, 
but the fact that desired cash ratios
175 were low and Treasury bills bore interest meant that 
banks has an incentive to satisfy the liquidity ratios principally by holding short-term 
government securities. 
 
While the liquidity ratio was introduced in the 1940s as a prudential measure, rather than 
for monetary policy purposes,
176 it came to be regarded as significant for monetary 
analysis.  Both the Bank of England
177 and influential observers such as Dacey (1960) 
and Sayers (1957), as well as the Radcliffe Report (paras. 376, 583), attached behavioral 
significance to the ratio of banks’ liquid assets to their total balance sheets—on the 
grounds that a fall in the ratio below desired levels would force banks to contract their 
business.  The 1960s critics of the official view argued, correctly, that the flaw in this 
approach was that commercial banks could restore their liquidity ratio by bidding away 
existing government securities from nonbank holders, without any contraction in 
aggregate bank assets or liabilities (see e.g. Crouch, 1964, p. 926). 
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This criticism certainly identified a flaw in official monetary analysis of the time, but it is 
doubtful whether it also found a major source of policy mistakes.  Such a finding would 
require that the liquidity ratio was actually regarded by the authorities as an instrument of 
monetary policy.  Thomas Wilson (1957, p. 241) claimed that they did do so, stating: 
“Credit policy in Britain has been operated by means of the liquidity ratio… [using] the 
liquidity ratio in order to check the growth of deposits.”
178 But it is very unlikely that the 
liquidity ratio was deployed much for this purpose, because, as discussed in Section 3A, 
restraining money growth was not a major concern of the authorities, especially after 
1957.  The liquidity ratio thus did underpin a flawed view by U.K. authorities of money 
supply determination, but correcting that flaw need not in itself have led to a different 
monetary policy, since official analysis gave little importance to the money stock. 
 
It also appears that, contrary to the perception of contemporary observers such as Thomas 
Wilson, the liquidity ratio was hardly used at all by the authorities as a monetary policy 
instrument.  When a critique of U.K. monetary policy appeared in the Journal of Money, 
Credit and Banking in 1971 (Hodgman, 1971), a Bank of England official wrote in the 
margin of the Bank’s subscription copy of the article, “At last an academic who realizes 
that we have used Liquidity Ratio as a control [device] for only a few months during the 
last 25 years!  But just as we have abandoned the system!” 
 
This suggests that the authorities did not regard the liquidity ratio as a central policy 
instrument, and treated it less prominently than other quantitative devices and Bank Rate.  
Its principal attraction to the authorities was not for implementing monetary policy but, as 
discussed below, to subsidize the financing of government debt.  The official’s comment 
quoted above is unfair to academic economists in one important respect: the Bank of 
England Governor had given credence in 1969 to viewing the liquidity ratio as a control 
device.
179 But perhaps it was during 1969 that the “few months” of the use of the 
liquidity ratio actually took place.
180 
 
The “abandonment” of the liquidity ratio referred to in the preceding quotation referred to 
the introduction of a new set of regulations on the banking system with the 1971 
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Competion and Credit Control reforms.  Though abolishing the liquidity ratio, these new 
arrangements introduced a new type of secondary reserve requirement, applying to all 
commercial banks (rather than the clearing banks alone, as the liquidity ratio had).  The 
new “reserve assets ratio” required that an amount equal 12.5% of bank liabilities be held 
in the form of specified assets, which included Treasury bills, soon-to-mature long-term 
securities, and (up to a low maximum) certain commercial bills. 
 
The creation of the new secondary reserve requirement set off a fresh guessing game 
among commentators on U.K. monetary policy on its role.  The predictable first reaction 
was to regard it as a new device, again based on the “liquid assets” theory of money 
creation, for controlling the aggregate balance sheets of the banking system.  Alternative 
accounts of U.K. monetary policy differ on whether the reserve assets ratio actually 
served as part of the authorities’ monetary control apparatus; indeed, there is not always 
agreement between different accounts by the same author.  Thus Congdon (1992, p. 216) 
criticizes Friedman’s (1980) attack on the reserve assets ratio as reflecting Friedman’s 
“imperceptiveness” about U.K. institutional arrangements, but Congdon (1978, pp. 
47−48) criticized the reserve assets ratio using an argument identical to that Friedman 
made.  This argument, in turn, corresponds to that raised by Laidler (1981, p. 177), who 
said, “I have, from their very inception, been critical of that provision of the Competition 
and Credit Control rules that makes Treasury Bills (not to mention certain private sector 
Bills) a component of the reserve base.” 
 
The criticism of Congdon, Friedman, and Laidler of the reserve assets ratio was 
presumably based on the following scenario.  The ratio might encourage commercial 
banks to regard Treasury bills as the equivalent of bank reserves, in the same way that 
they did during the postwar “cheap money” period when the price of securities was 
pegged in money terms (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963, p. 563).  Under those 
circumstances, open market operations (switches between base and short-term securities) 
no longer produce predictable effects on deposit creation, because they no do not affect 
the base-plus-securities aggregate that matters for banks’ expansion. 
 
This criticism, however, was not actually valid in practice.  The analogy between the 
cheap money period and the period of the reserve assets ratio (1971−81) breaks down 
because in the latter period, rates on U.K. Treasury bills and other short-term securities 
varied widely over time; although short-term rates were a policy instrument, their rate 
was not pegged.  Thus, however much the ratio’s presence tended to create equivalence 
between base money and bills, the variations in the return on bills broke that equivalence.  
Commercial banks did not have grounds, in making decisions affecting monthly or   63




The reserve assets ratio not only did not make commercial banks treat Treasury bills as 
equivalent to base money; it was not in fact used as a policy device for controlling the 
money stock (or total bank credit).  As the OECD put it (1982, p. 78): “The reserve asset 
requirement… was never intended and has never been used as a vehicle for direct control 
of the credit pyramid.” 
 
What then was the function of the reserve assets ratio?  Congdon (1992, p. 216) suggests 
the ratio’s role was as a prudential regulation, but the authorities in their Monetary 
Control document (1980) explicitly said that the “reserve ratio was not intended as a 
prudential control.”
182 Artis and Lewis (1981, p. 63) suggest that it may have come to be 
perceived as a prudential ratio over time, but Llewellyn (1981, p. 96) notes that it was not 
a meaningful prudential ratio by the late 1970s.  Artis and Lewis (1981, p. 63) also 
suggest that the reserve assets ratio was intended as a “‘second leg’ of interest-rate 
policy.”  In their 1980 document the authorities similarly claimed that the reserve assets 
ratio had been intended as “an element in the control of short-term interest rates,” but in 
the same document they acknowledged that demand for base money was sufficient to 
achieve that control (1980, paras. 3.6, 3.8). 
 
The actual function of the reserve assets ratio seems instead to have been unrelated to 
either the monetary policy or prudential concerns of the authorities.  Instead, it was 
simply a means of subsidizing official sales of government debt.  By forcing commercial 
banks to demand government securities, a secondary reserve requirement tends to lower 
yields on those securities relative to the case where the government and the private sector 
fully compete for funds.  This effect underlay Brunner and Crouch’s (1967, p. 109) 
judgment that “the liquid assets ratio is, to call a spade a spade, purely a device to reap 
‘monopsonistic profits’ for the Exchequer.”
183 Apparently the subsidization of 
government debt was also a motivation for imposing the reserve assets ratio in 1971 
(Brown, 1981, p. 4).  The reserve assets ratio was thus a straightforward successor to the 
liquidity ratio in being a tax on banks, though with the tax extended to the entire banking 
system instead of clearing banks alone.  The abolition of the reserve assets ratio in 1981 
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6.  Monetary policy developments in the 1980s  
 
Our discussion of 1980s developments covers first the early 1980s disinflation (Section 
6A) then the subsequent upsurge in inflation (Section 6B). 
 
6A.  The disinflation of the early 1980s 
 
In this subsection we focus on the period from 1979 to 1983, considering first the events 
that were the background to policy decisions (Section 6A.1), then the behavior of 
inflation and real variables during the disinflation (Section 6A.2). 
 
6A.1 Background to the disinflation 
 
The economic policies of the Thatcher Government elected in May 1979 were outlined in 
the speech opening Parliament, written by the Government but by tradition read out by 
the Queen.  A key passage of the Queen’s speech was: “My Government will give 
priority in economic policy to controlling inflation through the pursuit of firm monetary 
and fiscal policies.”
184 The reference in this passage to “firm monetary and fiscal 
policies” rather than monetary targeting (let alone to any specific definition of the money 
supply) brings out the most fundamental break from the past in 1979: the assignment of 
inflation control to monetary policy rather than incomes policy.  This break in policy 
behavior has outlasted both the Thatcher Government and monetary targeting, and has 
persisted to the present day.  It was a more fundamental policy shift than the introduction 
of the inflation targeting framework introduced by Chancellor of the Exchequer Norman 




Why did this policy shift prove lasting?  It was certainly not because of a wide consensus 
in favor of the new government’s reassignment of instruments.  Opposition by U.K. 
economists to the Thatcher Government’s policies was particularly strong during the 
disinflation and recession that took place during its first term.  Public critics of the 
government included not only former officials who continued to adhere to the Radcliffian 
tradition, such as Nicholas Kaldor and Robert Neild, but also the noted general 
equilibrium theorist Frank Hahn.  Hahn laid out his critique in a series of lectures in 
1981, published as Hahn (1983), in which he questioned the link between expansionary 
————————————————————————————————— 
184 May 15, 1979 Queen’s speech, quoted in Whitaker’s Almanack 1980 (1979, p. 361). 
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monetary policy and inflation, and recommended that the government’s tight monetary 
policy be abandoned in favor of expanding demand.  Hahn expressed legitimate concerns 
about the complexity of defining the natural rate of unemployment for an economy as 
complex as the U.K., yet his policy prescription was to have demand management guided 
by a full-employment target rate of unemployment—a.k.a. the natural rate of 
unemployment.  The tension between these positions was not lost on the late Herschel 
Grossman, who suggested that “the weakest aspects of these lectures are Hahn’s attempts 
to evaluate and prescribe monetary policy,” which, as Grossman noted, were out of date 
in light of “the realization by economists and persons of affairs, including Mr. Callaghan 
and Mrs. Thatcher, that his simplistic approach… provides no operational bounds on 
either monetary expansion or inflation.”
186 A review by Goodhart (1983) reached a 
similar judgment—“I found some of the assertions about more practical matters dubious 
and/or unhelpful.”  Nevertheless, critiques such as Hahn’s conferred legitimacy on the 
older nonmonetary approach to inflation, and likely contributed to the fact that at the 
1983 election the three principal opposition parties all advocated a return to compulsory 
price controls.  At the election, these parties received 53% of the popular vote.  It was the 
fact that the Government faced a divided opposition that prevented a reversion in 1983 to 
pre-1979 policies. 
 
But developments in 1983 do not explain why the Government was able to maintain a 
tight monetary policy over its first term and thus achieve the early 1980s disinflation.  In 
terms of pressure for a policy reversal in its first term, what really mattered was not the 
presence of outside critics but the strength of Thatcher’s internal opposition—in her 
Cabinet and parliamentary party.  In fact, Thatcher’s first Cabinet was dominated by 
senior figures from the Heath Government, many of whom remained sympathetic with 
the traditional nonmonetary approach to fighting inflation.  The disillusionment with 
traditional policy had in fact been deeper among some of the Callaghan Government’s 
team than among many of Thatcher’s senior personnel; reflecting this, Thatcher actually 
appointed a former member of Callaghan’s Cabinet as a junior minister in her 
government, while she has also stated that she would have liked to appoint Callaghan’s 
son-in-law to her Cabinet because of his “understanding of monetary economics.”
187 
 
Nor was it just Heath’s former subordinates who criticized the shift in economic policy. 
As Lamont later observed with understatement, “Mrs. Thatcher had her problems with 
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Ted Heath.”
188 Since losing the Conservative Party leadership to Thatcher in 1975, the 
former Prime Minister had criticized her rejection of incomes policy in favor of monetary 
policy, and kicked off a fresh campaign in late 1980 in the form of a radio debate with 
Milton Friedman and criticism of the Thatcher Government’s economic policy in a House 
of Commons debate.
189 Government figures occasionally attempted to suggest that Heath 
was now too marginalized for his criticisms to be damaging,
190 but this is belied by 
Harris’ (1988, p. 36) observation that when Heath spoke out, “every time he did so 
received wide publicity” and such criticism was privately “welcomed” by several 
members of Thatcher’s Cabinet.  Indeed, Nigel Lawson, Chancellor of the Exchequer 
from 1983, judged that Heath’s criticisms of monetary policy did political damage to 
Lawson as late as 1988,
191 while Thatcher herself has acknowledged that the “highly 
publicized attacks from Ted Heath” played a part in the sequence of events in 1989−90 
that led to her removal.
192 
 
Why then did the internal opposition to Thatcher’s policies not lead to a policy reversal 
during the crucial years of the disinflation: 1979 to 1981?  Several accounts have 
speculated that Thatcher was close to being forced by Cabinet into a policy change during 
1980 and 1981.  Most of these accounts, however, mix together reversals in fiscal policy 
and monetary policy.  It was the absence of a change of direction of monetary policy that 
was really crucial for securing the fall in inflation in the early 1980s.
193 Postwar 
economic policy arrangements traditionally gave the Cabinet considerable authority over 
fiscal policy but not monetary policy.  Monetary policy decisions tended to be decided 
away from Cabinet by the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and this 
remained the case in the early 1980s.  There were few precedents for other ministers to 
intervene in major monetary policy decisions, and those precedents suggested that only 
very senior non-economics ministers, such as the Foreign Secretary, could do so, as had 




188 Norman Lamont, quoted in Benedict Brogan, “Tories ‘Could Be Out of Power for a Generation,’” Daily 
Telegraph (London), August 24, 2001, pages 1 and 4. 
189 See Campbell (1993, pp. 722−725). 
190 See e.g. Ridley (1991, p. 173). 
191 See Lawson (1992, pp. 847−848). 
192 Thatcher (1993, pp. 749−750). 
193 Some accounts (such as William Keegan, “Mrs. Thatcher, Myth Snatcher,” The Observer (London), 
May 9, 2004, “Business” section, page 8) claim that the Thatcher Government shifted to a much easier 
monetary policy in early 1981.  But these accounts confuse nominal and real interest rates.  While short-
term nominal interest rates were reduced from their 1979−80 peak (which is the basis for Minford’s (1993, 
p. 412) statement that in 1981 the “decision was taken to loosen monetary policy”), real interest rates 
increased after 1980, and the lack of a policy reversal is also reflected in the fact that money base growth 
continued to be low in the five years after 1981. 
194 See Thorpe (2003, pp. 372−373).   67
The lack of a monetary policy reversal by the Thatcher Government therefore seems best 
explained by the fact that the most senior Cabinet members did not promote a change.  
Chancellor Howe and the other Treasury ministers were committed to disinflation, while 
Lord Carrington, Foreign Secretary over 1979−82, apparently did not challenge the 
Government’s economic policy in Cabinet discussions, despite being privately 
skeptical.
195 If—as had been mooted before Thatcher’s first Cabinet was appointed—
Thatcher had instead made Roy Jenkins Chancellor of the Exchequer and Heath Foreign 
Secretary, it is much more likely that these two longtime advocates of incomes policy 
would have forced a reversal in monetary policy in 1980 or 1981, and consequently 
terminated the disinflation effort. 
 
6A.2 Character of the disinflation 
 
Some accounts claim that the early 1980s disinflation was more drastic than intended. For 
example, Gilbody (1988, p. 252) claims that nominal GDP growth from 1980 “was 
declining… at a considerably faster rate than the gradual slowdown” envisaged by the 
authorities.  These accounts are, however, contradicted by two facts: first, inflation and 
nominal GDP growth if anything overshot their planned values in 1980; and second, in 
1982/83 nominal GDP growth was close to that envisaged by the Government in 
1979−80 (Bean and Symons, 1989, p. 16).  So the decline in nominal GDP growth from 
1979 to 1983 as a whole was as intended by policymakers, while the path to the desired 
rate featured overshoots, not undershoots. 
 
The unanticipated aspect of the disinflation instead took the form of surprises about the 
initial breakdown among the components of demand.  First, as Bean and Symons (1989, 
p. 16) note, the split of nominal GDP growth between real growth and inflation was very 
unfavorable in 1980, with nominal GDP growth rising yet the level of real GDP 
contracting.  Real GDP performance continued to be poor in 1981; while technically the 
recession ended that year, uninterrupted growth did not begin in 1982.  
 
The early 1980s contraction was also manifested in a sharp rise in unemployment, from 
about 5.3% in mid-1979 to over 11% by the end of 1982.  In judging the likely 
implications of the contraction for inflation, the authorities tended to place less weight on 
unemployment than on monetary and spending indicators.  For example, Charles 
Goodhart testified in July 1980: “we do not know what level of employment or 
unemployment is consistent with a desired rate of inflation… you cannot go back to the 
————————————————————————————————— 
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old policy of trying to aim for a particular level of employment.”
196 In the same week, 




In one sense, the behavior of unemployment during the recession itself does not seem too 
puzzling: the rise in unemployment was roughly three times as large as that in the only 
previous recession, 1973−75, but so too was the fall in GDP.
198 But this is not strong 
evidence that the rise in unemployment purely reflected the fall in aggregate demand, 
because both 1975 and 1979−81 saw major withdrawals of subsidies to government-
owned industries, and so both periods probably brought some hidden structural 
unemployment out into the open.
199 
 
The suspicion that the natural rate of unemployment was undergoing change was borne 
out in the economic recovery beginning in 1981, during which unemployment continued 
to rise until 1986.  Beside change in the labor market, another factor making for a break 
in the GDP/unemployment relationship during the 1980s was a faster rate of productivity 
growth and potential output, which reversed some of the post-1973 slowdown.
200 This 
development was just the opposite of that predicted by some observers during the early 
1980s recession.  Hahn (1983, p. 96) argued that the Thatcher Government’s disinflation 
would have permanent negative effects on potential GDP, due to the contraction in 
investment and therefore the physical capital stock during the early 1980s recession.
201  
Estimates of potential output by Backhouse (1983, p. 212) seemed to support this 
conjecture: deriving estimates of potential based on annual estimates of the U.K. capital 
stock, Backhouse found that growth in potential output had been below 2% over 1974−80 
and had then fallen further in 1981.  Estimates based on current data, on the other hand, 
continue to support the finding of weak growth in potential in 1974−80, but suggest that 
from around 1981 potential output underwent a shift to a higher average growth rate.  
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Real GDP growth over 1981−2003 (a long enough period to be indicative of the behavior 
of potential growth) was 2.6%, compared to 1.7% over 1974−79 and 0.9% over 1974−80. 
 
One important factor to be considered is whether slower growth in the capital stock 
during the early 1980s recession should have been taken as implying slower growth in 
potential, even in principle.
202 In any event, the rapid investment during the 1973 boom 
was followed by a slowdown in U.K. productivity, while the contraction in investment in 
1980 was followed by a reversal of much of the post-1973 productivity slowdown.  
Evidently, on both occasions any effect on future potential growth from slower capital 
accumulation was swamped by structural changes that worked in the opposite direction. 
 
6B. The late 1980s increase in inflation 
 
Measured by RPI inflation, there was a marked deterioration in U.K. inflation 
performance from the late 1980s, with the four-quarter inflation rate peaking at 10.4% in 
1990 Q3.  If the RPIX series (which excludes mortgage interest payments) is instead 
used, and if the distorting effect on price indices of the introduction of the poll tax in 
1990 is also excluded, four-quarter inflation instead peaked at 7.2% in 1990 Q4.  This 
rate still represented a major deterioration—an increase in the four-quarter rate of 3.5 
percentage points since the first quarter of 1988. 
 
Given that by the 1980s U.K. policymakers had accepted the important role for monetary 
policy in controlling inflation, how did the upsurge of inflation come about?  For his part, 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Nigel Lawson, stated shortly after his resignation in 
1989 that while the inflation problem did reflect excessive growth in aggregate demand, 
his policies were not to blame because, he claimed, “I didn’t boost demand at all.”  
Instead, he argued, the source of the expansion of demand was the “increase in personal 
borrowing… far greater than anything I expected.”
203 Lawson reaffirmed his diagnosis in 




This interpretation of events is not plausible, because the rise in inflation can be readily 
accounted for by prior developments in money base growth.  The four-quarter growth of 
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M0 rose 3.9 percentage points from 1986 Q1 to 1988 Q4, which, with a two-year lag 
between movements in the monetary base and movements in inflation, matches quite 
closely the 3.5 percentage-point rise in inflation over 1988−90.  If anything, the increase 
in RPIX inflation is low relative to the increase in money base growth; there is certainly 
no major excess of inflation over base growth requiring explanation.  Accounts such as 
Lawson’s that assign special importance to the behavior of banking or lending institutions 
therefore do not stand up. 
 
The take-off in money base growth over 1986−88 did reflect a change in monetary policy 
priorities.  In the period 1981−85, money base behavior was given weight by 
policymakers in making their interest-rate decisions, whereas it was not thereafter.  As 
we have seen, Margaret Thatcher publicly endorsed the monetary base as a significant 
monetary policy indicator in early 1981, while Minford (1993, p. 413) claims that the key 
outcome out of internal deliberations in 1981 was that “M0 [is] the key indicator to guide 
interest-rate changes.”  This principle was eventually ratified by the prominence given 
M0 in Chancellor Lawson’s 1983 “Mansion House” speech and the government’s 
projections for base money growth from the 1984 Budget onward; and Artis and Lewis 
(1991, p. 171) judge that movements in base money “were an argument in the interest 
rate reaction function—a leading one...”  While Goodhart (1992, p. 319) reported, “I 
cannot identify any monetary decision since 1985 in which the growth rate of M0 has 
played a significant part,” this actually dovetails well with the observation that the take-
off in money base growth began from early 1986, since that period was distinct from the 
1981−85 period where money base developments were given considerable attention by 
policymakers. 
 
Lawson (1992, pp. 805, 938) argues that money base growth could not have guided him 
to tighter policy during 1986−87, on the grounds that its growth rate reached only high 
levels in the first half of 1988.  This claim is supported by the judgment of Bernanke, 
Laubauch, Mishkin, and Posen (1999, p. 151), who note the moderate calendar-year 
growth of base money in 1987.  These assessments do not do justice to the quality of base 
money growth during this period because, as noted in Walters (1990, p. 102) and above, 
the take-off in base money growth began during 1986; the weak calendar 1987 growth 
reflects a low growth rate in the final quarter of 1987, interrupting a rising trend.  
 
Apart from reduced attention to money base growth, what were the distinguishing 
features of the more inflationary monetary policy after 1981−85?  There is general 
agreement that a major difference was the increased interest by policymakers, specifically 
Chancellor Lawson, in fixing the exchange rate.  In 1980, Charles Goodhart, testifying to   71
a parliamentary committee and therefore acting in the role of a spokesman for official 
policy, stated: “The level of the exchange rate is not an element of the Government’s 
policy objectives.”
205 Similarly Chancellor Howe observed in 1980, “We have said very 
often that it is our policy to leave the exchange rate to be determined primarily by market 
forces.”
206  These statements were clearly obsolete over 1987−90, when official interest-
rate movements in the U.K. intentionally mimicked those of the Bundesbank in an 
attempt to create conditions similar to membership of the Exchange Rate Mechanism.  
The rising money base growth pattern in 1987−88 indicates that the early stages of this 
managed exchange rate policy amounted to an easing of monetary policy. 
 
Nicholas Ridley, a member of the Cabinet over this period and a Treasury minister in the 
early 1980s, argued that policymakers in the late 1980s and early 1990s embraced cost-
push views, in contrast to the early Thatcher Government period.
207 As evidence for this 
claim, Ridley offered a passage from the U.K. Treasury’s 1990 Financial Statement and 
Budget Report which stated that the exchange rate “can also play a direct part in raising 
inflation; a lower pound tends to lead to higher import prices in sterling terms.”
208 This 
passage does not, in fact, amount to a break from the Treasury’s early 1980s position: in a 
February 1981 parliamentary submission, the Treasury had said that exchange-rate 
movements had “a direct impact on domestic prices—both by reducing the cost of 
imports and by putting pressure on producers of domestic substitutes to price 
competitively.”
209 And belief in a strong exchange-rate channel of the type described is 
consistent with belief in a monetary view of inflation, since the former can be regarded 
(together with the output-gap channel) as the conduit by which monetary policy affects 
inflation.  Indeed, contrary to Ridley’s interpretation, the Treasury explicitly said in 1990: 
“Inflation is a monetary problem and so monetary policy has to be in the forefront of the 
battle to conquer it.”
210 
 
Nevertheless, it is likely that the U.K. authorities had too much confidence in the 
quantitative significance of the exchange-rate channel, producing misjudgments about the 
extent to which exchange-rate stability itself created conditions for low inflation.
211 
Symmetrically, they may have underestimated the relative importance of the output-gap 
channel in the determination of inflation.  Such an error was compounded by the fact that 
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U.K. policymakers again severely underestimated the size of the output gap over this 
period (see Nelson and Nikolov, 2003, for estimates of the errors).  
 
The element of validity in Lawson’s claim that he did not stimulate demand is that his 
monetary policy actions never brought real interest rates down to the negative levels of 
the 1970s.  In fact, real interest rates during the period of monetary expansion, 1986−88, 
were higher than the levels observed during the low-inflation period of the 1990s.  The 
rise in aggregate demand and inflation in the late 1980s suggests that, high as real interest 
rates were, they should have been raised to still higher levels. 
 
7.  Monetary policy developments from 1990 to 2004 
 
The 15 years 1990 to 2004 divide evenly into the period preceding Bank of England 
independence (Section 7A); and the first seven-and-a-half years of the operation of 
monetary policy being the responsibility of the Monetary Policy Committee (Section 7B). 
 
7A. 1990 to 1997 
 
From the vantage point of the beginning of 1993, the two most significant events in U.K. 
monetary policy in the early 1990s probably seemed to be entry into the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism in October 1990 and the forced exit (with a large exchange-rate depreciation) 
in September 1992.  In retrospect, however, the two most important monetary policy 
events of the early 1990s were first, the monetary union opt-out provision negotiated for 
the U.K. by the Major Government with other European Union members at the end of 
1991, and the introduction in October 1992 of inflation targeting in the U.K.  The switch 
to inflation targeting in 1992 commenced a regime that continues to the present day.  The 
long-lasting nature of U.K. inflation targeting in turn reflects the U.K. government’s use 
(in both 1997 and 2003) of the opt-out provision, in the absence of which the U.K. would 
be part of the euro area. 
 
As noted above, the U.K. was a member of the ERM over 1990−92, a period which 
overlaps closely with the U.K.’s last recession to date.  The principal criticism of ERM 
membership is that it made the recession worse by forcing on the U.K. tighter monetary 
policy than was desirable.  The Chancellor of the Exchequer for most of the ERM period, 
Norman Lamont, has endorsed this criticism.
212 But the era’s Prime Minister, John Major, 
has argued that the criticism does not apply to 1991 or early 1992, and that it was “only 
in the final few months of our membership that the tensions between domestic monetary 
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policy and exchange-rate management became acute.”
213 In support of this claim, he 
notes that the U.K. authorities were able to cut interest rates throughout 1991 while 
belonging to the ERM.
214 This observation does not, however, preclude the possibility 
that the cuts in U.K. interest rates during ERM membership were less than could have 
been achieved under floating rates.  The experience of Australia, which had floating 
exchange rates over this period, supports the notion that the ERM was a serious 
constraint.  Lamont (1999, p. 90) acknowledges that the “British situation was similar to 
Australia” over this period, in the sense that both countries had overheated economies in 
the late 1980s and underwent a permanent shift to low inflation in the early 1990s.  But 
short-term nominal interest rates over 1989 Q4−1992 Q3 were cut by 12 percentage 
points in Australia compared to only 5 percentage points in the U.K., while real interest 
rates fell by less than 2 percentage points in the U.K. and by more than 6 percentage 
points in Australia.  This suggests that fixed exchange rates were indeed a serious 
constraint on U.K. monetary policy over the whole of 1990−92. 
 
Major (1999, p. 340) claims that ERM “membership turned Britain into a low inflation 
economy” and that “the ERM gave credibility that our policy would otherwise have 
lacked.”  The evidence is not strong, however, that the ERM conferred on the U.K. extra 
benefits in inflation control distinct from those inherent in keeping monetary policy tight.  
Much of the fall in inflation occurred in 1991 and 1992, which (with the lag in the effect 
of monetary policy actions) is most plausibly attributed to the tightening of monetary 
policy that preceded formal ERM membership.  ERM membership clearly did not 
produce a costless disinflation, so that it cannot be said to have satisfied that definition of 
“credibility”; indeed Major’s own description of ERM membership is that it “hurt, but it 
worked” (Major, 1999, p. 341). 
 
The concept of “credibility” that Major evidently has in mind is the shift of agents’ 
expectations to an environment of permanently low inflation.  His own evidence that the 
ERM achieved this is that annual nominal wage growth never fell below 7.5% during the 
1980s, even when price inflation was low, but did settle at lower levels during ERM 
membership and thereafter.
215 But U.K. productivity growth was higher in the 1980s too, 
so nominal wage growth is not directly comparable across the two decades.  And with 
forward-looking price-setting, low inflation in the face of rapid current wage growth can 
be a sign of high, not low, policy credibility. 
 
A better indication of a permanent shift in agents’ expectations about the regime is the 
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behavior of the demand for the monetary base.  In the U.K. in the 1970s and 1980s, the 
velocity of base money seemed to have an inherent upward trend, distinct from the 
standard determinants of money demand.  This suggests that agents felt it worthwhile to 
intensify their use of cash-saving devices, year in and year out.  But in the 1990s this 
trend came to an end, which suggests that expectations of a regime of price stability had 
made it no longer worthwhile to deploy further cash-saving devices.
216 The crucial fact is 
that the velocity trend-break took place in 1993, after the U.K. had abandoned ERM 
membership.  So the adoption of inflation targeting seems to have had a more decisive 
effect on credibility than did ERM membership. 
 
The shift to inflation targeting in October 1992 has a good claim to be regarded as the 
pivotal monetary policy change of the 1990s.  At the time, however, it was easy to 
discount the importance of this change, and to regard it as an attempt by the Major 
Government to reduce the political damage from its departure from the ERM.  Alan 
Budd, Chief Economic Adviser to the Major Government, later recalled that ERM exit 
“was seen at the time, to put it mildly, as something of a failure in economic policy and a 
certain amount of criticism (some of it violent) was directed at the Government in general 
and the Treasury in particular.”
217 Indeed, as of late 1992, it appeared likely that both 
Prime Minister Major and Chancellor Lamont would soon be removed from office.
218 As 
we have seen, the Callaghan Government had to resign in 1979 before it could take any 
steps to implement its new anti-inflation policy, and in 1992 it seemed that the Major 
Government, though offering a more coherent inflation-control package than 
Callaghan’s, might follow the same pattern.  In the event, while Chancellor Lamont was 
dismissed in May 1993, Major remained in office, though in a weak parliamentary 
position. 
 
Growing private sector confidence in inflation targeting, reflected in the 1993 shift in 
portfolio behavior noted above, nevertheless emerged.  Undoubtedly some of this came 
from a factor the authorities did not expect—the failure of the 1992 exchange-rate 
depreciation to produce an upsurge of inflation, even temporarily.  Lingering belief by 
policymakers in the strength of the exchange-rate channel led them to expect inflation to 
pick up after the ERM exit, an expectation implicit in Chancellor Lamont’s indication in 
1992 that “prospective, not current, inflation will be our guide…. [A] low inflation rate 
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today is not in itself a reliable cue for a relaxation of policy.”
219 But the exchange-rate 
depreciation led to shifts in relative prices rather than aggregate CPI inflation.  Evidently, 
low CPI inflation in 1993 was locked in by the preceding years of tight monetary policy. 
 
Confidence in inflation targeting was further consolidated by actions of the authorities to 
formalize policy arrangements.  The first Bank of England Inflation Report was 
published in 1993.  In 1994, Chancellor Kenneth Clarke proposed regular publication of a 
record of the advice he received from the Bank of England Governor on interest-rate 
decisions.  While admitting he was “dubious” about this move because he did not want it 
to lead to central bank independence, Major approved the proposal, and, as he has 
written, “[a]s a result of these innovations the Bank and the Governor moved a little more 
beyond the City and into the wider public gaze.”
220 
 
By 2002, however, former Chancellor Clarke felt he had to claim: “I opened up 
policymaking.  Gordon [Brown] taking credit for some dramatic change in policy is a 
load of old tosh.”
221 The reason for these protests is that the changes that Clarke made 
during his period in office (1993−97) no longer seem significant compared to either the 
introduction of inflation targeting in 1992 by Chancellor Lamont, or the introduction of 
Bank of England independence by Chancellor Gordon Brown in 1997. 
 
Bank of England independence 
 
The literature on central bank independence is vast and we do not touch on it here, 
instead focusing on key aspects of the U.K. experience. 
 
In testimony given to the Wilson Committee in the late 1970s, the Governor of the Bank 
of England, Gordon Richardson, used the “independence within government” phrase to 
describe the Bank of England’s role—a phrase identical to that used historically to 
describe the Federal Reserve’s position.  His elaboration on this description in his 
testimony revealed, however, that the analogy with the Fed was inappropriate, as 
Richardson described the Bank’s role as “independence within government, freely—and 
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The description Richardson gave could be applied to any senior civil servant; in no sense 
did it mean that the Bank of England was independent, either in making or publicly 
commenting upon monetary policy.  Speeches and publications from the Bank typically 
needed to be cleared in advance by the U.K. Treasury.  U.K. governments nevertheless 
occasionally benefited from the misconception that the Bank of England was able to 
speak publicly against government policy.  For example, a 1980 newspaper report on 
testimony to a parliamentary committee given by Charles Goodhart and other Bank staff 
was entitled “Bank’s Experts Support Thatcher,”
223 even though their positions did not 
entitle them to be anything other than spokesmen for government policy when appearing 
as Bank representatives at the committee.  And in 1976 Harold Wilson had quoted 
favorable commentary on his government’s anti-inflation policy from the Bank of 
England Quarterly Bulletin, asserting that the Bank “is never fearful of expressing its 




Turning to authority over policy decisions, Wilson observed in 1980 that there were 
“some who argue that the conduct of monetary policy the Bank of England should be 
made more independent of central government constitutionally, and given explicit 
statutory policy objectives of its own.”
225 The reference to “explicit statutory policy 
objectives” in this statement indicates that, from the outset, the debate over independence 
of the Bank of England in the 1980s and 1990s focused on whether the Bank should 
receive “instrument independence” in the terminology of Debelle and Fischer (1994), 
better known as “operational independence” in U.K. discussions. 
 
The Wilson Committee recommended against Bank of England independence on several 
grounds, including the constitutional one that independence “would be contrary to the 
British system and tradition of government.”
226 This skeptical attitude toward central 
bank independence was also found in two of Wilson’s successors, Margaret Thatcher and 
John Major.  Major relied on appeal to constitutional arguments similar to Wilson’s, 
recounting that he “dismissed the idea [of independence] because I believed the person 
responsible for monetary policy should be answerable for it in the House of 
Commons.”
227 This specific criticism of independence seems weak, not least because 
several of those responsible for other areas of policy in Major’s government were not 
members of the House of Commons. 
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Thatcher argued against central bank independence for the more practical reason that “the 
control of inflation is ultimately a political problem.”
228 Even accepting this position, 
however, central bank independence can be defended as a system for maintaining low 
inflation, even while broader inflation-control decisions remain with the political 
leadership.  Under the arrangements in force since 1997, a decision for a conscious step 
down or up in the inflation rate remains the responsibility of the legislative and executive 
branches of government via the creation of laws that specify the objectives for the Bank 
of England.  The assignment of responsibility for interest-rate decisions to the Bank of 
England reflects the notion that once an inflation target has been reached, maintenance of 
inflation at the targeted level requires technical judgments which specialists on monetary 
policy are best suited to make.
229 Thatcher’s case against independence, like Wilson’s 
and Major’s, is thus weak when applied to operational independence. 
 
Just as fundamentally, it is unlikely that the Bank of England’s independence actually 
means that the government in power would escape responsibility for serious misses of the 
inflation target.  The return of high inflation would surely be a major electoral liability for 
the incumbent government, just as high inflation was a major election issue in the 1970s.  
But such an assignment of responsibility would be appropriate, given that government 
legislation sets the framework for monetary policy, even though the executive branch is 
uninvolved in specific interest-rate decisions.  And symmetrically, just as the 
Government would not escape responsibility if inflation targets were missed, it has 
neither denied nor been denied credit for the stable macroeconomic conditions and low 
interest rate/inflation combinations of recent years.  For example, Prime Minister Tony 
Blair said in the House of Commons on January 26, 2005 that “we are running an 
economy with low inflation, low mortgage rates and low unemployment.”
230 
 
The attention given by Thatcher and Major to the issue of central bank independence 
reflects the momentum that the proposal gained over the 1980s and 1990s.  In the 1980s 
it was mainly discussed as a second-best solution.  Chancellor of the Exchequer Nigel 
Lawson, for example, proposed in 1988 to Thatcher that the Bank of England be made 
independent with a price-stability objective.  But he offered this proposal only after 
Thatcher had ruled out his preferred option of joining the ERM, and Lawson (1992, p. 
868) continued to maintain that an independent Bank of England with a price-stability 
goal was less desirable than ERM membership by the U.K.  This preference was also 
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reflected in Lawson’s support for Michael Heseltine’s campaign for the Conservative 
Party leadership in 1990, since Heseltine’s platform included a proposal to make the 
Bank of England independent but to retain ERM membership. 
 
In the 1990s, by contrast, the U.K. Treasury began to support as first-best policy the 
combination of central bank independence plus inflation targeting, and this policy was 
advocated within the Government by Chancellors Lamont and Brown.  Prime Minister 




As Lamont noted of his efforts to persuade Major, “My proposals meant that Parliament 
and Ministers would still have the key role of establishing the objective for the Bank.”
232  
Major’s opposition ensured that independence was not introduced before his defeat in 
May 1997, but neither Major nor other opponents of Bank of England independence 
succeeded in forming a truly compelling criticism that applied to operational 
independence.  Appropriately, when the newly elected Blair Government announced that 
the Bank would be made independent, it was the operational-independence character of 
the proposals that led former Prime Minister Callaghan to announce his support.  “The 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Brown, said that to transfer the monetary function to 
the Bank of England was a bold step.  He is right; it is a bold step,” Callaghan said in 
May 1997.  “It is made more acceptable because the Government intend to set the targets 
and will appoint four additional members of the Bank Monetary [Policy] Committee.  




7B. 1997 to 2004 
 
“The broad features of the reaction function in place in the United Kingdom increasingly 
seem to be publicly understood and built into expectations,” one of the members of the 
Monetary Policy Committee, Christopher Allsopp, remarked after some of the dust had 
settled on the 1997 changes.  Thanks to “innumerable speeches, presentations and 
discussions by members of the MPC,” it was “well understood that, should inflationary 
pressure arise, whether from demand-side or for supply-side reasons, monetary tightening 
would ensue,” including the understanding that “should fiscal policy change, there would 
be compensating interest-rate reactions to maintain consistency with the inflation 
————————————————————————————————— 
231 See Major (1999, pp. 153, 684). 
232 Lamont (1999, p. 323). 
233 James Callaghan, House of Lords Debates, May 20, 1997, page 313.   79
target.”
234 Another individual who had served on the MPC, Alan Budd, claimed that the 
new system was “possibly the best system in the world for setting monetary policy.”
235 
 
In discussing the new system, MPC members understandably emphasized the degree of 
information about monetary policy now released to the public, including the quarterly 
Inflation Report and the release of minutes of the monthly MPC meetings after a two-
week delay.  In another sense, a sign of success of the new system was the less intense 
discussion within the U.K. of monetary and macroeconomic developments compared to 
the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s.
236 The Queen’s speech opening the U.K. Parliament on 
November 23, 2004 began with: “My Government will continue to pursue policies which 
entrench economic stability and promote growth and prosperity,” then immediately 
moved on to non-economic matters, which subsequent press coverage focused upon. 
Whereas before the 1970s monetary policy received less attention than it deserved in 
public debate given its importance for price stability, in recent years the lack of public 
interest mainly reflects the absence of output or inflation volatility during the inflation-
targeting regime. 
 
The most significant change to monetary policy since 1997 came in December 2003 
when the inflation target was changed from 2.5% annual growth in the RPIX series to a 
2% rate for the new CPI series.  As the CPI is designed to correspond to the definition of 
prices used in the euro area, the switch in target series would smooth a possible transition 
to euro area membership.  That the change in target does not imply that U.K. adoption of 
the euro will necessarily occur is perhaps best shown by remembering Walters’ (1986, p. 
144) observation that the Bank of England made various changes to its conduct of 
monetary policy in 1981 that were “desirable in their own right, and which would 
facilitate a move toward MBC [monetary base control] if that seemed to be the 
appropriate policy.”  In the event, a regime change to MBC never took place.  Under 
current U.K. policy, the major steps that would need to occur prior to U.K. adoption of 
the euro are the U.K. Government’s approval of euro area membership after a 




234 Christopher Allsopp, “Macroeconomic Policy Rules in Theory and Practice,” Bank of England 
Quarterly Bulletin (Winter, 2002), Vol. 42(4), pp. 485−504; quotations from page 489. 
235 Quoted in Marc Champion and Michael R. Sesit, “Labour Can Thank Bank of England for Its Big Lead: 
Blair Gained by Giving Up Power over Interest Rates,” Wall Street Journal Europe, June 1, 2001, page 1.  
236 The current Bank of England Governor, Mervyn King, has cited this state of affairs as a criterion for 
success, reflected in his oft-quoted position that U.K. monetary policy should be made “boring.”  See e.g. 
Scheherazade Daneshkhu and Ed Crooks, “Bank Is Set for Big Changes When King Takes Rein from Sir 
Edward,” Financial Times (London), November 29, 2002, page 3.    80
7C. A summing up of the inflation record 
 
In Table 2 we summarize the inflation record of successive postwar U.K. administrations.  
In evaluating the implications of each government’s monetary policy decisions for 
inflation, it is important to allow for a delay between monetary policy actions and the 
response of inflation.  To that end, we report not only the average inflation rate during the 
life of each government and the average of inflation for the two years.
237 Some 
skepticism was voiced in the 1970s and 1980s about the existence of a two-year lag 
between U.K. monetary policy actions and inflation: for example, Allen (1982, p. 104) 
claims that the belief in a two-year lag emerged from a close match between Sterling M3 
growth and subsequent inflation in the early 1970s that did not occur elsewhere in the 
data.  But as we have documented elsewhere (Batini and Nelson, 2001), the evidence for 
a lag of a year or more before the peak effect of monetary actions on inflation is prevalent 
across subsamples of the U.K. data.  It is present if narrow money or interest-rate 
measures are considered instead of broad monetary aggregates, and is pervasive across 
different monetary policy regimes.  Indeed, a 1−2 year lag between movements in 
currency and prices was noted in the U.K. during the nineteenth century, and is detectable 
if the nineteenth century U.K. data are studied in isolation.  Acceptance of a lag of about 
two years between monetary policy actions and inflation has underpinned the U.K.’s 
inflation-targeting framework, with Norman Lamont noting in 1992 that “[m]onetary 
adjustments take time to have effect”




Allowing for a two-year lag has a material effect on the record of successive 
governments.  In particular, the average inflation rate under the Heath Government goes 
up from 10% to 17.9% because the peak in inflation in 1975 is now attributed to the 
monetary expansion in the years to 1973; while the average inflation rate under the 
Thatcher Government falls because high inflation in 1980 is reassigned to the 1974−79  
————————————————————————————————— 
237 Our treatment of the 1974−79 Government as a single administration despite the change in Prime 
Minister from Harold Wilson to James Callaghan in 1976 reflects two factors.  First, a single Chancellor of 
the Exchequer (Denis Healey) served continuously over 1974−79.  Second, on his return to office in 1974 
Wilson delegated much of the government and party leadership to Callaghan (see Morgan, 1997, pp. 
408−409)—to such an extent that Thatcher (2002, p. 371) refers to decisions in 1974−75 as those of “James 
Callaghan’s Labour Government,” and Kissinger (1999, p. 913) refers to Callaghan as being Prime 
Minister in the first quarter of 1976, even though Callaghan did not become Prime Minister until the second 
quarter of 1976. 
238 Lamont (1992, p. 49). 
239 The official description of the Monetary Policy Committee’s decision-making process states: “the MPC 
looks at a range of domestic and international economic and monetary factors, which will have a bearing on 
inflation over the future—usually about two years, this being the time it takes for the full effects of interest 
rates to work through the economy and impact on inflation.”  From “Monetary Policy Committee (MPC),” 
Bank of England website.   81
 
 
Table 2.  Inflation records of successive governments 
 
   Average 
inflation: 
 



















Eden Apr  55-
Jan 57 
5.5%  3.5%  Apr 57-Jan 59  +1.1  −0.8 
Macmillan Jan  57-
Oct 63 
2.5%  3.0%  Feb 59-Oct 65 
 
−2.2 +2.7 
Douglas-Home Oct  63-
Oct 64 
4.0% 3.9% Nov  65-Oct  66 
 
+2.5  −1.1 
Wilson Oct  64-
Jun 70 
4.6% 6.1% Nov  66-Jun  72  +1.7  +2.4 
Heath Jun  70-
Mar 74 
10.0%  17.9%  Jul 72-Feb 76  +7.8  +15.4 
Wilson/Callaghan Mar  74-
May 79 
15.9% 13.7%  Mar  76-Apr  81 
 
−4.4  −9.1 
Thatcher May  79-
Nov 90 
7.8%  5.7%  May 81-Nov 92 
 
  0.0  −8.8 
Major Nov  90-
May 97   
3.4%  2.8%  Dec 92-Apr 99  −6.7  −0.8 
Blair/MPC May  97-  2.5%
a  2.3%  May 99-Nov 04  −0.3  −0.2 
a. To November 2004. 
 
Labour Government, while the disinflation under the Major Government is now 
attributed to Thatcher Government policy.  The fall in average inflation under the 
Thatcher Government is, however, the same—just over 8 percentage points—irrespective 
of whether lags are taken into account.  With a two-year lag allowed for, the average 
inflation rate under the Major and Blair Governments is lower than under any other 
postwar governments. 
 
An alternative method of assessing the record is to disregard average performance and 
simply look at whether annual inflation rose or fell.  That information too is given in the   82
table.  Annual RPIX inflation was the same (9.2%) in both May 1979 and November 
1990, which is the basis for the criticism that literally no improvement in inflation took 
place under the Thatcher Government.
240 But once a two-year lag is allowed for, the 
improvement in inflation performance under the Thatcher Government is again over 8 
percentage points.  The inflation improvement under the 1974−79 Labour Government is 
also greater once lags are taken into account. 
 
8.  Fiscal policy 
 
The evolution of fiscal policy in the United Kingdom has been the flipside of the greater 
importance accorded to monetary policy: fiscal policy received center stage as a demand-
management tool prior to 1970, and specific fiscal actions were also thought important in 
controlling wage inflation, but in recent decades, the emphasis has instead been on the 
longer-term role.  Fiscal policy increasingly has come to be seen as affecting the division 
of aggregate demand between private and public demand, rather than as exerting a 
decisive influence on either aggregate demand or inflation.  We break up our discussion 
chronologically, beginning with the pre-1970 period. 
 
8A. 1955 to 1969 
 
As we have seen, Lionel Robbins described U.K. macroeconomic policy over 1945−54 as 
“a gigantic experiment” in activist fiscal policy for demand-management purposes, and 
this experiment continued over 1955−69.  Until the early 1960s, however, the ratios of 
government spending and taxes to GDP (Figures 3 and 4)
241 are instead dominated by 
downward trends.  An important source of decline in the government spending/GDP ratio 
is the reduced share of defense spending to GDP, reflecting both the absence of U.K. war 
engagements in the 1957−81 period and reduced military commitments to former U.K. 
colonies. 
 
The 1951−64 Conservative Government presided over a sharp reduction in the ratio of 
taxes to GDP.  This decline reflects not only the Government’s preference for tax cuts as 
a means of stimulating private sector expenditure, but also its subscription to cost-push 
views of inflation.  For example, Alec Douglas-Home, Prime Minister in 1963−64,  
————————————————————————————————— 
240 See e.g. William Keegan, “Margaret Thatcher, Myth Snatcher,” The Observer (London), May 9, 2004, 
“Business” section, page 8. 
241 The ratios plotted are the November 2004 vintage of OECD estimates, available from 1970, with pre-
1970 ratios calculated from national sources, spliced in at 1970.  The resulting Figure 4 closely resembles 
the tax/GDP series plotted by Beenstock (1979), who also compiled his data from national sources.   83






















believed that income tax increases were “inflationary.”
242 
 
Harold Wilson summarized the standard critique of demand management over this period 
as: “Policy oscillated between expansionary measures designed to reduce the high levels 
of unemployment and contractionary measures made necessary by subsequent balance of 
payments deficits.  The whole period from the early 1950s to the mid-1960s was aptly 
labeled ‘stop-go.’”
243 Though economic fluctuations over this period would look mild by 
————————————————————————————————— 
242 Alec Douglas-Home, “They Might Not Save the Pound Again,” Daily Mail (London), December 1, 
1964, page 6. 
243 Wilson Committee (1980, p. 6).   84
comparison with later developments, proponents of fiscal policy at the time were clearly 
disappointed by U.K. performance under fiscal activism.  The perceived failure of 
stabilization policy initially did little to reduce confidence in fiscal policy for demand 
management.  Instead, hard-line Keynesians such as Dow (1964) cited technical obstacles 
to the implementation of an effective fiscal policy, such as the low ratio of public 
investment to GDP, or the impediments to a sufficiently rapid reaction of fiscal policy to 
economic developments.
244 In crude Keynesian terms, these explanations postulated that 
the multiplier for autonomous government spending was large, but that the base for the 
multiplier had been set at too low a value and had not been varied with sufficient speed.  
Events did not initially produce a rethinking of the relative importance of fiscal and 
monetary policy; Dow (1964), in particular, reaffirmed his extreme pessimism about the 
scope for monetary actions to affect aggregate demand. 
 




A striking feature of fiscal developments in the early 1970s is the deep decline in taxes as 
a share of GDP—a fall of 5.25 percentage points from 1970 to 1973.  This fall has been 
the subject of a flawed interpretation by several observers, who have exaggerated the 
contribution of fiscal policy to the 1970s inflation.  Harold Wilson, for example, cited 
“large tax cuts in the 1972 Budget” as a major stimulus to aggregate demand,
245 while 
Bernstein (2004, p. 214) similarly cites the “enormous tax cut in 1972” and “the 
government’s policy of lowering taxes” as the source of the fall to the tax-to-GDP ratio. 
 
These claims are erroneous in two respects: in overstating the contribution of fiscal 
policy to the expansion of aggregate demand, and in identifying the source of the fall in 
the tax/GDP ratio.  On the first of these errors, it is implausible that the opening up of the 
budget deficit was central to the take-off of inflation during the 1970s.  The behavior of 
monetary policy was instead decisive for that: it is feasible for monetary policy to be tight 
in the presence of fiscal expansion.  In the event, monetary policy was expansionary in its 
own right, well beyond any accommodation of fiscal deficits—as shown by the behavior 
of real interest rates, which fell sharply from 1970, whereas a monetary expansion 
triggered by fiscal expansion should see real rates constant or rising. 
 
————————————————————————————————— 
244 A detailed discussion of contemporaneous critiques of 1950s and 1960s fiscal policy, such as those of 
Dow (1964) and Prest (1968), is given in HM Treasury, Fiscal Stabilisation and EMU (June, 2003), pp. 
34−36. 
245 Wilson Committee (1980, p. 7).   85
But even the view that the 1970−73 decline in the tax-to-GDP ratio reflects tax cuts is not 
supportable, once one considers the background in detail.  It is true that the Heath 
Government intended to cut this ratio by tax cuts.  Keegan (1985, pp. 27−28) instead 
suggests that the Heath Government did not come into office planning to cut overall taxes 
relative to GDP, but rather planned tax reform that left the share unchanged.  As 
evidence, he gives a quotation from the Conservative Party’s economics spokesman, Iain 
Macleod, in 1969 that “taxation must be cut.  But let us be quite clear what that does and 
does not mean.  It does not mean that by international standards the proportion of income 
taken in taxation in the United Kingdom tax is above average.  On the contrary, it is 
below average: it does mean that we tax the wrong things in the wrong way.”
246 But the 
origin of this quotation, Macleod (1969), indicates that Macleod’s statements about tax 
revenue were inferred from data provided in answers to parliamentary questions in late 
1968 and early 1969.  It was only later that data on the rise in taxation to GDP under the 
1960s Wilson Government became widely available.  When they did, Macleod stated: 
“Total taxation now is 40 per cent of GNP—it was 32 per cent in 1964” and indicated his 
intention “to bring back the level of taxation to where it was at the beginning of the 
Labour Party’s period of office.”
247 Similarly, Heath wrote in early 1970 that he was 
“determined to reduce direct taxation” on both labor and investment income, and then 
“reduce taxes still further,”
248 and after his election victory stated: “We repeat our 
undertakings to reduce the burden of taxation in this country.”
249  Thus it is clear that the 
Heath Government did come into office planning to reduce the tax share of GDP. 
As we have discussed, a principal motivation for the Conservatives’ interest in reducing 
taxes in the 1960s and 1970s was a belief in a tax-wage-push view of inflation.  An 
additional important motivation was a belief in the importance of incentive effects of tax 
cuts.  Emphasis on these incentive effects continued under the later Thatcher 
Government, but members of that Government, such as Howe (1994, p. 128), have 
emphasized that they “never succumbed” to Laffer-curve views regarding the revenue 
effects of tax cuts, and so compensated for cuts in income tax rates by other measures to 
increase revenue (such as the increase in VAT in 1979) or by reductions in spending 
programs.
250 Indeed, a spokesman for the Thatcher Government wrote in 1979: 
————————————————————————————————— 
246 The quotation we use here is taken from Macleod (1969, p. 307); the unsourced quotation given in 
Keegan (1985) is clearly based on this source, but slightly paraphrased.  
247 Iain Macleod, House of Commons Debates, November 3, 1969, page 666. 
248 Edward Heath, “Less Tax and More Savings,” Daily Mail (London), February 25, 1970, page 13. 
249 Edward Heath, House of Commons Debates, July 2, 1970, quoted in Frank Johnson, “Tax Cuts in Mini-
Budget This Autumn, Heath Hints,” The Sun (London), July 3, 1970, page 2. 
250 Bean and Symons (1989, p. 14) similarly observe that the Thatcher Government’s attitude to tax cuts 
was that “there was to be no dabbling in the black arts of the Laffer curve.”  Some U.S. enthusiasts for 
supply-side economics did claim that the Thatcher Government’s tax cuts were motivated by Laffer-curve 
considerations.  See e.g. John Chamberlain, “Jack Kemp’s Tax Ideas Work: Thatcher Has Similar Policy in 
England,” Fort Lauderdale News, July 2, 1979, page 18A.  But Laffer himself denounced the Government   86
“Professor Laffer seems to be arguing that taxes should be cut regardless of whether 
expenditure is cut… No responsible official could advocate this.”
251 
The Heath Government, on the other hand, did enter office explicitly basing policy on 
what was later known as the Laffer curve.  The Conservative Party’s 1970 election 
manifesto stated: “We will concentrate on making progressive and substantial reductions 
in income tax and surtax.  These reductions will be possible because we will cut out 
unnecessary Government spending and because we will encourage savings. And as our 
national income rises we will get a larger revenue with lower tax rates.”
252 Taken in 
combination with the Government’s pledge to reduce the ratio of taxes to GDP, it appears 
that it had in mind that the tax cuts would generate an increase in real tax revenue, but 
proportionally less than the increase in real GDP from the tax cuts and other measures, so 
that the ratio of taxes to GDP would fall substantially. 
 
Therefore, the Heath Government did plan to reduce the tax-to-GDP ratio; and 
commentators have interpreted the actual fall as reflecting tax-cutting zeal.  But in fact 
the fall reflects factors almost completely different from the tax cuts.  While recorded 
income tax rates were cut—for example, the top-bracket rate was cut from 89% to 
75%,
253—wage and price inflation were so high in the early 1970s that the tax cuts only 
approximately compensated for the effects of bracket creep, so that household income tax 
burden did not fall substantially.  Nor was the corporate tax burden genuinely reduced: 
King’s (1977, p. 78) estimate of the corporate tax rate is essentially static at 40% over 
1970−72, then rises sharply to 49% in 1973. 
 
Rather, the fall in the tax-to-GDP ratio over 1970−73 is a by-product of the Heath 
Government’s nonmonetary approach to inflation control.  A prominent component of 
this approach, as noted earlier, was the policy of holding down nationalized-industry 
prices.  A Treasury official testified in 1980 that this policy led to “a considerable 
acceleration in the public sector borrowing requirement” as “prices got out of line with 
costs” and the Government injected funds to cover the difference.
254 A similar process 
took place in the private sector: government pressure for firms not to pass on higher costs 
                                                                                                                                                 
at an early stage for offsetting its income tax cuts with indirect tax increases.  See Arthur Laffer, “Margaret 
Thatcher’s Tax Increase,” Wall Street Journal, August 20, 1979, page 12. 
251 W.S. Ryrie, “Taxation in Britain,” Wall Street Journal, September 7, 1979, page 18.  Ryrie was a U.K. 
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252 Conservative Party Manifesto “A Better Tomorrow,” May 1970, quoted in Iain Macleod, House of 
Commons Debates, July 7, 1970, pp. 512−513. 
253 Anthony Lewis, “Heath Program Faces Harsh Economic Test,” New York Times, April 26, 1971, pages 
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into higher prices reduced corporate profitability,
255 and this in turn triggered government 
financial assistance to firms, including outright government takeover of some companies 
(such as Rolls Royce in 1971).  The increased subsidies to the private and public sectors 
over this period were generally counted as “negative taxes,” and so reduce the measured 
ratio of taxes to GDP. 
 
The sharp rise in the tax-to-GDP ratio from 1974 reflects the increase in the effective tax 
burden from non-indexation of tax scales to rising inflation; cancellation in 1975 of much 
of the existing system of subsidies;
256 and some explicit tax increases, such as the 
increase in the top marginal tax rate to 83% in 1974.
257 The last of these measures 
remained in force for the remainder of the Labour Government’s term, leading Pechman 
(1980, pp. 207−209) to observe: 
 
  The individual income tax starts at a lower income level and has higher initial starting rates 
in the United Kingdom than in most other countries… The 1978−79 top-bracket rate of 83 
percent on earned income was close to the highest in the world; the top rate of 98 percent on 
investment income was surpassed only in Algeria… The personal exemptions did not keep 
pace with inflation from 1973−74 to 1976−77, and tax rates were raised significantly in 
1974−75 and 1975−76… As a result, between 1973−74 and 1978−79 effective tax rates rose 
in real terms for practically all taxpayers. 
 
Thatcher (1995, p. 573) states that “low marginal tax rates were the goals in the 1980s; 
and they were achieved.”  The Thatcher Government, however, had an ambiguous record 
in reducing taxation.  Thatcher’s economics spokesman, Geoffrey Howe, had said in 
1975 that a top income tax rate of 50 per cent was a desirable goal.
258 When it came to 
office in 1979, however, the top marginal tax rate (on labor income) was reduced to 60% 
rather than 50%.
259 Moreover, it was accompanied by a large increase in indirect tax 
which, together with subsequent tax increases, meant that estimates of the tax on labor 
are actually higher for 1980−87 than 1973−79: 51% compared to 45% (Nickell, 2003, 
Table 2).  As Figure 4 shows, the share of taxes in GDP also rose over this period.  
Further cuts in the top marginal income tax rate did not occur until 1988, when it was 
reduced to its present 40%. 
 
————————————————————————————————— 
255 According to the Midland Bank Review (Winter, 1977), “successive phases of prices and incomes policy 
restricting profits and dividends reinforced the longer-run effects of the declining profitability of capital” 
(“The Paradox of Personal Saving,” pp. 12−18; quotation from page 14). 
256 Geoffrey Howe (in July 28, 1980, testimony in Treasury and Civil Service Committee 1981, p. 185) 
described the Labour Government’s actions in 1975 as canceling the Heath Government’s policy of 
“hold[ing] nationalized industry prices down by means of subsidies.”  In addition, the Government 
withdrew a number of subsidies to food prices it had introduced in 1974. 
257 “Five Years’ Hard Healey,” The Economist (London), April 7, 1979, pp. 76−77. 
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Government spending 
 
As noted above, the Heath Government entered office pledging to “cut out unnecessary 
Government spending,” but after a slight fall in 1970 and 1971, the share of government 
spending in GDP rose by over 6 percentage points in 1971−74 (Figure 3).  The 
spending/GDP ratio subsequently peaked at 48.9% in 1975.  Thereafter, a series of efforts 
were made to tighten the fiscal stance.  Thatcher (1995, p. 569) acknowledges that the 
reductions in real government expenditure undertaken by the Callaghan Government in 
1976 “were significant steps toward the kind of approach in which I believed.”  Indeed, it 
is fair to say that the Thatcher Government’s record on government expenditure did not 
consist of lower spending but instead, amounted to sustaining the reduction in the ratio of 
government spending to GDP achieved by the previous administration.  The Callaghan 
Government reduced government spending from 48.7% of GDP in 1976 to 43.3% in 
1979; the Thatcher Government did not achieve a lower ratio than this until 1988, and in 
1990, Thatcher’s last year in office, it rose to 42.2%. 
 
As Figure 3 shows, the government spending/GDP ratio actually rose for much of 
Thatcher’s first term.  While Thatcher (1995, p. 571) notes that “the deep recession of 
1980/81 pushed [government spending] up,” the fastest-growing category of government 
expenditure in her first term was actually defense spending.
260 Policy decisions made 
prior to the Thatcher Government’s election almost guaranteed that defense spending 
would rise in relation to GDP.  In May 1978, Callaghan committed the U.K. to 3% per 
year real growth in defense expenditures into the early 1980s as part of the NATO 
response to the Soviet military buildup.
261 The Falklands War led to further defense 
expenditures in the financial year 1982/83, as well as reconsideration of planned cutbacks 
within the defense budget.  After Thatcher’s first term, defense spending did fall as a 
fraction of GDP.  Despite this source of decline, government purchases of goods and 
services were actually a slightly higher fraction of GDP in 1987 than in 1979 (Bean and 
Symons, 1989, p. 14). 
 
Deficit reduction and privatization 
 
Slower growth in government outlays in the late 1980s, together with rising receipts from 
the recovery in employment that began in 1986, helped rein in the deficit completely in 
1988−89.  The precise magnitude of the fiscal improvement, however, was overstated in 
the U.K. authorities’ presentation of fiscal aggregates.  In the 1986 Budget, for example, 
————————————————————————————————— 
260 Campbell (2003, p. 170). 
261 James Callaghan, House of Commons Debates, June 6, 1978, pages 29−30.   89
Chancellor Lawson projected a decline in the budget deficit from 10 to 7 billion pounds, 
but 2.5 billion pounds of the recorded reduction was expected to come from sales of 
government assets.
262 This tactic had been earlier deployed by the Callaghan Government 
in 1976 when it announced sales of shares in the government corporation British 
Petroleum.  During the Thatcher Government’s privatization program, concentrated in its 
second and third terms, asset sales became a major source of recorded reductions in 
budget deficits. 
 
One macroeconomic justification for these sales cited by U.K. policymakers in the 1970s 
and 1980s was precisely that they contributed to deficit reduction.  But this particular 
justification is highly questionable, reflected in the refusal by outside commentators such 
as Bean and Symons (1989, p. 17) and Kay and Thompson (1986, p. 27), to regard 
privatization proceeds as cutting the budget deficit.  For one thing, the once-and-for-all 
nature of privatization revenue distinguishes them from ongoing taxation, and it was on 
this basis that former Prime Ministers Macmillan and Heath spoke out in November 1985 
against the Thatcher Government’s treatment of asset sales.
263 But against this criticism 
the Government could argue that privatization proceeds were analogous to windfall taxes 
or temporary taxation; and while temporary tax measures have different effects on private 
behavior than permanent measures, it remains legitimate to count revenue from 
temporary taxes as reducing the budget deficit. 
 
A more fundamental criticism, however, underlay economists’ critique of the official 
treatment of privatization proceeds, and was voiced by Milton Friedman when the British 
Petroleum sales were announced in 1976: “items such as the sale of the British Petroleum 
assets really do not do anything about releasing more resources for the private sector.”
264 
A key motivation for deficit reduction in the 1970s and 1980s was the belief that doing so 
released extra funds in the securities market for existing private-sector projects.
265 But a 
deficit reduction accomplished by privatization sales does not release extra funds, 
because the reduced need for the government to issue securities is exactly offset by the 
————————————————————————————————— 
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substitute of (lump-sum) taxes for bond financing.  But as we will see, privatization revenue should not be 
regarded as a substitute either for tax revenue or government spending reduction; it should therefore be 
rejected as a deficit-reducing measure in both Ricardian and non-Ricardian environments.   90
creation of a new asset (the share in the privatized enterprise) in need of a private 
purchaser.  From this perspective, asset sales should be regarded as equity finance of a 
budget deficit: a substitute for bond finance of the deficit, but not a form of tax revenue. 
 
In fact, the illegitimate treatment of asset sales in 1980s fiscal policy went beyond 
counting them as revenue.  The government spending-to-GDP figures published by the 
U.K. government during the privatization period also need to be treated with suspicion, as 
they counted privatization proceeds as “negative spending” (Bean and Symons, 1989, pp. 
16−17; Keegan, 1989, p. 192).  Consequently, official estimates of government spending 
were artificially deflated over this period.  In her memoirs Thatcher (1995, p. 572) used 
estimates of the U.K. government spending/GDP ratio excluding privatization proceeds, 
apparently conceding that her Government’s accounting practice had been inappropriate. 
 
8C. The 1990s and 2000s  
 
The early 1990s witnessed a return to large budget deficits—over 7 percent of GDP in 
1993.  Official estimates by the U.K. Treasury of the cyclically-adjusted budget balance 
suggest that about 3 percentage points of this deficit was due to the automatic reaction to 
the early 1990s recession.
266 
 
The striking development in the subsequent recovery is less the reduction in the deficit 
that occurred, but the shift to generally lower levels of government spending and taxation 
to GDP in the 1990s compared to prior decades.  Government spending falls continuously 
as a share of GDP during the 1990s recovery, and in the late 1990s falls below 40% of 
GDP, something it never did in the thirty years 1968−97.  Taxation falls below 40% of 
GDP in the early 1990s, and stays below that level until at least 1998.
267 
 
Over this period, the authorities reaffirmed that fiscal policy would no longer be 
employed as an important demand-management weapon.  For example, shortly after 
leaving the post of Chancellor of the Exchequer, Kenneth Clarke, remarked: “The control 
of demand and activity is largely a function of monetary policy, and one sets interest rates 
to hit inflation targets… The aim of fiscal policy is to produce healthy public finances.  
Over the cycle, one aims to ensure that there is not excessive borrowing.  Fiscal policy is 
all about tax and is linked to public spending and borrowing.”
268 Various reforms to the 
————————————————————————————————— 
266 HM Treasury, Public Finances Databank (August, 2004). 
267 The U.K. Treasury’s Public Finances Databank gives a sharper rebound in the tax/GDP ratio in the 
early years of the post-1992 economic recovery than does the U.K. series in the OECD database.  Both 
sources agree that the ratio was well below 1980s levels. 
268 Kenneth Clarke, House of Commons Debates, July 3, 1997, page 448.   91
reporting of public finances by the Blair Government, formalizing the longer-term 
perspective for fiscal policy, are described in Balls and O’Donnell (2001). 
 
Official Treasury estimates give the share of government spending in GDP in 2003−04 at 
40.6%, a rise of 3.5 percentage points above its 1999−2000 trough, but the same share 
prevailing in the final financial year of the Major Government, 1996−97.  By contrast, 
OECD estimates give the share as 43.7% in 2003, a full 6.3 percentage points above its 
2000 trough and 2.4 points above its 1997 level.  Besides differences in methodology and 
data vintage, the discrepancy may be due to the sharp increase in the relative price of 
government output.  The Bank of England’s Inflation Report in May 2004 reported: 
“Since 1997 Q1, nominal government consumption… has risen by 62%.  Over the same 
period the [official] measure of real spending has risen by just 14%, with the implied 
price deflator rising by 42%.  By contrast, the CPI has risen by 10% over that period.”
269 
Consequently, indices of the government-spending-to-GDP share tell different stories, 
depending on whether the spending series used in calculating the share are nominal or 
real. 
 
The Inflation Report suggested that some of the rise in the price of government output 
reflects improvements in quality and unmeasured increases in quantity.
270 If so, future 
data revisions may reallocate some of the rise in nominal government spending between 
prices and output.  But on the basis of what is already known, it appears clear that the fall 
in the government spending to GDP below 40% in the late 1990s has proved transitory 
and that the Government’s share of total resources has increased, though not to the levels 
observed in several years of the 1970s and 1980s. 
 
There are, in addition, several general grounds for preferring expenditure-share ratios 
based on nominal rather than real spending data (see Whelan, 2000).  For the U.K., these 
arguments have been reinforced by the observation (noted by several U.K. policymakers) 
that U.K. nominal expenditure series are revised less drastically than the split of nominal 
spending between real and price components.
271 In light of these arguments, the OECD 
estimates of the government spending to GDP ratio, using nominal data, are more 
————————————————————————————————— 
269 Bank of England, “Measuring the Impact of Government Spending on Inflationary Pressure,” Inflation 
Report (May, 2004), page 24. 
270 A report on the issue, Atkinson Review, Final Report: Measurement of Government Output and 
Productivity for the National Accounts, commissioned by the National Statistician in late 2003, was 
released on January 31, 2005. 
271 See Mervyn King, “The Governor’s Speech at the East Midlands Development Agency,” Bank of 
England Quarterly Bulletin (Winter, 2003), Vol. 43(4), pp. 476−478; Marian Bell, “Monetary Policy, Data 
Uncertainty and the Supply Side: Living with the Statistical Fog,” Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, 
(Winter, 2004), Vol 44(4), pp. 510−521.  See Mahadeva and Muscatelli (2005) for an analysis of these 
revisions.   92
reliable.  Taken at face value, the behavior of this ratio suggests that the role of 
government has been increased from 2000 to 2003 even more drastically than under the 
Heath Government from 1970 to 1974, since the recent period features a 6.3 percentage 
point increase in the government/GDP share, vs. a 5.5 point increase over 1970−74.  Such 
a conclusion, however, would not be appropriate.  As discussed above, much of the 
increase in government spending under Heath took the form of increased subsidies, and 
so was reported as a cut in taxes rather than higher government spending.  And the 
voluntary and compulsory wage and price controls under Heath amounted to a major 
increase in government command over resources that was not recorded in the government 
spending/GDP share. 
 
9.  Productivity and economic growth 
 
Judgments on the U.K.’s economic growth performance in the first quarter-century of the 
postwar period have tended to become less negative over time.  For example, Prime 
Minister Edward Heath was reported in November 1970 as describing his aim as to shift 
from the “weakness of the past 25 years toward a coherent and far more effective national 
performance.”
272 By November 1980, Heath’s position had changed, as he said he was 
“not one who apologizes for that period during the post-war years to the middle of 
1975.”
273 Similarly, a former minister in Heath’s Government, Geoffrey Howe, has said: 




The reason for the changed perspective is the sharp slowdown in GDP and productivity 
growth in 1974−79 compared to the prior U.K. record.  Judged in light of these low 
growth rates, pre-1974 U.K. growth looks impressive.  It also looked favorable compared 
to prewar historical U.K. performance, as was occasionally noted by observers: Paul 
Samuelson, for example, said in 1968 that the U.K. “whom we all pity, has averaged 
faster growth in the postwar era than ever she did in Victoria’s glorious days…”
275 
 
The reason for the frequently negative contemporaneous judgments about postwar U.K. 
growth performance is that it was less favorable than that of European competitors.  
————————————————————————————————— 
272 Quoted in Associated Press, “Heath Outlines Goals,” Kansas City Times, November 26, 1970, page 9D. 
273 Edward Heath, House of Commons Debates, November 27, 1980, page 603.  More recently, Heath has 
partially returned to his 1970 position, describing the pre-1973 period as one of “economic and political 
decline” which was reversed, although with a lag of “ten or more years,” by his bringing the U.K. into the 
European Union (then the EEC).  See Edward Heath, “The Fanatics in the Conservative Party Risk 
Everything We Have Gained,” The Independent on Sunday (London), December 29, 2002, page 18. 
274 Howe (1994, p. 162). 
275 Paul Samuelson, “The French Galbraith,” Newsweek, July 22, 1968, page 73.   93
While some defenders of the U.K. record attribute the higher European growth purely to 
recovery of wartime output losses (e.g. Thatcher, 2002, pp. 363−364), this explanation is 
inadequate since, as has been frequently pointed out, the levels of output per person in 




On the other hand, the 1980s and 1990s did not see much further deterioration in the 
U.K.’s relative position.  For example, Prescott (2004, Table 1) reports that the U.K.’s 
output per person was 67% of the U.S. level in 1970−74 and 68% in 1993−96.  The end 
of the period of severe deterioration reflects both productivity and employment 
developments.  Bean and Symons (1989, p. 15) report a productivity growth rate of 2.2% 
per annum for the Thatcher government's first nine years in office.  The revised data that 
we use to compute productivity continue to give 2.2% as the annual U.K. productivity 
growth rate for 1979 Q2−1988 Q4.  If we start the sample in 1981 Q1, representing the 
point at which the 1980s economic recovery began, and also update the sample, 
productivity growth continues to record some reversal of the post-1973 slowdown: 2% 
average annual productivity growth for 1981−2002 compared to 1.4% for 1974−79.  
Within this average, productivity growth is above 2% in the 1980s and somewhat below 
2% in the recovery that began in 1992.
277 The failure of productivity to exhibit a pickup 
in the 1990s compared to the 1980s has led to initiatives by the U.K. authorities to 
encourage further innovation by U.K. firms, and in particular to efforts to emulate the 
revival of productivity growth observed in the U.S. 
 
Actual GDP growth in the U.K. has averaged a higher level in the present recovery than 
in the post-1981 period as a whole, because faster growth in employment has 
compensated for the slower growth in productivity.  U.K. unemployment rates in the 
2000s are close to mid-1970s levels.  Estimates of the natural rate of unemployment 
roughly track the movements in actual U.K. unemployment, including its sharp rise 
during the 1970s and first half of the 1980s, and sharp fall since 1993.  It would be 
inappropriate, however, to interpret recent declines in the natural rate as simply winding 
back the supply-side deterioration that caused the rise in the natural rate in the 1970s and 
1980s.  To see this, it is useful to consider the interpretation offered by Allan Meltzer in 
1981: “For many years people were unemployed, but no one knew it.  They were hidden 
away in British Leyland, British Steel, British Airways.  These firms were subsidized in 
part to hide unemployment, to keep workers in the labor force.  Mrs. Thatcher took away 
————————————————————————————————— 
276 See e.g. Caves (1980, p. 136) and Prescott (2004, Table 1). 
277 The most recent complete calendar year of the recovery, 2004, exhibited a notably better productivity 
growth rate than this average.   94
some of the subsidies, so the workers are now counted as unemployed.”
278 
 
Removals of subsidies took place not only in the early 1980s but in 1975, and were 
followed by the major privatization programs of the mid-1980s.  If Meltzer’s 
interpretation is valid, then examination of natural-rate estimates understates the effects 
of supply-side improvements on unemployment.  Let the status quo in 1975 be a natural 
rate of unemployment of ua, which is artificially low because of unemployment being 
hidden by subsidies.  Removal of subsidies then raised the natural rate to ub > ua, while 
supply-side deterioration raised it further to uc > ub by the mid-1980s.  The past two 
decades then saw the natural rate fall back to ua, but without recourse to subsidies.  
Because it has emerged without resort to artificial measures to keep unemployment low, 
present rates of unemployment reflect a stronger supply-side situation than did the same 
unemployment rates in the 1970s. 
 
The present emphasis on productivity growth as the main source for further supply-side 
improvement is nevertheless understandable, since the large fall in unemployment has 
reduced the scope for further growth in output per person that can come from 
employment growth alone. 
 
10.  Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we have provided a retrospective on U.K. macroeconomic policy in the last 
50 years.  As we stressed in the introduction, the U.K. economy over this period is of 
special interest because of the multiplicity of monetary policy regimes that have been 
deployed.  We have, however, not arranged our discussion strictly by regime.  In large 
part, this is because subsequent developments often diminish the significance of what 
initially appears to be a major regime change.  For example, the adoption of domestic 
credit targets in 1969 and monetary targets in 1976 proved not to be major regime 
changes, because the U.K. authorities continued to emphasize incomes policy and to 
carry out easy monetary policy after the targets were adopted.  The 1972 floating of the 
exchange rate was not a major break in policy behavior because it was simply a by-
product of a domestic monetary expansion that had already been in place for over a year.  
The Thatcher Government’s announcement of a “Medium-Term Financial Strategy” in 
1980 was not an important regime change because it enshrined a link between monetary 
and fiscal policy which was fallacious and which the Government did not let determine 
its subsequent decisions, and because the Government within a year shifted its emphasis 
from broad money to the monetary base as the measure of money. 
————————————————————————————————— 
278 Quoted in JMCB (1982, p. 141).   95
The 1992 shift to inflation targeting does qualify as a major regime change, but it is 
nevertheless undesirable to divide the U.K. policy record into two eras, inflation targeting 
and pre-inflation targeting.  This is because changing views by policymakers about the 
importance of monetary policy, a process which took place roughly from 1970 onward, 
made possible the eventual adoption of inflation targeting.  There were essentially three 
steps to this process in the U.K.  The first was the acceptance of monetary policy as the 
key tool for managing aggregate demand; this acceptance took place in the early 1970s.  
The second was the shaking-off of cost-push views of inflation in favor of a monetary 
view, allowing monetary policy to become the government’s anti-inflation weapon; this 
shift occurred in 1979.  The third was the discarding of ineffective monetary policy 
instruments, which had given U.K. policymakers the false notion that they could alter the 
stance of monetary policy without affecting short-term interest rates or the monetary 
base.  This process culminated with the abandonment of overfunding in 1985.  And as the 
role of monetary policy became clearer and more coherent in the U.K., the role of central 
bankers also shifted, from the “City Syndrome” era emphasis on responsibility for 
financial-market psychology, to the ability to make technical judgments regarding 
macroeconomic developments. 
 
The abandonment of nonmonetary views of aggregate demand and inflation 
determination also had important ramifications for the conduct of U.K. fiscal policy.  The 
nonmonetary approach not only led to a misplaced confidence in fiscal activism in the 
1950s and 1960s, but to the use of fiscal measures as remedies for cost-push inflation: for 
example, the attempts to hold down prices via subsidies in 1970−74, and attempts at 
wage/tax trade-offs over 1974−79.  The casting-off of cost-push views of inflation was a 
precondition for fiscal policy to be assigned a longer-term role, while the acceptance of 
the importance of monetary policy for demand management has also diminished 
policymakers’ interest in short-term fiscal adjustments.  96
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